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After a long period of single party government at Westminster, significant parts of the UK – 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales – are now administered by coalition governments.  
There remains the possibility, too, of electoral reform at the centre which, if followed through, 
would increase the likelihood of coalition politics at Westminster.  It is thus a propitious 
moment to examine the dynamics of coalition government.  This is particularly the case since 
the introduction of power sharing administrations raises a host of practical issues for policy 
makers.  The principal issues for consideration are: 
 
The role of elections 
• If governments are only formed through inter-party bargaining, how do voters know 
what their ballot will mean for government formation? 
• If governments comprise two or more parties sharing power, how can voters identify 
responsibility for government activities? 
 
The constitutional rules covering government formation and termination 
• Where no one party commands a majority of seats after an election, which party should 
take the lead in forming a government?  
• Is it necessary for an incoming government to demonstrate that it commands a minimum 
level of parliamentary support and, if so, what should this level be? 
• Under multi-party conditions, when can a prime minister gain a dissolution of 
parliament? 
• Under what rules should inter-party bargaining take place? 
• What rules might be required to cover the operation of interim, or ‘caretaker’, 
governments? 
• Overall, how adequate are the UK’s existing constitutional rules on government formation 
and termination?  Are any modifications to, or clarifications of, these rules required?  
 
Negotiating a government 
• By what process do parties usually bargain with one another to form a government? 
• What resources do the parties draw on in negotiating a new government? 
• How long should the negotiating process take, and should it be subject to time limits to 
prevent delay?  
 
The coalition agreement 
• How far do the written agreements made by the parties shape the subsequent activities of 
coalition governments? 
• What kind of agreement best underpins the effective operation of a coalition government?  
In particular, what should be the balance between detailed commitments and flexibility? 
 
Coalition management 
• What methods are used by coalitions to coordinate their activities?  What is the balance 
between informal and formal mechanisms? 
• How far do coalitions weaken the operation of collective responsibility? 
• What role does the junior partner play in coalition management, and what resources does 









• How are the dynamics of coalition government affected by a decentralised political 
system? 
 
This report examines these, and other important, issues associated with the transition from 
single party to coalition government.  The research is based on study visits undertaken in four 
overseas countries: Denmark, Germany, Ireland and New Zealand.  Across these locations, a 
total of seventy interviews were carried out with government ministers, other politicians, civil 
servants, political advisers and commentators. 
 
The aim of the report is to extend the awareness among policy makers in the UK of the 
methods by which coalitions in other countries are formed, operate and terminate.  The report 
both describes and evaluates these arrangements, with a view to enhancing knowledge and 
identifying possible options for policy reform in the UK.  Readers who want a brief precis of 
the findings and recommendations for each set of issues set out above will find them in the 
‘Conclusion’ at the end of each chapter.  A short policy briefing on the issues contained in this 








The distinction between single party and coalition government 
The United Kingdom has, for a long time, been one of the main exemplars of the ‘majoritarian’ 
system of democracy.  The principal feature of this model is that executive power tends to be 
held by a single party and not shared between parties (Lijphart, 1999).  By contrast, 
governments in many other countries are formed by two or more parties in coalition.  It is true 
that, for a significant part of the twentieth century, the UK has been governed by coalition 
administrations (Figure 1).  But this experience has always taken place in the context either of 
wartime or economic crisis or as a prelude to mergers between political parties (Bogdanor, 
1983: 10-12).  Two or more parties have never come together to share power outside these 
circumstances.  Moreover, all the examples of coalition occurred prior to 1945. 
 
 
Figure 1: Single party and coalition governments in Britain, 1900-2000 
Notes 
Positive value = single party government 
Negative value = coalition government 
Source: Butler, 1986: 36-7; updated by the author 
 
 
As of 1999, however, government in the UK is no longer dominated by the single party model.  
The first elections to the Scottish Parliament were followed by the formation of a coalition 
between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  The Northern Ireland Assembly is also governed 
by a coalition, this time of four parties under a prescribed power sharing arrangement.  The 
Welsh Assembly was initially overseen by a minority single party administration, but this 
lasted only a year and a half, at which point Labour formed a coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats to give the government a majority in the Assembly.  At Westminster, too, there is 
the possibility of reforming the electoral system in a way that would make coalition 
governments a more normal feature of our politics.  The report of the ‘Independent 
Commission on the Voting System’, chaired by Lord Jenkins, proposed a semi-proportional 









































administrations (Jenkins, 1998).  At the time of writing, the Jenkins Report has made little 
progress, and the chances of electoral reform for Westminster appear slim.  But coalition 
politics in the UK no longer depends on the possibility of electoral reform for Westminster; it 
can now be seen in action in Scotland, Wales (see Box 1 for a précis of coalition formation in 
these two areas) and Northern Ireland.   
 
The differences between single party and coalition governments raise a host of important 
normative questions.  These tend to contrast the identifiability, clarity and capacity to govern 
of single party administrations with the representativeness and fairness of coalition 
administrations (Powell, 2000: 3-20).  It is not my purpose in this report to tackle these issues 
(although Chapter 2 considers various normative issues related to coalitions and elections), 
nor to take a view on whether coalition governments are superior or inferior to their single 
party counterparts.  What I do address are some of the more practical consequences of 
moving to power sharing executives.  The assumption underlying the report is that a shift to 
coalition administrations brings with it different forms of behaviour on the part of political 
parties, new methods of operating for cabinet government and, potentially, new constitutional 
rules covering government formation and termination.  The rest of this report identifies these 
differences, examines their implications and, where potential problems arise, suggests 
appropriate remedies. 
 
The report does not suggest that a change from single party to multi-party rule completely 
changes the rules of the political game and the way that political actors operate.  Governments 
in any one country may shift between the two models with only limited adjustments to 
administrative and institutional structures.  Differences in the way that governments operate 
are often the product of countries’ political cultures rather than variations in government 
forms (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993a: 10-11).  And single party and coalition 
governments are not wholly distinct models, but rather two points on a continuum.  As two 
comparative scholars note: 
 
“Governments are not only of the single party or of the coalition type: they have, in a 
sense more or less of a coalition character, as coalitions can be more or less extreme, more 
or less ideologically diverse, and composed of partners who are more or less equal” 











The May 1999 elections gave Labour the largest share of seats, at 43% of the total 129.  
Through the long campaign for the Scottish Parliament, Labour had forged good relations 
with the Liberal Democrats, and it was no surprise when the latter, with 13% of the seats, 
negotiated with Labour to form a majority (‘minimum winning’) coalition.  The negotiations 
lasted for just five days, resulting in a 12 page Programme for Government.  The day before the 
agreement was signed, elections for the First Minister were held in the Parliament, with 
Donald Dewar being supported by Labour and the Liberal Democrats and gaining 71 votes 
out of a possible 129.  In a cabinet of eleven ministers, the Liberal Democrats gained two 
portfolios, justice/home affairs and agriculture, with their leader, Jim Wallace, becoming 
deputy First Minister.  The Liberal Democrats also gained control of two of the eleven junior 
ministerial posts. 
 
Following Donald Dewar’s death in October 2000, the Labour party selected Henry McLeish 
as its leader.  McLeish was subsequently elected First Minister by parliament later that month, 
gaining 68 votes in a four way contest.  This succession did not affect the Liberal Democrats’ 
representation in cabinet.  McLeish resigned in November 2001 over a financial scandal, being 
replaced as First Minister by the former Education Minister, Jack McConnell, who gained 70 
votes in parliament in a four way contest.  Again, this transition did not affect the Liberal 




Unlike in Scotland, Labour had expected to win a majority of seats in the Welsh Assembly, 
and was not prepared for the results of the election in 1999.  In the event, Labour gained 47% 
of seats, and decided to govern alone as a minority administration.  However, this meant 
yielding power in the Assembly, first on the post of Speaker, which went to Plaid Cymru, and 
also on committees, with only two of the six gaining a Labour chair.  The administration also 
had to negotiate to get its legislative programme passed, introducing compromises such as the 
reintroduction of free eye tests as a condition of gaining Plaid Cymru’s support for its first 
budget.  However, the executive’s strategy, of forging ad hoc agreements with whichever 
party would support it, was criticised for being too secretive.  For the executive itself, the 
inability to introduce a longer term legislative agenda became a source of frustration.  The 
opposition’s power was demonstrated in February 2000, when it unseated the First Secretary, 
Alun Michael, in a vote of no confidence. 
 
The Labour group elected Rhodri Morgan as Michael’s successor, with Morgan subsequently 
being elected unopposed as First Secretary.  But the Labour administration was still forced to 
negotiate on its legislative programme, with Plaid Cymru getting some of its own policy 
commitments into the administration’s policy programme, A Better Wales, in return for its 
support. 
 
However, this model was not seen as allowing for effective government, and in October 2000, 
following two months of secret negotiations, Labour and the Liberal Democrats announced 
the formation of a majority (‘minimum winning’) coalition.  Under the deal, secured by a 25 
page agreement, the Liberal Democrats gained two of the nine portfolios, including the key 
economic development post.  Their leader, Michael German, was made Deputy First 
Secretary.  The junior partner also gained one of the five deputy secretary posts. 
 
Source: The country chapters in Hazell (2000), as well as ongoing monitoring of devolution in Scotland and Wales, 
available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ 
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Nonetheless, significant practical and normative differences do exist between single party and 
coalition governments.  The easiest way to highlight some of these practical variations is to 
follow the coalition government process, beginning with the formation of an administration, 
continuing with its operation and ending with its termination.  Within each part of the process 
lie key sub-areas: the role of elections, negotiating a coalition, forging an agreement, 
managing relations between the parties and the rules covering the ending of a government.  
The following section examines each sub-area briefly, raising a set of issues or ‘pressure 













The role of elections 
Majoritarian electoral systems encourage two party electoral competition which in turn 
promotes single party governments.  In such conditions, it is normally clear to voters prior to 
the election what their vote will mean for government formation.  Voters can thus use their 
ballot to determine the government that gets formed after the election.  By contrast, under 
proportional electoral conditions, party competition is more fragmented and it is less likely 
that a single party will gain an outright majority of seats.  In these conditions, governments 
are often formed only after post-election haggling, with voters potentially having little sense 
of what their ballot will mean for government formation.  As described in Chapter 1, this 
feature of proportional electoral systems is held by some to weaken the power of voters over 
government formation.  The two key questions that need to be considered in such a multi-
party context are (a) how can voters be given a clearer role in government formation, and (b) 
how can voters identify responsibility for government activities when coalitions involve two 
or more parties sharing power? 
 
Formation and termination rules 
Under Westminster’s current arrangements, the rules covering the formation and termination 
of governments are rarely tested.  After an election, one party tends to hold a majority of 
legislative seats, and can thus form a government.  It remains in office until it no longer 
commands parliament’s support, which is usually dependent on election results not on 
shifting allegiances within the legislature.  In between elections, a government can usually 
gain a dissolution of parliament since this is held to be the wish of the majority in parliament.  
But under multi-party conditions, the ambiguities in the rules become starker.  In particular, 
in a situation when no one party has gained a majority of seats, which party should take the 
lead in forming a government?  What level of parliamentary support must a party command 
to be installed as a government?  And in what circumstances can a prime minister gain a 
dissolution of parliament?  These questions suggest that, at the very least, the application of 
the existing constitutional rules needs to be clarified; or it may that a new set of rules to cover 










considers the function of external agents (notably the Head of State) in the formation process 
and the role of ‘caretaker’ governments, the administrations responsible for ‘holding the fort’ 
while a new government is being formed. 
 
Underlying these specific questions are two more general issues.  The first asks whether the 
parties be allowed a free rein when it comes to negotiating a new government or whether 
some constraints on their behaviour are necessary in order to generate more optimal 
outcomes?  Constraints may serve to limit the bargaining power of some parties – particularly 
small ones – and prevent them from playing off other parties to extract the maximum possible 
advantage.  Constraints, or rules, may also help prevent deadlock in the formation process.  
The second issue is whether new constitutional rules are needed to underpin the stability of 
coalition governments, since these tend to be less durable than single party majority 
administrations.  In covering these issues, Chapter 2 examines how far constitutional rules 
that are appropriate in the context of single party governments remain so in the context of 
coalition administrations. 
 
Negotiating a government 
When governments are formed by single parties, no delay is necessary when one 
administration falls and another is formed.  Thus, following government defeats at 
Westminster elections, the removal vans are usually parked at the prime minister’s residence 
the day after the contest to remove the incumbent and install his/her successor.  But in multi-
party conditions, elections may not be ‘decisive’ and governments may only be formed 
following a process of inter-party bargaining.  These negotiations, along with the formal 
written agreement to which they usually give rise, is the most obvious visible difference 
between single party and coalition administrations, and is dealt with in Chapter 3. 
 
Compared to the almost instantaneous government formation process under single party 
conditions, the negotiations usually necessary for multi-party governments may take weeks or 
even months to complete.  This raises the question of whether explicit or implicit time limits 
should be placed on the government formation process to prevent it dragging on and putting 
the ‘caretaker’ under undue strain.  On the other hand, whereas individual parties may take 
months or even years to draw up detailed election manifestos, which then serve as the basis 
for decisions in government, proto-coalitions have only a relatively short period of time in 
which to decide what their programme for government will look like.  Far from being too 
long, then, the coalition formation process may be a tight squeeze, raising the question of how 
the bargaining process should best be conducted and what resources the parties should be 
able to draw on.  
 
The coalition agreement 
Under single party conditions, the government programme of the victorious party is its 
election manifesto.  Under multi-party conditions, the winning parties must compromise on 
their manifestos and pool their commitments in a common programme for government, 
which usually takes the form of an explicit agreement.  To the extent that this agreement 
shapes the subsequent behaviour of the coalition, the question arises of what form it should 






Government under single party conditions involves the constant coordination, negotiation 
and compromise between individual ministers and between party factions.  It might be 
thought that coalitions, which involve an additional layer of interaction between, rather than 
just within, parties merely increase intra-governmental activity rather than changing its 
nature.  But, in simplified terms, the two models differ since, under single party conditions all 
the main actors stand or fall together, while under coalition conditions either partner may 
benefit by breaking the agreement and going it alone.  Coalitions thus tend to be less cohesive 
than single party governments, all things being equal.  To overcome this problem, coalitions 
often establish elaborate mechanisms to ensure coordination and agreement between the 
partners.  What models can be identified, and how effective are they?  How far do they really 
allow coalitions to function as unified governments?  How far is collective responsibility, the 
mainstay of cabinet government under single party conditions, maintained and how far do 
the realities of power sharing induce weaker collective obligations?  The analysis of different 
coordination arrangements is undertaken in Chapter 5. 
 
Other issues for consideration: Minority governments and sub-national coalitions 
Under multi-party conditions, parties will often secure majority status by forming coalitions 
with one another.  But an alternative is for one or more parties to take office with only a 
minority of seats and to attract support from other parties in the legislature.  I don’t deal in 
this report with the principal analytical question this throws up, of why minority 
governments might be formed.  Chapter 6 only deals with the more practical issue of what 
strategies are open to, and used by, minority governments to secure their legislative 
programme.  In examining the tactics of minority governments, the chapter touches on how 
far different approaches underpin stability and what implications these have for government 
accountability. 
 
It should be remembered that parts of the UK are not only experiencing coalition politics, but 
are also doing so in the context of a decentralised political system.  This means that coalition 
formation and management must not only factor in considerations of party behaviour and 
constitutional rules, but also the role of other tiers of government and party structure.  In 
Chapter 7, I examine the impact that devolution has on coalition dynamics. 
 
A summary of the specific issues and more general thematic issues, or ‘pressure points’, 





Table 1: The transition to coalition government: Key questions 
 
 






General thematic question 
 
   
Election How do voters know when casting the 
ballot which post-election coalition 
options are likely? 
 
How can prospective and retrospective 
accountability be provided for under coalition 
conditions? 
 How can voters identify policy 
responsibility when government 




Formation and termination By what rules governments form, hold 
and lose office? 
 
How can the constitutional rules be fair across the 
parties and also allow for an effective formation 
process? 
 
 Under what rules should the 
negotiations be conducted? 
 
Should the parties be constrained in the way they 
are allowed to negotiate to form a government? 
 
 What role does the Head of State, or 
other external agent, play in government 
formation and termination? 
 
Are additional safeguards needed to ensure the 
stability of coalition governments? 
 




Negotiations What are the key features of the 
negotiating process? 
 
What timescales and resources are needed for 
parties to conduct effective policy negotiations ? 
 




Agreement What level of detail is usual in coalition 
agreements? 
 
What kind of agreement most effectively 
underpins stable and effective coalitions? 
 
 To what extent does the agreement 




Coalition management What balance should be struck between 
informal and formal coordination 
mechanisms? 
 
How can two or more parties sharing office 
coordinate their business so that they operate as a 
unified government? 
 
 How far can portfolios be used as a tool 
of coalition management? 
 
 
 Within the constraints of collective 
responsibility, what arrangements are 
made for party differentiation? 
 
How far is collective responsibility maintained 
under coalition conditions? 
 
 What role does the junior partner play?  
What resources does it require? 
 
 
Minority government What strategies do minority 
administrations use to gain support in 
the legislature? 
 
Are minority governments prone to instability?  
How far is the identifiability of government 
maintained under minority conditions? 
 
Sub-national coalitions  What opportunities and constraints exist when 









Thus, in answer to the question of what difference power sharing administrations would 
make, this report builds on the observations of one British commentator, that coalition 
“cannot be understood unless it is recognised as a specific type of government with its own 
conventions and rules, all flowing from the fundamental principle of power sharing” 
(Bogdanor, 1983a: 263).  Another has argued that “There is no change that would have more 
far reaching implications for [Britain’s] political system than for hung parliaments to become 
the norm” (Butler, 1986: 16-17).  This report examines some of these implications. 
 
It is one thing to suggest that the transition to coalition government raises major questions for 
a country’s constitutional and political system.  It is another to argue that these issues cannot 
simply be accommodated by ad hoc changes to the existing system.  Clearly, to some extent, 
they can; coalitions have been introduced in Scotland and Wales with relatively little 
contingency planning (certainly in the latter case) and, with the exception of some hiccups, the 
adaptation does not appear to have thrown up too many problems.  But such benign 
outcomes are wholly dependent on the foresight, mutual trust and restraint of the major 
actors, notably civil servants and politicians.  In circumstances where these conditions are 
absent, the outcome can be far less healthy.  To take one recent example, in 1996 New Zealand 
changed its electoral system from single member plurality to a variant of the Additional 
Member system (’Mixed Member Proportional’, or MMP, in New Zealand).  The old system 
had tended to yield single party governments, while the new system was designed in part to 
produce power sharing between the parties.  Yet, in spite of extensive preparation, the 
transition was not a success.  The formation of the first coalition was a drawn out affair, and 
produced a result that few voters expected, leading to an unpopular government.  The 
coalition also lacked internal cohesion and suffered from poor management and personality 
clashes.  When the government fell, just twenty months after having been formed, it 
represented merely the final part in a catalogue of mistakes that eroded voters’ support for the 
electoral system and the country’s democratic process (Karp and Bowler, 2001).  It would be 
unwise to assume that any transition to coalition government at the UK level would 
necessarily avoid similar teething problems. 
 
It is thus important that policy makers new to coalition government reflect on, and prepare 
for, the different conditions that power sharing administrations bring with them.  What 
sources of information might they draw on in undertaking these tasks? 
 
 
Sources of policy learning 
 
Learning from within: Coalition government in the UK 
I noted above that the UK has had fairly extensive experience of coalition government in the 
twentieth century.  However, these examples date from at least fifty or so years ago and, while 
they highlight some of the ambiguities latent in our constitutional rules, provide little 
practical guidance for how coalitions might operate in more contemporary political 
conditions.  More useful lessons can be gleaned from the last time that a minority 
administration had to systematically draw on the support of another party, the Lib-Lab pact 
of 1977-78.  We can learn from this episode that the main collective forum, cabinet, was, 
indeed, downgraded as decisions were taken in small meetings of the party leaders.  The ‘top 
down’ nature of the collaboration between the parties was one of its weak points, since 
important actors outside the elite group, notably the parliamentary parties, were not 
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committed to its success and subsequently brought it down (Steel, 1980: 156; Hennessy and 
Masani, 1992: 8).  However, the Lib-Lab pact has so far been a one-off, limiting the extent to 
which we can draw general lessons for power sharing situations.  And it should be 
remembered that the pact was an example of minority government, not coalition government 
proper, since the Liberals were never formally brought into government.  The experience thus 
hints at various considerations that will need to be taken into account should Westminster 
move to coalition government, but it hardly provides a rich source of information. 
 
Nor can we glean much from other tiers of government.  True, around one third of Britain’s 
local authorities are currently ‘hung’, with no one party holding a majority of seats (Leach and 
Game, 2000).  As a result, local councils have good experience of power sharing arrangements 
and minority administrations.  But these arrangements tend to fall short of formal coalitions, 
since they usually involve the partners sharing the rewards of office (committee chairs) but 
not a common policy programme with structured coordination mechanisms.  Formal 
coalitions are far rarer than power sharing arrangements, although they may be getting more 
common (Temple, 1999).  Moreover, until recently, local authorities had no provision for 
executive cabinets, and therefore any power sharing was organised on a decentralised basis – 
through the committee system – rather than through a single central executive body.  The 
infrequency of formal coalitions at the local tier, plus local authorities’ very different 
institutional set-up, suggest that this level of government has only limited relevance to the 
national and regional tiers. 
 
Learning from overseas 
An alternative approach is to look further afield at overseas countries, where the incidence of 
coalition administrations at the national level is greater.  One source of information is the 
voluminous secondary literature on coalition government.  One of the major branches of 
research and writing within political science over the last few decades has concerned itself 
with multi-party bargaining in coalition situations.  Yet much of this research is highly 
theoretical, being concerned primarily to explain how different forms of coalition are formed 
in the first place rather than how they operate in practice.  Recently,  a body of work has 
appeared that has more relevance for policy makers, focusing as it does on the way that 
institutional variables influence government formation (see Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994).  
Comparative research also includes a greater empirical element, since the particularities of a 
country’s constitutional and political system are now held to be an important part of 
explaining coalition behaviour.  Notable in this respect is a recent edited collection of case 
studies from thirteen west European countries, which painstakingly records how coalitions 
form, operate and terminate (Müller and Strøm, 2000).  This volume is an extremely useful 
source of information and data, as will be evident from its numerous citations in this report. 
 
But short case studies can only convey a limited amount of information, and they are 
essentially descriptive rather than analytical.  Sometimes, the data from case studies is 
brought together in a more comparative focus.1  But these accounts often operate at a high 
level of generality, and rarely attempt to pass judgements on the coalition arrangements they 
describe.  Their focus tends to be explanatory rather than evaluative.  While explanation helps 
us understand what impact different variables have on political behaviour and outcomes, it is 
less good at addressing the relative merits of the different coalition models on offer. 
 
                                                     
1 The volume of country case studies just referred to is shortly to be followed by a more analytical 
volume (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, forthcoming). 
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It is perhaps not surprising that the academic literature rarely engages in evaluation, since 
there is little demand for lesson learning among west European countries, which tend to have 
long experience of coalition government.  We have to look further afield for such demand.  A 
good example is New Zealand which, in 1996, changed its electoral system to a proportional 
model (MMP), and engaged in serious preparation for the transition to multi-party 
government.  Changes that were foreseen included the need for specific mechanisms to 
manage and coordinate coalitions, a reduction in the power of the prime minister as a result of 
having to share power with one or more parties, the need to ensure balanced representation 
on cabinet sub-committees and an increase in the time taken to make decisions due to the 
requirement for greater consultation between the coalition partners.  On the administrative 
side, civil servants would be faced with longer periods of uncertainty as new governments 
were formed after elections, and with the need to accommodate inter-party politics in their 
departmental policy role (Boston et al, 1996: 116-51).  The preparations undertaken to meet 
these challenges included systematic planning by teams of civil servants (James, 1997), 
overseas visits by officials and parliamentarians (Shroff, 1994; State Services Commission, 
1995) and a wave of academic research.2  As part of this academic endeavour, detailed 
analyses were made of coalition arrangements in various European countries, leading to 
evaluations of the different models and their applicability to New Zealand.  The most 
comprehensive of these lesson drawing exercises (Boston, 1998) is a thorough yet accessible 
volume that will repay study in the UK’s context.  The references to this book in my report are 
an indication of my debt to its author and his research. 
 
The existence of a body of research and information in New Zealand, while helpful for policy 
makers in the UK, may not fully exhaust their needs.  For a start, much of the literature 
focuses on overcoming the instability New Zealand faced after the formation of its first post-
MMP coalition government, a situation not necessarily applicable in the UK.  Second, while 
New Zealand shares many political features with the UK, it also exhibits noticeable 
differences.  The main distinction is its unitary status, a factor of its small territorial and 
population size.  The UK is a far larger country, with a newly decentralised political system in 
which coalitions at the sub-national tier must interact with a powerful tier of government at 
Westminster.  This is an important consideration for the new coalitions in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, yet is a dimension wholly missing from New Zealand. 
 
The existing secondary literature – in its theoretical, empirical and comparative guises – 
represents a good source of information for policy makers in the UK, but without providing 
either the detail or evaluation or specific political context that is arguably required.  This 
report draws widely on this literature, but attempts to fill the gap by building in an original 
programme of research in four overseas countries. 
                                                     
2 These preparations paid off.  In spite of the widespread concerns in New Zealand that MMP would 
induce substantial dislocation in the operation of government, the administrative system appears to 
have adjusted well to the change (contrast this with the behaviour of the politicians which, as noted 
above, seriously damaged the standing of the new electoral system and power sharing government).  
This is due in part to the adaptability of the country’s officials, but also reflects the extensive 
preparations undertaken prior to the switch (Shroff, 1998).  Undoubtedly, if these preparations had not 
taken place, the administrative system in New Zealand would have faced the difficulties in adapting to 
coalition politics that the political parties did.  The systematic nature of the planning process and the 
openness to learn from more mature coalition models in other countries is a model of how policy 




The country case studies 
The countries examined in this report are Germany, Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand.  All 
are ‘parliamentary’ systems, in which executive authority is drawn from an elected legislature 
rather than being the subject of a separate vote.  Moreover, in each, the executive holds office 
only with the support of the legislature, thus being distinct from systems (eg. Switzerland) in 
which the legislature cannot dismiss the executive.  The study countries also share reasonably 
similar party systems to that in the UK, since they are broadly unidimensional (oriented 
around a single ideological structure) rather than multidimensional (with a more complex set 
of ‘cleavages’ structuring party competition) (Budge and Laver, 1992). 
 
Table 2 shows the patterns of government in the four study countries over the last thirty 
years.  It can quickly be seen that the experience of coalition government varies between 
country.  Germany has a well developed system of coalition government; more than nine in 
ten governments formed during the twentieth century have involved two or more parties 
(Müller and Strøm, 2000: 2).  Both Denmark and Ireland have relatively mature coalition 
systems, although coalition has only become the norm in Ireland since 1989, when the 
dominant party, Fianna Fail, ended its moratorium on sharing power.  New Zealand has a 
more limited experience of coalition government, dating only from the mid-1990s.  This range 
in the maturity of coalition administrations allows the research to explore both the short term 
implications of a shift to power sharing governments (New Zealand) as well as assessing the 









   Germany  
Year 
 
Government PM  Year Government PM 
 SD SD   SPD-FDP SPD 
1973* Lib Lib  1972* SPD-FDP SDP 
1975* SD SD  1976* SPD-FDP SPD 
1977* SD SD  1980* SPD-FDP SPD 
1978 SD-Lib SD  1982 SDP SPD 
1979* SD SD   CDU-CSU-FDP CDU 
1981* SD SD  1983* CDU-CSU-FDP CDU 
1982 Con-Lib-CD-CPP Con  1987* CDU-CSU-FDP CDU 
1984* Con-Lib-CD-CPP Con  1990 CDU-CSU-FDP CDU 
1987* Con-Lib-CD-CPP Con  1991* CDU-CSU-FDP CDU 
1988* Con-Lib-RL Con  1994* CDU-CSU-FDP CDU 
1990* Con-Lib Con  1998* SPD-Green SPD 
1993 SD-CD-RL-CPP SD     
1994* SD-CD-RL SD     
1996 SD-RL SD     
1998* SD-RL SD     




CD Centre Democrats  CDU Christian Democratic Union 
Con Conservatives  CSU Christian Social Union 
CPP Christian People’s Party  FDP Free Democrats 
Lib Liberals  SPD Social Democrats 
RL Social Liberals    





   New Zealand  
Year 
 
Government PM  Year Government PM 
 FF FF   Nat Nat 
1973* FG-Lab FG  1972* Lab Lab 
1977* FF FF  1975* Nat Nat 
1981* FG-Lab FG  1978* Nat Nat 
1982* FF FF  1981* Nat Nat 
 FG-Lab FG  1984* Lab Lab 
1987* FF FF  1987* Lab Lab 
1989* FF-PD FF  1990* Nat Nat 
1992 FF-PD FF  1993* Nat Nat 
1993* FF-Lab FF  1994 Nat-RoC Nat 
1994 FG-Lab-DL FG  1995 Nat Nat 
1997* FF-PD FF  1996 Nat-Uni Nat 
            * Nat-NZF Nat 
    1998 Nat-Ind Nat 
    1999* Lab-All Lab 
 
DL Democratic Left  All Alliance 
FF Fianna Fáil  Ind Independent 
FG Fine Gael  Lab Labour 
Lab Labour  Nat National 
PD Progressive Democrats  NZF New Zealand First 
   RoC Right of Centre 
   Uni United New Zealand 
 
*    Government formed after an election 
Bold Majority status 
 
 
The study countries were also selected for some specific features they exhibit and that are 
relevant for coalitions in the UK context.  The first is the experience of minority 
administrations, where Denmark is clearly the European leader; in the forty years since 1945, 
almost nine out of every ten Danish governments held only a minority of seats in the 
legislature (Strøm, 1990: 58).  While its fellow Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Norway, 
also have a high proportion of minority administrations, these are more likely to comprise a 
single party rather than coalitions which, in recent years at least, have been the norm in 
Denmark.  The second feature of interest to this project is the degree of centralisation within 
the political system.  Three of my study countries – Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand – are 
unitary systems.  Arguably, though, the dynamics of coalition formation and operation are 
different in a decentralised system (see Chapter 7 for the arguments).  For this reason, I have 
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analysed coalition government in Germany’s federal system, drawing on practice both at the 
centre and at the state level.3 
 
But while these factors help explain why my four study countries provide a useful source of 
policy learning for the UK, their political systems vary in important ways, such that any 
lesson learning needs to be undertaken cautiously.  For a start, three of the countries are far 
smaller than the UK, although closer in population to Scotland and Wales.  This is not a trivial 
point in the context of the operation of coalition government.  As I describe more fully in 
Chapter 5, the management and coordination of coalitions depends to a high degree on close 
personal contacts and mutual trust.  The smaller the polity, the greater the likely contact 
between ministers and between other important political actors, and the lesser the need to 
resort to formal coordination mechanisms.4 
 
A second distinction relates to the countries’ political institutions and culture.  The UK’s 
democratic system is an example of the ‘Westminster’ or ‘majoritarian’ model, key features of 
which include the concentration of power in single party cabinets, the domination of the 
executive over the legislature, a majoritarian voting system and a dominant two party pattern 
of electoral competition (Lijphart, 1999: 9-31).  The UK shared these conditions with New 
Zealand until the latter’s switch to a proportional electoral system in 1996.  Ireland exhibits a 
less majoritarian political system and Germany even less so.  Denmark, in contrast to the UK, 
has a political system often described as consensual; certainly political authority is far less 
concentrated in the cabinet, and more dispersed to the legislature, than in the UK (Lijphart, 
1999: 248). 
 
In important ways, the, the four study countries differ from one another and from the UK.  
But they also share sufficient features in common that comparisons can be made between 
them.  This raises the question of how far the UK can learn from the practice of coalition 
government in different contexts.  We must always be careful about seeking to transfer 
institutions or arrangements that work well elsewhere to our very different domestic 
conditions.  In general, the closer the political systems and conditions between the host and 
study countries, the easier it is to engage in policy transfer.  But the efficacy of lesson learning 
also depends on what is being examined.  In this case, the success or failure of different 
coalition models depends to a large extent on relationships between the key political actors.  
Such ‘soft’ or informal norms and mechanisms are sui generis and not transferable between 
countries or, indeed, within countries over time.  More amenable to cross-jurisdictional lesson 
learning are ‘hard’, or formal, mechanisms such as rules and institutions (Rose, 2000: 637-8).  
These tend to operate ‘mechanically’ or ‘quasi-mechanically’ in that they exert a strong 
influence over outcomes independently of other background variables.  If a particular 
institution produces a specific outcome in one country, it is highly likely to do the same in 
another.  The mechanical rules of most interest in this context are those covering the formation 
and termination of governments.  For example, one of the features often held to contribute to 
the relative stability of government in Germany is the constitutional rule that the opposition 
parties can only pass a motion of no confidence in the government if they also nominate a 
                                                     
3 The state, or Land, chosen for study is Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.  The rationale for this choice is 
explained at the start of Chapter 7. 
4 A measure of this point is the size of the ministerial pool in each country.  Thus, among large 
countries, the UK government has around 60 cabinet ministers and ministers of state and Germany 
around 40 ministers.  Not surprisingly, smaller countries have more restricted ministerial pools: Ireland 
has 32 ministers, New Zealand has 23 ministers, Scotland has 22 ministers, Denmark has 21 ministers 
and Wales has 14 ministers. 
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successor at the same time.  This ‘constructive no confidence’ provision has subsequently been 
extended to Spain and Belgium, and has recently been recommended for adoption by Ireland, 
as a means of avoiding parliamentary deadlock (Constitution Review Group, 1996). 
 
Given this caveat about drawing lessons from overseas, what does this report aim to do?  In 
part, it aims to extend the level of awareness among policy makers in the UK of the methods 
by which coalitions in other countries are formed, operate and terminate.  There are a wide 
range of ways in which coalition governments are structured, and this report adopts a 
descriptive approach to highlight some of these.  The greater the knowledge among domestic 
policy makers of coalition models in other jurisdictions, the wider their range of options in 
designing institutions for a UK setting.  But the report goes beyond description to evaluate 
coalition arrangements, by comparing these arrangements in the different study countries.  
Given the caveat above about policy transfer, my judgements are limited to formal 
mechanisms – such as the constitutional rules for government formation or the arrangements 
adopted to ensure coalition business is coordinated – which are more amenable to cross-
national lesson learning.  Where evaluations are undertaken in the following chapters, it will 
be made clear on what criteria judgements are being made.  In the main, the criteria relate to 
factors such as government stability, avoidance of deadlock or undue delay in the formation 
process, fairness between parties and ensuring a reasonable balance between the executive 
and legislature.5 
 
Finally, a note about the sources on which I have drawn.  My main sources are a series of 
seventy interviews I conducted with politicians, civil servants, political advisers, academics 
and other commentators in each of my study countries.  The list of people interviewed is set 
out in Annex 1.  To supplement these first hand accounts, I have also drawn on a variety of 
primary and secondary sources, ranging from individual coalition agreements, to country 
case studies, through to comparative cross-national research.  The secondary literature on 
coalition government has been used to provide information and data that may help policy 
makers clarify the effect of different constitutional rules, and thus help them identify which 
set of rules might be appropriate in any given setting.  A full bibliography is also provided at 
the end of this report. 
 
This report addresses two main audiences.  The first are those involved in the coalitions up 
and running in Scotland, Wales and, to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland.6  The second are 
those who would be involved in the preparation for, and running of, any coalition 
administrations at Westminster.7  This report thus tries to ride two horses more or less at the 
                                                     
5 The last is the most difficult to operationalise.  The balance I have tried to strike in making judgements 
is to avoid giving greater power to the executive (since, at Westminster at least, the executive already 
enjoys a dominant position over the legislature) while retaining some of its powers to act and break 
deadlocks.  Thus, I suggest in Chapter 2 that the incumbent prime minister be stripped of the automatic 
right to a dissolution of parliament, but be able to obtain one in situations where parliament is merely 
obstructing his/her government’s legislation programme without granting a dissolution. 
6 The government of Northern Ireland is sui generis, in being a forced, rather than voluntary, coalition.  
The formation rules stipulate that cross-community agreement is needed for the appointment of the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister.  But these figures do not control the allocation of portfolios, as 
is usually the case; rather, ministries are allocated by the d’Hondt formula, again reflecting the dictates 
of cross-community representation (Ward, 2000: 122-4).  Given the peculiarities of the Northern Ireland 
coalition, this report focuses its attention on the coalitions in Scotland and Wales. 
7 As noted above, the chances of regular coalition government at Westminster depend on reform of the 
electoral system, which currently appears a slim prospect. 
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same time.  On the one hand, government formation and termination in the devolved areas is 
already covered by a detailed set of constitutional rules.  The report briefly examines the rules 
in Scotland and Wales, not in the belief that – if found to be ineffective or inadequate – they 
could be wholly rewritten, rather that minor amendments or additions may be possible.  
Nonetheless, the existence of a detailed constitutional framework in Scotland and Wales 
means that policy makers there may find more of value in my discussion of ‘softer’ issues, 
such as how coalition governments operate in practice, and the dynamics of sub-national 
coalitions.  When it comes Westminster on the other hand, there is clearly little point in 
discussing in detail how a potential coalition regime might operate; rather, it is far better to 
think through what set of constitutional rules might be appropriate should we move to a 
multi-party situation for the House of Commons. 
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CHAPTER 1: Coalition Governments and Elections 
 
 
A frequent criticism of proportional electoral systems is that they change the relationship 
between voters and governments, weakening accountability and responsiveness in the 
following ways: 
 
• If governments are only formed after elections on the basis of horse-trading between the 
parties, voters may have little way of knowing before the election how their vote will 
translate into government outcomes. 
• Multi-party governments, where responsibility for decisions is shared between two or 
more parties, may make it difficult for voters to attribute responsibility for policy 
outcomes. 
• Parties that perform poorly at elections may get a ‘second bite at the cherry’, by 
negotiating successfully to enter government.  Moreover, small parties tend to gain 
government rewards out of proportion to their electoral performance. 
 
The primary focus of this section is on the relationship between voters, parties and 
governments.  The questions raised are the subject of a very broad and detailed scientific 
literature.  In this section, I do no more than summarise some of the main points from this 
literature, to suggest what evidence is available in thinking through some of the points just 
laid out. 
 
The decisiveness of elections 
One of the main fears of those opposed to proportional electoral systems is the belief that they 
weaken the link between votes cast at elections and the formation of governments (Norton, 
1997: 85-6).  In majoritarian systems, such as that used for the House of Commons, the voter 
can be pretty sure how his/her vote will translate after the election.  Thus, if they vote Labour 
and Labour wins the largest share of seats, it will be in the position to form a government by 
itself, and to implement those policies it promised in its manifesto.  Crudely, this is the idea of 
the government ‘mandate’ or ‘prospective accountability’, the link between voters’ 
preferences and the activities of governments (Budge, 1998: 6).  One caveat to this view is that 
Westminster governments rarely command more than half the votes cast; in fact no 
government since 1935 has obtained a majority of votes at a UK general election.  The riposte 
by proponents of proportional representation is that, by combining two or more parties in 
coalition, it is more likely that governments will command majority support.8 
 
The electoral control of voters, via the conferment of a mandate, exists under the following 
conditions:  
 
“First, the voter needs to be able to identify the prospective future governors and have some 
idea of what they will do if elected.  Second, the outcome of the election should bring into 
office a coherent government committed to policies that correspond to the voters’ 
anticipations and capable of carrying them out” (Powell, 2000: 71). 
 
                                                     
8 In technical parlance, the ‘median’ voter.  Note, however, that the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition 
in Scotland only commands a plurality of the vote (46% of the regional list vote combined across the 
parties), as does its counterpart in Wales (48% of the regional list vote). 
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Under majoritarian arrangements, so the argument goes, voters (a) know what they are voting 
for and can thus use their vote to register their desired outcome; because (b) elections are 
‘controlling’ in allocating to the party with the largest share of seats a legislative majority 
(Budge, 1998: 6).9  The question I want to explore is the first part of the argument namely, 
under multi-party conditions, how do voters know what they are voting for; how can 
governments be ‘prospectively’ accountable?  (The second part of the argument, is a question 
about how decisive electoral success is for the formation of government, and is dealt with 
below;  pages 30-1) 
 
In multi-party systems, the link between electoral preferences and government composition is 
surely weaker than under majoritarian conditions, since governments are usually only formed 
via a process of post-election bargaining by the parties, over which voters have little control.  
In fact, bargaining after the election can be shaped by voters’ actions under two conditions 
(Budge, 1998: 7).  First, when the party system ‘cleaves’ into two distinct blocs, usually of the 
right and left, and when governments adhere to these blocs (avoiding cross-bloc governments 
containing parties of both the left and right).10  The second condition is when parties make 
clear to voters prior to the election the likely configuration of post-election governments 
(Powell, 2000: 71-2).  This is usually done through pre-electoral alliances, and it is these 
arrangements that I explore here. 
 
Pre-election alliances 
What indications regarding government formation are offered by parties prior to the election?  
We might distinguish three pre-election scenarios: 
 
a. A formal agreement between two or more parties, including a common policy programme. 
b. An indication from the parties on which other party(ies) they would prefer to form a 
government with.  Such indications may be intended to facilitate inter-party vote transfers 
that align with the party leaders’ government preferences.  (A subset of this category 
would be an indication of which partners a party would not form a coalition with after an 
election; signals can thus be negative as well as positive.) 
c. No pre-election signals on government preferences. 
 
The parties will have to weigh up various trade-offs in deciding which course to take.  While a 
formal agreement or strong indication of preferred coalition partner(s) aids accountability and 
also minimises the complexity of the post-election bargaining environment, they also limit the 
parties’ flexibility in the negotiating arena.  Prior to the 1992 general election in Ireland, the 
                                                     
9 A further link in the chain between votes cast and actions taken is that parties in governments can, 
indeed, introduce what they promise at elections.  Critics of multi-party government contend that the 
requirement for coalitions means that party promises are watered down in practice.  However, 
comparative analysis suggests that the relationship between election promises and government 
programmes depends in part on the nature of the party system.  The relationship is found to be 
strongest in countries (eg. Norway) where governments tend to alternate between competing 
ideological blocs, and weaker in countries (eg. Germany) where a middle party ‘softens’ the impact of 
competition between opposing blocs (Budge and Laver, 1992: 421-3). 
10 Conversely, prospective accountability is more difficult to achieve in countries with party systems 
that are fragmented and not orientated around clear left or right poles.  Denmark is a good case of this; 
it has a fragmented party system with several parties occupying the centre ground.  These parties are 
highly ‘coalitional’, in the sense that they can, and do, form governments with larger parties on both the 
right and left.  It is thus often difficult for voters to know precisely what coalition(s) is likely after an 
election, given the high number of realistic permutations. 
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Labour party was asked by Fine Gael to form a pre-election alliance with the Progressive 
Democrats.  But this was rejected by the Labour leader, Dick Spring, since he – rightly as it 
turned out – expected Labour to perform well at the election, which would boost its 
bargaining power afterwards (Girvan, 1992).  The desire to maximise post-election bargaining 
capacity by limiting pre-election commitments may be a particularly acute concern for small 
parties located in the centre of the political spectrum, who can often play a ‘pivotal’ role in 
government formation.11  At the first PR election in New Zealand in 1996, the pivotal centre 
party, New Zealand First, refused to state whether it would support National or Labour in the 
event of holding the balance of power (Miller, 1998: 121-3).  However, by virtue of the fact that 
the centre parties can incline both ways and are often pivotal, they are frequently placed 
under pressure to indicate their government preferences.  The FDP in Germany falls into this 
position and has generally obliged, although its presence in government virtually continually 
between 1969 and 1998 has facilitated this strategy (parties in government being more likely 
than those in opposition to indicate pre-election preferences, since they usually campaign for 
a continuation of the government). 
 
Another way of putting this conundrum is that, under multi-party conditions, parties tend to 
seek votes at elections by distinguishing themselves from one another, yet after the election, 
they seek office by minimising their differences.  By contrast, in two party systems where no 
accommodation is usually necessary to gain office, a successful electoral strategy is 
compatible with a strategy for office (Narud, 1996). 
 
Substantive pre-election policy agreements are virtually unknown in western Europe.  Thus, 
the 1997 election was the first time in Ireland, for example, that allying parties – in this case, 
Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic Left – agreed a common policy programme as part of 
their pre-election alliance.12  More common is for parties to indicate their coalition preferences 
without specifying a programme for government.  These alliances are frequent in Germany; in 
eight of the eleven elections between 1945 and 1990, at least some of the parties concluded 
pre-election alliances (Klingemann and Volkens, 1992).  Parties in Ireland have also formed 
such alliances, sometimes explicitly (1973, 1977 and 1989) and sometimes implicitly (1981 and 
1982) (Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994: 316).  Prior to 1989, these alliances were primarily a 
device by the other parties to challenge the dominance of Fianna Fail, which remained 
opposed to participation in coalitions (Laver and Higgins, 1986).  In similar vein, pre-election 
preferences are sometimes indicated by parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden to cement 
relations between bourgeois parties against strong social democratic parties (Narud, 1996a: 
486).  In Denmark, an indication of coalition preferences is usually limited to the parties in 
government who, as in 1998, campaign for a re-election of that administration.  The most 
recent election, in November 2001, involved a dual electoral alliance, pitting the incumbent 
Social Democrat-Social Liberal coalition against the four bourgeois parties: the Liberals, 
Conservatives, Centre Democrats and Christian People’s Party. 
 
                                                     
11 Parties at the centre of the political spectrum are also more likely to have a support base with a 
diverse range of views, from those inclined to the left to those inclined to the right.  Any pre-election 
indication from the party hierarchy that leans the party towards one of these poles risks alienating 
supporters who incline the other way. 
12 This election was also the first in which all the major parties competed as part of one of two alliances.  
Thus, the Fine Gael-Labour-Democratic Left alliance was matched by the Fianna Fail-Progressive 
Democrat governing alliance; in a multi-party situation under these circumstances, voter information 
and control is as high as under a two party majoritarian system as with Westminster elections. 
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But parties do not necessarily indicate their coalition preferences in order to maximise voters’ 
information.  In fact, in two of my study countries where the parties often forge pre-election 
alliances – Denmark and Ireland – commentators suggested to me that there was little voter 
pressure for them to do so.  Instead, parties in countries that operate preferential (eg. Ireland) 
or two vote (eg. Germany, New Zealand) ballots often indicate allegiances to maximise their 
own electoral strength, rather than to indicate their post-election government preferences.  
Such strategies minimise mutually destructive competition for votes as well as helping small 
parties that may otherwise struggle to cross explicit or implicit voting thresholds.  New 
Zealand’s second election under proportional conditions is instructive in this regard.  
Whereas the first election in 1996 had been marked by little inter-party cooperation prior to 
the poll, by 1999 the parties realised the electoral advantages to be had by cooperation.  As a 
result, the left of centre parties, Labour and the Alliance, cooperated with each other on 
electoral strategy and policy programmes while campaigning separately (Boston and Church, 
2000: 232-7).  In Scotland prior to the first devolution election in 1999, and despite the close 
working arrangements between Labour and the Liberal Democrats in planning the Scottish 
Parliament, the parties issued no indications as to their coalition preferences, apart from 
negative messages from the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives about going into 
coalition with the separatist Scottish National party.13  Just as New Zealand’s parties changed 
their strategies for the second election under proportional conditions in 1999, so we might 
expect the parties in Scotland and, perhaps, Wales to do likewise. 
 
Parties may use pre-election indications to send not only positive signals, but also negative 
ones.  Such behaviour tends to occur in one of two situations.  The first is when a centre party 
occupying a likely pivotal role clarifies its position but without boxing itself in.  Thus a centre 
party might rule out a particular government option, without necessarily ruling anything in at 
the same time.  This was how New Zealand First behaved in 1996 (and again in 1999); 
seeming to rule out a coalition with National, while at the same time refusing to indicate with 
whom it would go into government.  The second situation is when a party on one ideological 
wing of the spectrum wishes to reassure voters that it will not enter a coalition with another 
party on the more extreme end of that wing.  Thus, prior to Germany’s last federal election in 
1998, the SPD, keen to attract voters from the centre, ruled out a coalition with the former East 
German communist party, the PDS. 
 
Commentators have argued that British parties occupying the centre of the political spectrum 
– and thus likely to be pivotal in any post election bargaining – should make clear prior to the 
election its coalition preference to aid the decisiveness of the contest (Birch, 1984: 100).14  Such 
a strategy also seems to be popular among voters.  The only available survey question that 
seeks the views of British voters living under proportional electoral conditions was asked as 
part of the Scottish Parliament/Welsh Assembly election studies.  Immediately after the first 
devolution elections in May 1999, Scottish and Welsh voters were asked for their reactions to 
the statement that “All parties should have told us before polling day who they would prefer 
                                                     
13 The Liberal Democrats’ formal pre-election position was that they would hold talks with whichever 
party held the most seats after the election (Finnie and McLeish, 1999: 51). 
14 This was a difficult proposition in the mid-1980s, when the centre party, the SDP-Liberal Alliance, 
was strongly critical of both Labour and the Conservatives.  The current situation, however, is clearer 
for voters, since the third party, the Liberal Democrats, is far closer to Labour than the Conservatives; 
indeed, on one measure, to the left of Labour (Budge, 1999; Bara and Budge, 2001).  But should the 
Liberal Democrats move back to the middle of the ideological spectrum, the need for clearer signals 




to work with in a coalition government”.  In Scotland, a majority (53%) agreed with the 
statement, while in Wales, a plurality (41%) did so, with less than one in five disagreeing 
(Curtice et al: 2000: 26-7). 
 
The importance of pre-election alliances depends somewhat on what voters believe the 
purpose of elections to be.  If, on the one hand, they believe the role of elections is to choose a 
government, then information on parties’ government preferences will be important.  If, on 
the other hand, voters are happy to let the parties sort out the shape of the government 
through post-election bargaining, then there will be less demand for the parties to commit 
themselves prior to the ballot.  One commentator on Irish politics argues that the increasing 
use of pre-election agreements in that country arises from a recognition by the parties and by 
voters of the likely permanence of coalition arrangements, allied with a belief that the role of 
elections is to decide the composition of the government, not just that of the parliament.  This 
concern may set Ireland apart from many west European countries, in which elections are 
seen to be decisive only for the composition of the parliament, not directly for the executive 
(Coakley, 1987: 167-8).  The majoritarian political tradition in Britain may – in similar fashion 
to Ireland – incline voters to expect that elections will continue to provide a link between 
ballot preferences and the formation of executives, even if we move to a proportional electoral 
system.  We have some evidence of this in Scotland and Wales, from the same survey as 
mentioned above.  Table 3 shows that, in response to a question seeking views on the purpose 
of elections (note that the election in question is not specified), one in two voters in Wales, and 
two out of five in Scotland, prefer to see elections as decisive for government formation, thus 




Table 3: Views on the purpose of elections, Scotland and Wales 
 
 
“Which of these statements comes closest to your views?” 
 Scotland  Wales 
 
 
It is more important that elections should produce a clear 







It is more important that elections should produce a fair 







Base 1141  429 
 
Source: Scottish Parliament Election Study 1999, Welsh Assembly Election Study, 1999 (Curtice et al, 2000). 
 
 
But parties may only provide voters with information about post-election possibilities if 
voters are ready to use that information.  This raises the question of how far, under 
preferential electoral systems, voters respond to party signals on coalition preferences either 
by following these cues or by indicating an alternative preference?  There is a large literature 
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on preferential voting behaviour which I cannot cover here.  However, some evidence casts 
doubt on the extent to which voters use their ballot to signal which parties they would prefer 
to see in government.15 
 
In Ireland in the post war period, levels of vote transfers between Fine Gael and Labour have 
increased noticeably at elections in which the parties have formed alliances.  In other words, 
voters appear to respond to their party leaders’ cues and, in turn, appear to send signals 
approving the leaders’ actions (Sinnott, 1995: 214-6).  However, it may be that such transfer 
patterns represent less an affinity on the part of Fine Gael and Labour voters for the other, and 
more a desire to boost their own party against the dominant player, Fianna Fail (Laver, 2000).  
In New Zealand at the first proportional election in 1996, only one third of people reported 
being motivated to vote in the way they did by the need for find a coalition partner, although 
this aim was more prevalent among minor party supporters (Miller, 1998: 126-7).16  Voters 
may also take little heed of the party leaders’ coalition preferences.  True, levels of coalitional 
voting in Germany – that is, ‘splitting one’s ticket’ in a way congruent with the parties’ 
announced coalition preferences – tends to increase when the parties issue clear signals prior 
to elections.  But even though most elections are preceded by such signals, only around half of 
split-ticket voters respond by supporting the signalled coalition options with their first and 
second votes (Schoen, 1999).  In Scotland at the 1999 devolution election, research has shown 
limited use by voters of their two votes to signal coalition preferences.  Thus, among voters 
who supported a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition and who voted for one of these parties on 
their first vote, more (14%) proceeded to vote for a different party on their second vote than 
voted for the other coalition partner (10%) (Curtice and Steed, 2000). 
 
But even if voters do not use the electoral system to influence coalition outcomes, the parties 
need to take heed of the preferences that are manifested.  The most recent cautionary tale is 
that of New Zealand’s 1996 election where, having indicated to voters that it would oust 
National from government, New Zealand First then joined it in coalition after the election.  In 
doing so, New Zealand First not only alienated supporters of other potential coalition 
partners, such as Labour and the Alliance, but also its own supporters and those of National, 
neither of whom wanted their party to strike a deal with the other.  New Zealand’s first 
coalition government was emphatically not “the people’s choice” (Miller, 1998) and New 
Zealand First paid a high electoral price for failing to heed its supporters’ preferences.  
Similarly, the Labour party in Ireland attracted the opprobrium of its supporters after the 1992 
election when, having criticised the Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition and thus 
suggested it would only form an alternative administration, it finally went into government 
with Fianna Fail (Mair, 1999: 146-7). 
 
Electoral identifiability 
The discussion above showed that prospective accountability (ie. voters’ control over electoral 
outcomes) need not be weakened in multi-party conditions if parties make clear their post-
election intentions before polling day.  But if voters wish to express a judgement on the 
performance of the incumbent government (‘retrospective accountability’), how is this to be 
                                                     
15 There is no reason why we should expect them to behave in such a way.  Electoral behaviour is based 
on many factors (eg. boosting the strength of one’s own party or responding to a particular candidate or 
set of local conditions) other than having an eye on a future government. 
16 Note that this low figure may be partly due to the parties’ own lack of pre-election commitments to 
one another.  If the parties do not play the coalition game before the election, there may be no reason to 
expect voters to do so when it comes to the ballot. 
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done bearing in mind the difficulty in identifying responsibility for government decisions if 
power is shared between parties?  In situations when two or more parties share power in 
government, such retrospective judgements become harder to make than when a single party 
controls all the ministries (Narud, 1996a: 480). 
 
There is no simple answer to this question.  However, voters faced with coalition 
governments may be helped in two ways.  The first is only a long run solution, and therefore 
of little help for voters in Scotland and Wales, both of which are new to power sharing 
arrangements.  In deciding which portfolios are allocated to which coalition party, there is a 
clear trend for parties to select those ministries that correspond to their core policy concerns.  
Accordingly, socialist parties will tend to opt for ministries in charge of welfare issues, with 
bourgeois or conservative parties preferring the interior and defence portfolios (Budge and 
Keman, 1990).  Thus, in Germany, between 1969 and 1998 and irrespective of the composition 
of the coalition, the foreign ministry remained in the control of the junior partner, the Free 
Democrats.  In other words, over time, voters will learn which parties are responsible for 
which portfolios, and will thus be in a better position to assign responsibility for policy 
outputs. 
 
In the short term, it may still be possible for coalition parties to convey reasonably clear lines 
of responsibility for decisions.  This can be achieved either if parties take sole control of 
particular ministries, or if they identify particular decisions as being ‘theirs’ rather than the 
product of collective government.  Thus, for much of the period in which the Free Democrats 
controlled Germany’s foreign ministry, they did so alone, which aided identification of 
responsibility for voters.  The waters were, however, muddied when the FDP’s stewardship of 
the foreign ministry had to be shared with the senior coalition partner (either the SPD or 
CDU/CSU) who held a junior portfolio in the ministry (Saalfeld, 2000: 67).  (I examine such 
‘divided’ or ‘pooled’ patterns of portfolio allocation in more detail in Chapter 5.)  Parties can 
also send signals to voters by ‘badging’ decisions, so that they are identified with a particular 
set of outputs; this aspect of coalition management is also examined in more detail in Chapter 
5.  I should point out here, though, that such behaviour is often more closely linked to a desire 
to maintain electoral support for the junior coalition partner than to aid the accountability of 
government per se.  However, the prominence that the Liberal Democrats in Scotland have 
given to the government’s freedom of information regime, achieved by virtue of their minister 
holding the Justice portfolio, indicates the way in which voters can be helped to assign 
responsibility under coalition conditions. 
 
A final issue that can be touched on in this section is the importance that voters place on 
electoral identifiability.  We have one piece of evidence from Scotland which suggests that, 
while this capacity is of some importance for voters, it is not necessarily a priority.  As part of 
the Scottish Parliament Election Survey in 1999, voters were asked whether they believed it 
“better to have two or more parties in government so that more people’s views are 
represented”, or “better to have just one party in government so that it is very clear who 
should be blamed if things go wrong”.  More than half the sample (55%) backed the coalition 
option, with one third (33%) preferring identifiability through single party rule (Curtice et al, 
2000).  While the survey question is designed principally to get at views on the relative merits 
of coalition and single party government, and while the survey was conducted right at the 
beginning of the Scottish coalition’s time in office, the answers suggest that clarity of party 





Further down the chain, the question arises of how far electoral performance shapes 
government formation.  Do parties that have been punished at elections manage to stay in 
office?  Do parties that have won only minor shares of the vote gain undue reward in terms of 
office?  The first question concerns the responsiveness of elections, the second the 
proportionality of the rewards.  If governments are formed through a process of post-election 
inter-party bargaining with little reference back to the election results, then executives cease to 
be responsive to the preferences of their citizens. 
 
It is perfectly possible for parties that have won minor shares of the vote to gain a place in 
government.  For example, the FDP has participated in two thirds of post-war German 
governments, yet has never polled more than 13% of the vote.  But while small parties may 
participate in government, they tend only to command limited resources.  The allocation of 
ministries across countries tends to reflect party strength, so that portfolios are distributed 
broadly in line with the proportion of seats each partner contributes to the coalition.  The only 
exception to this is the slight bonus that small parties are often given; but this rarely adds up 
to anything more than a single additional post (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 171-3). 
 
When it comes to forming, and participating in, a coalition, comparative analysis suggests that 
electoral success is an important factor in determining which party(ies) becomes the formateur 
(lead party in the formation process) and ends up in the coalition (Warwick, 1996).  But 
electoral responsiveness varies between countries.  Analysis of the Netherlands and Norway 
shows that, while responsiveness in the former is very low (ie. there is very little relationship 
between how well parties fare at elections and their chances of getting into government), it is 
higher in the latter, mainly due to the organisation of the parties into two opposing blocs 
(Narud, 1996a: 492-3).  A larger dataset reveals considerable variation between countries, with 
the highest score attached to the UK on account of its majoritarian electoral system (Strøm, 
1990: 75).17 
 
One way of analysing the responsiveness of elections is to examine whether the largest party 
(measured here in terms of vote share) gets to form a government.  Across a basket of west 
European countries, I have found that they generally do.18  The exceptions are Denmark and 
Sweden (where the Social Democrats have sometimes been the largest party but have been 
outnumbered by coalitions among the ‘bourgeois’ parties) and Ireland and Norway (where 
Fianna Fail and Labour, respectively, have often refused to enter coalition). 
 
An alternative measure is to examine whether parties that have lost ground at elections have 
still managed to gain a place in the resulting governments.  I have examined election results 
for nine west European countries19 in the post-war period, to see how far coalition formation 
is either mildly unresponsive to elections (defined as a party entering a government when its 
vote share – although not necessarily seat share – has slipped slightly from the previous 
election), or more egregiously unresponsive (defined as a party entering a government when 
it has suffered a 6% or more drop in vote share from the previous election).  It is frequently 
the case that parties lose vote share at an election yet make it into government.  The countries 
                                                     
17 Note, however, that the UK scores a less than perfect 0.94 on a scale of 0-1, since there have been 
occasions (eg. Feb/Oct 1974) when a party without a plurality of the vote has formed a government. 
18 The countries I examined are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden 
19 As per the above, minus France and Portugal. 
 
31
with the lowest incidence of such unresponsive outcomes are Germany and Ireland, in both of 
which only four out of the twelve elections I measured led to an election ‘loser’ making it into 
government.  Electoral responsiveness is far lower in the other seven countries.  In other 
words, it is quite common for elections in coalition situations to be at least partially 
unresponsive (the potential reasons including party system fragmentation or the dominance 
of one or two parties that almost always make it into government irrespective of their 
electoral performance).  But it is far rarer for parties that have performed very poorly at 
elections (those suffering a 6% or more fall in vote share) to make it into government; only in 
Austria, Norway and Sweden has this happened during the post war period, and even here 
only on one or two occasions in each.  Coalition government, then, might do harm to the 
principle of electoral responsiveness, but not egregious harm. 
 
Generally, it appears that government formation under majoritarian electoral conditions is 
more responsive to election results than under proportional conditions, but that the difference 
is one of degree not kind (Powell, 2000: 47-50, 122-156).  The crucial determinants of electoral 
responsiveness appear to be (a) the extent to which parties in multi-party situations form pre-
election alliances and thus compete as opposing blocs, with the electoral success of one of the 
blocs following through into its control of government; and (b) the degree of party system 
fragmentation, with highly fragmented systems less likely to deliver a majority of seats to one 
party or an alliance of parties (Budge, 1998: 7-8).  This brings us back to the discussion at the 
outset of this section.  Alliances are certainly a device by which the parties themselves can 
affect the role of elections under multi-party conditions.  The other dominant factor appears to 
be the nature of the party system and patterns of party competition, which are not amenable 
to such instant solutions. 
 
When are coalitions formed? 
The discussion thus far has examined the role of elections in government formation.  A final 
issue for consideration is how far governments are, indeed, formed following an election?  For 
single party governments, elections are the main cause of government termination/formation.  
Across nineteen countries between 1950-83, two thirds of all terminations of single party 
majority administrations were triggered by elections.  However, when it comes to coalitions 
and minority administrations, elections account for a lower proportion of government 
terminations, just over one third in the case of (‘minimal winning’) coalitions for example, 
across the same period (Budge and Keman, 1990: 167). 
 
Two questions arise from this brief analysis.  First, are coalitions in all countries prone to 
replacement in between elections (ie. without the direct support of the electorate)?  Second, in 
multi-party conditions, how far does a withdrawal of support by parliament commit a 
government to call elections and hand over responsibility to voters, or does it provide the 
parties with the opportunity for further bargaining between themselves to form a new 
government? 
 
In relation to the first question, we need to distinguish between coalitions that change by 
simply gaining or losing a member and coalitions that change in a more substantive manner 
by passing from the control of one partisan bloc (left, right or centre) to another.20  One 
                                                     
20 Such ‘substantive’ shifts may not involve wholescale replacement of the coalition members.  Thus, I 
count as a substantive shift the transition in Germany in 1982 between the SPD-FDP and CDU/CSU-
FDP coalitions, and in Ireland in 1994 between the Fianna Fail-Labour and Fine Gael-Labour-
Democratic Left coalitions.  Both these shifts, neither of which occurred as a result of elections, switched 
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comparative analyst has suggested that, while coalitions may be replaced in between elections 
in Belgium, Denmark and Finland, there is a presumption in favour of seeking an electoral 
mandate in the Netherlands and Sweden (Bogdanor, 1983a: 274-5).  In fact there have been 
three non-electoral substantive shifts of government in Denmark in the post-war period: 1950, 
1982 and 1993.  Other country case studies suggest an ‘electoral rule’ (whereby any 
substantive shifts in coalition membership must receive the mandate of the voters) is very 
strong in Austria and the Netherlands, fairly strong in Germany and Ireland, and not strong 
in Belgium and Norway, where there have been several coalition shifts since 1945 without 
recourse to elections (Müller and Strøm, 2000a: 574).  This convention is also claimed to have 
applied to Sweden since the late 1970s (Boston, 1998: 106-7), although in 1990, the resignation 
of a Social Democrat administration did not lead to elections, but to a request from the 
Speaker of the Riksdag to the Conservative Party opposition to try and form an alternative 
government, an attempt which ultimately failed (Bergman, 2000: 203). 
 
There has only been one coalition ‘shift’ in Germany, in 1982 when the Free Democrats left 
their SPD partner for the CDU/CSU.  However, concern that this move might be thought 
illegitimate prompted the new Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, to call for fresh elections – via an 
engineered vote of confidence – six months later.  Ireland has also only seen one substantive 
change of coalition without an election, in 1994, when Labour ended its coalition with Fianna 
Fail to join with Fine Gael and the Democratic Left.  Evidently, this shift caused fewer 
problems, since no election to legitimate the new government was held for another two and a 
half years.  
 
On the issue of what follows a successful no confidence vote, one comparative study suggests 
that such votes always lead to fresh elections in Ireland and usually do in Sweden.21  In Italy 
and Denmark, successful no confidence votes are often followed by inter-party bargaining 
and the formation of a new government without an intervening election (Laver and Shepsle, 
1996: 45-6).  To this list, might be added Belgium and Norway, in both of which successful no 
confidence votes are often followed by inter-party bargaining rather than fresh elections (see 
the case studies in Müller and Strøm, 2000). 
 
This brief discussion suggests the typology set out in Table 4, which grades selected west 
European countries by the degree to which elections are decisive for coalition formation (ie. 
the extent to which any new coalition is the product of voters’ actions, and not those of the 
parties in parliament). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
governments from one ideological bloc to another, even though the membership of one party remained 
constant betweem the coalitions.  
21 In 1970, the constitutional rules governing the criteria for successful no confidence votes were 
changed, so that an absolute majority of all members is now required for the motion to pass.  Since this 




Table 4: The role of elections in government formation in selected west European democracies 
 
  Are governments usually changed by 
elections, or also by ‘shifting’ coalitions? 




Does the parliamentary overthrow of 






















A = Low electoral decisiveness 
B/C = Medium electoral decisiveness 
D = High electoral decisiveness 
 
* The constructive no confidence provision means the automatic replacement of one government by another following a 
parliamentary vote.   I have placed Germany in the ‘Elections’ column since ‘shifting’ coalitions are seen by many to be 




I have reviewed some of the arguments about the role of elections under multi-party 
conditions, and some of the research which throws light on these points.  Overall, the extent to 
which elections are decisive for government formation depends to a large degree on the 
nature of the party system.  Party systems which are relatively cohesive and organised into 
opposing ideological blocs tend to produce more decisive elections than systems which are 
fragmented and not organised into distinguishable blocs.  But the parties themselves can 
shape the decisiveness of elections, by indicating prior to the ballot their coalition preferences.  
While parties only rarely form substantive policy coalitions prior to elections, they often 
provide indications of their preferred coalition partner(s) and/or rule out other potential 
partners.  Although such behaviour is sometimes aimed more at boosting post-election 
bargaining power rather than aiding accountability, it can often serve the latter function.  
There is some indication of popular support in Scotland and Wales for parties to indicate their 
preferred alliances prior to the ballot, and we might expect to see the parties respond in 
subsequent devolution elections. 
 
Voters may find it more difficult to identify responsibility for policy actions if governments 
comprise two or more parties sharing power.  Even here, however, voters may be helped, in 
the long run by becoming accustomed to the ministries usually controlled by a particular 
party, and in the short run if individual coalition partners identify themselves with particular 
policy outputs.  Overall, elections can retain their decisiveness for government formation 
under coalition conditions, although this requires parties steeped in majoritarian conditions to 
adapt their behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 2: Forming and Terminating Governments 
 
This chapter examines some of the ‘pressure points’ that may arise when governments form 
and fall, in multi-party conditions.  In particular, it examines whether the constitutional rules 
in place under majoritarian conditions can survive the transition to a situation where coalition 
governments are routine. 
 
The impact of constitutional rules 
By constitutional rules, I do not refer simply to those articles found in a country’s written 
constitution.  A quick scan of the constitutions of west European countries shows that their 
dictates rarely extend to the formation of governments (since they were largely drawn up 
prior to the growth of political parties and the introduction of proportional electoral systems 
which gave rise to multi-party politics; Bogdanor, 1983a).  There are exceptions; Germany’s 
Basic Law, for example, refers to the need for an alternative chancellor to be put forward in 
cases where the opposition parties move a no confidence vote.  Such formal or ‘hard’ rules 
tend to be specific and legally enforceable.  But government formation is also subject to a host 
of informal or ‘soft’ rules; stipulations that are often less specific and which are sometimes 
little more than conventions.  Both formal and informal rules act as constraints on the process 
of government formation and termination, reducing the options available to the main players: 
the parties (their leaders, elected members and supporters), parliament and the Head of State 
(Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994). 
 
It is important to study the rules covering government formation and termination for a 
number of reasons.  First, the mere existence of a distinct set of rules brings a certain clarity to 
the process.  If government formation and termination is not covered by any rules, these 
processes must by necessity be dictated either by convention, the role of an external figure 
(such as the Head of State) or political expediency.  But even if formal rules do exist, they may 
be vague or open to interpretation.  The impartiality and legitimacy of the government 
process requires the rules themselves to be clear.  This indicates the importance of the 
constitutional rules’ intrinsic properties.  But the rules also have extrinsic or instrumental 
properties which must also be taken into account.  As I shall point out below, the nature of the 
rules affects, among others: whether minority governments may be formed, or whether 
majority administrations are privileged; the relative balance between the executive and the 
legislature and between large and small parties; and the stability of governments. 
 
The criteria I use to evaluate the different constitutional rules in my study countries flow from 
these intrinsic and extrinsic properties.  Thus, as far as possible, well designed rules should 
provide clarity, they should be broadly neutral between parties of different sizes, they should 
maintain the impartiality of the Head of State, they should minimise the chances of deadlock 
and undue delay in the formation process and they should maximise government stability. 
 
What are the significant rules concerning the formation and termination of governments?  
One comparative researcher (De Winter, 1995: 123) lists the principal rules as covering: 
 
1. The terms on which a government holds power 
• The requirement to hold an investiture vote and, if so, of what form 




2. The means by which a government is chosen 
• The role of the Head of State 
 
3. The authority of a government to gain a dissolution of parliament 
 
4. The maximum time between elections. 
 
We might add to this list the rules covering the resignation of the incumbent prime minister at 
elections, either once the election has been called or after the election if the result is unclear.  A 
summary of the constitutional rules covering government formation and termination for 
various western democracies is set out in Table 5. 
 
A more detailed comparison of the arrangements in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and for 
Westminster, is set out in Table 6.  This highlights the sheer variety in the rules applicable 
within the UK.  The most interesting variations relate to the new institutions in Scotland and 
Wales (since, as noted above, the circumstances in Northern Ireland are unique).  The 
legislation establishing the Scottish Parliament is far more detailed than its Welsh counterpart 
on government formation providing, for example, for time limits on the duration process and 
for the recall of the legislature after an election.  No doubt the detail in the ‘Scotland Act 1998’ 
is due to its designers’ anticipation of coalition governments, while those in Wales appear to 
have paid less attention to this possibility.  The nature of the institutions also plays a role.  
Thus, the Scotland Act provides for a dissolution of the legislature – on a two thirds majority 
vote – while no such provision is made for Wales.  This reflects the fact that the Welsh 
Assembly does not have primary legislative powers or the authority to block the 
government’s supply (Ward, 2000: 124-5).  It is also a collegiate body, lacking clearly distinct 
executive and legislative arms.  But while these factors may, ordinarily, preclude the need for 
premature dissolutions, exceptional circumstances, such as deadlock in the choice of a First 
Minister, require that such a provision be made (see page 44). 
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Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands New 
Zealand 
Norway Scotland Sweden Wales 
              
Formal rules covering government 
formation? 
Yes Yes Yes No1 Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
              
Involvement of Head of State? Yes Yes No No2 Yes No No Yes No Yes No No3 No 
              
Designated formateur? Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes4 No 
              
Rules for choice of formateur? Yes5 Yes5 No - No - - Yes5 - No - No - 
              
Use of informateurs? No Yes Yes6 No No No No Yes No No No No No 
              
Investiture vote required? No Yes No Yes7 No Yes7 Yes7 No No No Yes7 Yes7 Yes7 
              
Government resignation at election? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No 
              
Dissolution power of PM? Yes8 Yes8 Yes Yes No No9 Yes10 Yes8 Yes No Yes11 Yes12 No 
              
 
Notes 
‘Formal rules covering government formation’: Defined as being a body of rules or conventions that structure/provide an order to the formation process, usually by providing for a ‘first mover’. 
‘Involvement of Head of State?’: Involvement is defined as having at least some discretion in which party leader to nominate as prime minister. 
 
1    Not since 2000. 
2   The President played a strong role prior to 2000, but new constitutional rules give more power to parliament. 
3   Since 1975, the monarch has played no part in the formation process, the role having transferred to the Speaker of the Riksdag. 
4   A formateur may be, but is not always, designated.  If no formateur is selected, the parties simply bargain among themselves. 
5   The leader of the largest party is entitled to begin negotiations.  This is merely a convention in most countries. 
6   This is the exception rather than the rule. 
7   The Prime Minister is chosen by parliament. 
8   Only with majority support in parliament. 
9   Dissolution only if a government loses a no confidence vote 
10  The President retains the discretion to refuse a dissolution request but has never done so. 
11 Only with two thirds support in parliament. 
12  Any dissolution is in addition to, and does not replace, regular three yearly elections. 
 








Scottish Parliament Welsh Assembly N Ireland Assembly 
 
Constitutionally stipulated deadline 
for recall of parliament after election 
 
 
None; convention of one 




First meeting called by Secretary of 
State.  No provision for Assembly to 




Time limit on formation 
 




None First Minister, ministers and 
junior ministers 
 
First Minister First Minister, Deputy First Minister 
Investiture threshold 
 
- Relative majority Relative majority Majorities in (a) Assembly and (b) 
among each of nationalist/unionist 
members.  Ministers are elected by 
Assembly using d’Hondt formula 
 
Role of Head of State 
 
Appoints Prime Minister Appoints First Minister, 
ministers and junior 
ministers 
 
No appointment role No appointment role 
Size of the executive 
 
No limits (apart from a 
maximum limit of 95 
ministers drawn from the 
Commons). 
No limits Maximum of nine ministers, plus as 
many Assembly Secretaries as there 
are ministers plus 2 





Non-fixed 5 years 
 
Semi-fixed 4 years.  Election 
cancelled if dissolution <6 
months before polling date. 
 
 
Fixed 4 years 
 
Non-fixed 4 years 
Dissolution rules 
 
Available to PM at any time. Two thirds majority among 
all members; or if no First 
Minister within 28 days 
 
No provision Two thirds majority among all 
members; or if no FM/DFM within 6 
weeks  
Rules on resignation of  
executive 
 
No confidence motion 
passed by simple majority.  
Elections follow. 
No confidence motion 
passed by simple majority.  
Parliament attempts to find 
a new executive within 28 
days. 
No confidence motion passed by 
simple majority.  Assembly must find 
a new executive, since no provision for 
a dissolution. 
First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister can only be ousted by a two 




Government formation and termination: Positive and negative parliamentarism 
In ‘parliamentary’ political systems, a government must always retain the support of the 
legislature to survive.  But what is a government’s relationship to the legislature when it 
enters office; what level of support must it obtain?  Across parliamentary systems, two main 
models have been identified: ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ parliamentarism (Bergman, 1993).  
Under negative conditions, a government may take office under one of two conditions: (i) if, 
when an investiture vote is held, there is no absolute majority in parliament against the 
government; or (ii) if no investiture vote is required.  The conditions are more onerous under 
positive conditions.  Here, an investiture vote is always required22, and a government must 
satisfy one of the following: (i) winning the vote with an absolute majority; or (ii) winning the 
vote with a relative majority (ie. a majority of votes cast).  What this amounts to is that, under 
negative rules, a government must merely be tolerated by parliament to be formed, while 
under positive rules, it must gain the active support of parliament. 
 
Negative rules are more likely to be found in countries with a monarchy, since their 
provisions reflect the role of the monarch, as opposed to parliament, in appointing the prime 
minister.  Countries with more recent constitutions (eg. Germany and Sweden) tend to have 
introduced more stringent rules covering the formation and termination of governments 
(Strøm, 1990: 25, 111; Müller and Strøm, 2000a: 567).  Countries with strong links to the 
Westminster model, derived from the UK’s parliamentary tradition, have diverged in the 
extent to which they have mimicked its negative provisions on government formation.  In 
spite of shifting from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral system, New Zealand has 
broadly retained the rules established under the previous political regime.  But Scotland has 
moved away from the Westminster tradition.  Its First Minister must pass a parliamentary 
investiture vote before attaining office and, once there, is denied the recourse to a dissolution 
seen as the right of Westminster prime ministers (a dissolution of the Scottish Parliament 
being dependent on two thirds support among MSPs). 
 
Positive and negative parliamentary rules cover not only the formation of governments, but 
also their termination (de Winter, 1995: 134-9).  In the main, the type of termination rule tends 
to mirror the formation rule.  Thus, countries that oblige governments to obtain an absolute 
majority in parliament before taking office (eg. Germany and Spain), also stipulate that, for 
that government to be overthrown in parliament, a no confidence vote must obtain an 
absolute majority (moreover, that majority must also agree on a successor to the prime 
minister; the ‘constructive’ no confidence provision).  At the opposite end of the scale, 
countries (eg. Britain, Denmark, New Zealand and Norway) that don’t insist on an investiture 
vote for incoming governments, often also stipulate that no confidence motions need only 
secure a relative majority to be successful.  In between, some countries (eg. Sweden) set 
relatively loose conditions for the formation of governments, but tighter ones for their 
termination, or vice versa (eg. the Netherlands).  Others (eg. Ireland and Italy) provide a level 
playing field: governments taking office and oppositions overthrowing them must both 
achieve majorities among those taking part in the vote (ie. relative majorities).23 
                                                     
22 Although there is no investiture vote in the Netherlands, there is a convention that a government 
must command majority support within the legislature (Bergman, 2000: 202). 
23 The formal rules don’t identify what type of issue requires a government resignation in the event of a 
parliamentary defeat.  In most countries, a government will only resign if defeated on a specific no 
confidence vote or on a very major policy issue, normally the budget or finance bill.  However, in 
Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Finland, a government will usually step down if defeated on a 




Figure 2 sets this out in diagrammatic form.  Within this schema, Scotland and Wales exhibit a 
hybrid position.  In both, the executive may be overthrown if a no confidence motion 
supported by a relative majority is passed.  But to achieve office, a government must clear a 
‘positive’ parliamentary hurdle in the form of the election by the legislature of the First 
Minister.  This requirement, similar to that in Ireland, represents a de facto investiture vote, 
with a relative majority required for the Head to be appointed. 
 
These rules would be of interest mainly to constitutional lawyers were it not for the fact that 
they have a strong influence on the type of government formed.  In particular, the nature of 
the investiture rules shapes the likelihood of a majority or minority government being formed.  
Thus, comparative studies have found that, among countries with positive formation rules, 
minority administrations constitute one quarter (25%) of all governments formed between 
1945 and 1987, a far lower level than in countries with negative formation rules, where the 
proportion of minority administrations is almost half (48%) (Bergman, 1993: 60-1). 
                                                                                                                                                                        
government is often confused.  For example, the convention in Ireland appears to be that a government 
may remain in office until suffering an explicit no confidence vote or defeat on the main Finance Bill, 
yet Garret Fitzgerald resigned in 1982 after being defeated only on part of his coalition’s Finance Bill 
(Laver, 1996: 476; Ward, 1996). 
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Figure 2: ‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ parliamentary rules 
 
 










* The convention is that a government must command an absolute majority in parliament. 
Sources: Bergman, 1993; de Winter, 1995; Boston, 1998; Strøm and Müller, 2000 
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Identifying a prime minister 
 
The ordered v unordered process 
The first step in the government formation process is to identify a potential new prime 
minister.  After an inconclusive election in multi-party conditions, such figures are identified 
in one of two ways.  The first involves the Head of State (usually, though not always, the 
monarch) selecting a party leader to start the negotiations.  The second leaves the Head of 
State out of the start of the process, which is a matter for the parties alone.  These bargain 
among themselves until one party, or a combination of parties in coalition, believes it has 
sufficient strength to operate as a government.  The Head of State may, at this stage, play a 
purely ceremonial role in appointing the new prime minister.  In other words, one set of 
arrangements creates order by virtue of selecting a single party leader to begin the 
negotiations, while the other allows the parties to bargain as they wish.  In the comparative 
literature, the distinction is between a “freestyle” process and a rule bound one (Laver and 
Schofield, 1990: 206-11).  In practice, the distinction may not be so straightforward.  For 
example, a country’s formal constitutional rules may provide for an external agent to select a 
‘first mover’, but in reality such a figure emerges from inter-party bargaining with the agent 
on hand at this point to present his/her nominee to parliament (as is the case in Sweden).  
Bearing in mind such caveats, we can draw a distinction between countries thus: 
 
• Countries operating an ‘ordered’ or ‘rule bound’ process: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden 
• Countries operating an ‘unordered’ or ‘freestyle’ process: Finland (after 2000), Germany, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales 
 
Over the last fifty years, the process of appointing the British prime minister has been 
relatively straightforward.  Only in February 1974 has no party gained an outright majority of 
seats.  Only then has the question arisen about which party leader should be asked by the 
monarch to form a government.  But what happens if the result of the February 1974 election 
was repeated on a regular basis?  In the absence of a majority winner, under what process 
would a government be formed? 
 
Britain falls into the ‘unordered bargaining’ set of countries, in that no single party leader is 
designated with the task of forming a government (this figure is known as the formateur).  The 
convention is that this task falls first to the incumbent prime minister.24  But if inconclusive 
elections became the norm, this convention would be called into question, since the mere fact 
of incumbency might not be held to confer such special advantages.  Moreover, the absence of 
any requirement for an incoming government to test its support in the legislature facilitates 
minority government.  It is thus perfectly possible for an incumbent government to lose its 
majority at an election, but to remain in office and challenge the opposition to unseat it.  The 
minority bias of the current conventions might come under challenge from smaller parties in a 
genuinely multi-party situation, as they seek rules that maximise their own power in the 
formation process.  In sum, Britain’s current constitutional conventions: 
                                                     
24 After virtually each election in Britain, it is clear which party leader commands majority support in 
parliament, and the monarch can therefore appoint a prime minister immediately.  But the designation 
need not be immediate if there is a question mark over the support a candidate enjoys.  Thus, in 1963, 
the monarch invited Alec Douglas-Home to form a government and to report back on progress, since 
some uncertainty hung over his support among the Conservative party so soon after the previous 




“… offer an advantage to the incumbent prime minister by yielding him or her a strong 
tactical position in the confused aftermath of an indecisive election.  Since the rules 
encourage the formation of single party minority governments, they strengthen the position 
of the major parties at the expense of the minor ones, freeing a prime minister from the need 
to consult with other parties or to negotiate the formation of a government which can 
command a majority in the House of Commons.” (Bogdanor, 1995: 163) 
 
In countries operating an ordered process of coalition formation, the incumbent prime 
minister doesn’t occupy a privileged position.  He or she will merely be one of the players 
considered as a potential formateur.  But in unordered systems, the initial advantage in 
government formation often accrues to the incumbent.  In most countries, prime ministers are 
not expected to resign immediately before or after an election, but may stay in post until 
ejected by a replacement.  Under these arrangements, a prime minister in charge of a 
government enjoying only minority status may thus simply remain in office if the majority 
opposition cannot agree to replace him/her. 
 
The privileged position of the incumbent even extends to post-election situations in which the 
prime minister no longer heads the largest party.  Take the February 1974 election, in which 
the Conservative party of the prime minister, Ted Heath, had not only come second in terms 
of seats in the Commons, but had also lost seats since the previous election (thus being an 
electoral loser in two senses).  But Heath did not resign, preferring instead to seek a coalition 
with the Liberals.  Ultimately, this attempt to retain power failed.  But it illustrates the 
incumbent prime minister’s dominant position in the post-election environment.  Thus, under 
the UK’s conventions “until a government has resigned, the question of whom to appoint as 
prime minister does not arise, for there is no vacancy” (Bogdanor, 1995: 151).   
 
This matters because whoever holds the ‘first mover’ position commands significant powers.  
In positive vein, they can entice potential coalition partners by offering office and patronage 
benefits, while in negative vein the opposition parties may be unwilling to vote down in the 
legislature a government put together by the first mover, since they will be concerned at 
forcing fresh elections so soon after the initial contest (Bogdanor, 1983b).  Incumbency might 
also provide a governing party with greater access to civil service resources during coalition 
negotiations (see Chapter 3).  If the political rules also confer on a prime minister the power to 
gain a dissolution on request (pages 50-3), the first mover enjoys even greater advantages, 
since he/she may form a minority administration with a view to bolstering their position via 
fresh elections months later.  This is exactly what happened in Britain in 1974, when 
inconclusive elections in February led to a minority Labour government which capitalised on 
favourable conditions just eight months later in October to gain a slim majority at fresh 
elections. 
 
The first question facing constitutional designers, then, is whether the incumbent government 
should retain any privileged position following an election, or whether the parties should 
start on an even keel by virtue of the government being forced to resign unless it has clearly 
won a fresh mandate?  In only a handful of countries are governments required – by 
convention or constitutional rule – to step down at an election: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France and the Netherlands (see Table 5).  In some unordered systems (eg. Germany, and 
Ireland until recently), elections have tended to be fairly conclusive for government 




However, if governments may remain in office after an election, but lack the power to gain a 
dissolution of parliament, then the advantages of office decline somewhat, and a more level 
playing field between the parties is possible.  In this situation, there is less need for a 
government to have to resign.  But an additional appropriate safeguard requires any new 
government to demonstrate some level of parliamentary support, via an investiture vote 
(pages 47-9).  In an unordered bargaining system, with no requirement for a new government 
to test its support in parliament, an initial sensible step might be to require the incumbent 
government to resign at an election to nullify any advantage it might gain in an inconclusive 
bargaining situation. 
 
Selecting the ‘first mover’ 
The second question for consideration is whom should be appointed to lead inter-party 
bargaining?  In countries where the formation process is not subject to ordering, there is no 
designated formateur, and the question for the Head of State becomes merely whether the 
party leader (who may or may not be the incumbent prime minister) who emerges from any 
bargaining and claims a mandate to govern does, indeed, command the necessary support in 
parliament.  In countries that hold investiture votes, this decision is effectively made by the 
legislature.  Thus, in Germany and Ireland, a party leader must obtain the support of 
parliament before being sworn into office by the Head of State.  The same is true in Scotland.25  
Where the Head of State must initially make a judgement on whom to nominate to parliament 
– in Germany, for example – this decision is often aided by the clarity of election results. 
 
In systems where no investiture vote is held, the nomination of the Head of State assumes 
greater significance, and he or she may well demand an assurance that the incoming 
government is at least viable, in the sense of commanding sufficient legislative support to win 
a confidence motion.  This is the safeguard used by the Governor General in New Zealand 
(Boston, 1998: 26), and could also be adopted by the UK in a multi-party situation (Bogdanor, 
1995: 165; Brazier, 1999: 40-44).  Ideally, however, an incoming government should have to 
test its strength in the legislature (see pages 47-9). 
 
So in ‘unordered’ systems, the responsibility for identifying a new government rests squarely 
with the parties.  But what happens if, following an election or mid-term resignation of a 
government, the parties cannot agree on a successor who commands the necessary legislative 
support (a scenario only likely to arise when at least a relative majority is needed in an 
investiture vote)?  How would such a deadlock be broken?  One means would be to introduce 
some order to the formation process, for example by giving the Head of State the discretion to 
appoint a party leader as a formateur.  The appointment of a formateur by the Head of State 
“provides a structure to what might otherwise by a chaotic process, thereby reducing the 
possibility of deadlock” (Laver, 1996: 478).  But, should the formateur be no more successful, a 
lower threshold may be required to end any deadlock.  Thus in Germany, the constitution 
(Art. 63) provides for a series of parliamentary votes on a chancellor over a fourteen day 
period followed, should voting have failed to produce a candidate with an absolute majority, 
for the President to appoint the candidate with the highest number of votes or, alternatively, 
to call fresh elections.  Under the Finnish constitution, the parliament has two shots at electing 
a prime minister by a relative majority, after which the candidate who receives a simple 
plurality is elected. 
 
                                                     
25 In Wales, the Head of State has no role in appointing the First Minister, which is a task solely for the 
Assembly.   
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What arrangements are there in Scotland and Wales for the possibility of deadlock in the 
formation of a new government?  In Scotland, the First Minister is elected by a relative 
majority of MSPs within a 28 day period.  If, in the very unlikely event that no-one has been 
selected within this period, the Scottish Parliament can be dissolved and fresh elections held.  
But in Wales, there is no provision for resolving any deadlock.  This omission was almost put 
to the test in February 2000, when a no confidence motion was passed against the incumbent 
First Secretary, Alun Michael.  Following this vote, the suggestion was made that the Labour 
group could re-nominate Michael as First Secretary.  Ignoring its constitutional legitimacy, 
such a move risked opening the prospect of an unending sequence of nominations and 
rebuttals in the form of no confidence votes.  There is clearly a need for a mechanism to break 
any such deadlocks, along the lines of the Scottish provision for a dissolution, once a certain 
time limit has been reached. 
 
In countries that impose an order on the formation process, a government still emerges via 
inter-party bargaining, but only after one party is given the lead role by the Head of State (or 
Speaker of the parliament in Sweden).  In this model, the question is by what criterion is the 
first mover chosen (the ‘recognition rule’; Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994: 312-2)?  A frequent 
convention (eg. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands) or explicit rule (eg. Greece) is to select 
the leader of the largest party, on the basis that they command an electoral mandate. But 
while this rule brings clarity, it may fail to recognise the post election balance of power 
between the parties, since it will often be the case that the largest party is not the one best 
placed to form the largest, or potentially most durable, coalition. 
 
Other countries have more elaborate arrangements for identifying the formateur.  In Denmark, 
should an election produce an inconclusive result, the Head of State is provided with advice 
from the parties.26  Under this ‘Queen’s Round’, the party leaders individually convey their 
advice to the monarch on whom they recommend to be chosen as formateur.  The 
responsibility for interpreting this advice falls to the incumbent prime minister, not the 
monarch.  If one party leader is seen to command majority support in the legislature, he or she 
is appointed as formateur; if not, the person with the best chance of forming a viable 
government is given the task.  If there is no obvious person to lead the negotiations, the 
monarch may, on the advice of the parties, appoint someone to conduct further talks among 
the parties to see whether a formateur can be identified (this person, the informateur, may well 
become the formateur, especially when the person appointed is the incumbent prime minister).  
The designation of an informateur was necessary in 1975 and 1988, with the Speaker of the 
Folketing asked to try to break the deadlock (Boston, 1998: 34-6; Damgaard, 2000: 237-43).27 
 
It might be thought unwise to give the incumbent prime minister a role in advising the Head 
of State on coalition options in the event of an inconclusive election.  After all, this person may 
                                                     
26 If the result is conclusive, there is no need to resort to the Queen’s Round.  Thus, in 1998, the Social 
Democrat led coalition simply remained in office after the election without any need for reappointment 
by the monarch.  A single Round followed the 2001 election, after the incumbent prime minister 
resigned.  Four parties holding a majority of seats recommended that the Liberal leader, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, be given the task of forming a government.  The resulting administration included only 
two parties holding a minority of seats, although assured of majority support in the legislature. 
27 This is not to say that the Danish process is wholly constrained and formal, since a fair amount of 
informal bargaining continues and helps to make sure the formal process operates smoothly.  For a 
start, the parties consult with one another immediately after the election so that their advice to the 
monarch is delivered with good knowledge of one another’s positions.  It is also common for the formal 
bargaining process to be paralleled by informal talks between the parties (Damgaard, 2000: 241). 
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well be a major player themselves, and thus have their own interests to look after.  For this 
reason, one commentator (Bogdanor, 1995) has cast doubt on the idea that the British monarch 
might look to the incumbent for advice after an election.  In Denmark, my interviews 
suggested that the role of the incumbent prime minister had not generally proved 
controversial, although there have been instances where some small parties have queried the 
interpretation of their recommendations. 
 
The Head of State might avoid courting controversy in designating a prime minister by 
transferring this responsibility to an independent figure, or informateur, a senior political 
figure not engaged closely in partisan party matters.  The job of the informateur is act on behalf 
of the monarch in exploring the viability of different coalitions.  However, the specific role of 
this figure varies between countries.  In Belgium, he or she may start inter-party negotiations 
by drawing up a list of items for discussion.  In the Netherlands, the job entails discussions 
with the parties and the identification of the most suitable figure – the formateur – to lead the 
negotiations (de Winter, Timmermans and Dumont, 2000: 309-10; Timmermans and 
Andeweg, 2000: 362-3).  But the use of informateurs has gained little support in Britain.  One 
concern is that the selected figure might themselves behave in a partisan fashion (Butler, 
1986).28  A second is that the model is just not needed in Britain, since the monarch already has 
a circle of expert advisers (notably her Private Secretary) on whom to draw for advice 
(Bogdanor, 1995: 169-72). 
 
An ordered or unordered formation process? 
Government formation proceeds through one of two models.  The first leaves the bargaining 
process to the parties, the winner being whoever can command the support of parliament.  
The second restricts the parties’ bargaining options by giving a single party the first ‘bite of 
the cherry’.  Having outlined the main features of the two models, I now explore briefly their 
relative merits. 
 
What criteria should be used in reaching judgements?  I suggest the following: 
 
• The speed of the process: While the formation of a government is not to be rushed, it is also 
undesirable for the process to become drawn out.  Is there any evidence that an ordered 
bargaining environment is more or less prone to such an outcome than an unordered one? 
 
• The clarity of the process: It is desirable that the bargaining process be clear and orderly, 
without the parties bargaining incessantly among themselves to maximise their own 
advantage. 
 
• The balance between the parties: As a general rule, the chances of a party taking part in 
bargaining and entering government should grow as that party increases its share of seats.  
In other words, bargaining power should be weighted in broad proportion to a party’ size.  
The formation rules should thus avoid undue weighting of power, either to large parties 
that can then ignore smaller ones, or to smaller ones to play off large parties. 
                                                     
28 This is also seen as a problem with an even more radical solution, the Swedish arrangement by which 
the Speaker of the Riksdag, not the Monarch, leads government formation.  But disputes between and 
within the parties in the 1970s over whom to nominate as Speaker highlight the often partisan process 
from which the Speaker emerges (Bogdanor, 1995: 172-4).  The fierce and divisive contest for the 
Speaker of the House of Commons in October 2000 hardly suggests that the UK looks to the Swedish 




• The position of the Head of State: The balance between ensuring the impartiality of the 
monarch and providing for a non-partisan external ‘agent’ to help break any deadlock in 
the formation process is a crucial one.  However, the role of the monarch opens a host of 
issues in its own right, and has been dealt with extensively elsewhere (eg. Bogdanor, 1995; 
Brazier, 1999).  For this reason, I don’t pursue further these issues here. 
 
In terms of the speed of the government formation process, there is little difference between 
countries with ordered or unordered arrangements.  The formation of governments in 
Belgium may be drawn out in part because the process is highly structured (de Winter, 
Timmermans and Dumont, 2000: 309).  But the formation of a coalition in New Zealand’s 
unordered system in 1996 also took a long time, at two months.  If we take the duration of 
cabinet formation for the countries studied in a recent comparative volume, we find that the 
average duration among countries with an ordered bargaining process29 is much longer, at 31 
days than that among countries operating unordered arrangements, across which formation 
takes an average of 12 days (Müller and Strøm, 2000: 570).  But there are large variations 
within these categories, as well as within countries themselves, suggesting that factors such as 
the extent of party system fragmentation and the desire of particular proto-coalitions to form 
‘tight’ or ‘loose’ agreements may be more important than the constitutional rules (ibid: 571-2). 
 
These rules may have more impact when it comes to the clarity of the formation process, since 
they constrain the bargaining options open to the parties.  For example, following its first PR 
election in 1996, New Zealand’s unordered arrangement allowed a centre party, New Zealand 
First, to play off the parties to its left and right, Labour and National.  This led to a drawn out 
and uncertain bargaining process, generally deemed to have been highly unsatisfactory 
(Boston, 1998: 5-7).  By designating a single party leader as the instigator of the process, or 
‘first mover’, greater order is given to the process and parallel bargaining is largely avoided.  
Parties are also constrained if they have to state openly their coalition preferences.  The advice 
that the parties give to the monarch in Denmark during the ‘Queen’s Round’ is made public, 
and thus binds them, in theory at least, to a specific coalition option. 
 
But any rule which limits parties’ bargaining power tends to have the most impact on parties 
in the centre who otherwise can play off larger parties on the right and left to maximise their 
office and/or policy gains.  As such ‘kingmaker’ parties are usually small ones, rule bound 
systems thus tend, all things being equal, to weaken the power of small parties in favour of 
the larger ones. 
 
It is important to stress that there is no right or wrong answer to the question of which 
institutional model is most appropriate for government formation in multi-party situations.  
In the wake of New Zealand’s long and messy government formation in 1996, commentators 
recommended that more stringent rules be introduced, including giving the Speaker of 
Parliament the task of designating a single party leader as formateur (Boston, 1998: 104-8).  A 
similar concern can also be seen among Irish commentators who have noted that, since the 
early 1980s, government formation has taken progressively longer.  Again, the solution is seen 
to be the introduction of order into the process by explicitly giving one party leader the task of 
negotiating a government (Farrell, 1990: 189; 1993: 146).  The Irish experience suggests that 
                                                     
29 Those countries judged to have a ‘Formal procedure of government formation’ (Müller and Strøm, 
2000a: 566).  Sweden is not included, since the constitutional rules covering government formation were 
changed in 1975. 
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parties may take some time to adjust to a coalition environment; it was only in 1997 that the 
parties may be said to have adapted fully to coalition politics by forming two main pre-
electoral alliances that facilitated a speedy change of government after the election (Mitchell, 
1999: 243-4).  On the other hand, the first coalition in Scotland was put together in 1999 
quickly and with minimum fuss (although this was no doubt aided by the limited party 
system fragmentation, the existing close relations between the coalition partners and the 
existence of a ‘pariah’ party, the Scottish Nationalist Party). 
 
Provided that the main actors – the political parties – behave sensibly and with an eye to the 
legitimacy of the political system as a whole, I see no reason to impose constraints on the 
bargaining process.30  The role of an external agent should be limited to nominating the leader 
who emerges from inter-party bargaining and possibly, in the case of deadlock, to nominating 
a formateur.  The latter step might be more appropriate than providing for a dissolution of 
parliament and fresh elections.  Although this is the rule adopted in Scotland, a second 
election hard on the heels of the first would be unpopular with voters.  On the other hand, it 
may be thought preferable to avoid the Head of State playing any role at all in the 
government formation process.  If so, deadlock between the parties may be ended by reducing 
the investiture requirement to a simple plurality, rather than a majority (as in Finland and 
Germany).  Making provision for the resolution of any deadlock, as well as encouraging 
relatively speedy government formation through a thirty day limit to the recall of parliament 
(see Chapter 3), seems to me to be an appropriate, if limited, set of institutional rules.  Forcing 
the parties to state publicly at the outset of negotiations their preferences, as in Denmark, 
might constrain their bargaining options, but would not prevent them reneging on their 
public commitments if they felt the rewards of doing so were sufficiently high (Boston, 1998: 
106).  For this reason, and because such a step would be alien to British parties, I don’t 
recommend this additional constraint. 
 
The investiture of a new government 
Once a potential prime minister has been identified, the next question is whether or not he or 
she should have to submit to a formal test of strength before being sworn in.  In other words, 
is it enough that a potential government has emerged from the bargaining process, or should 
it also have to receive the support of parliament before taking office?  Three types of 
reasoning underpin this question.  The first relates to the legitimacy of a government.  If there 
is no investiture requirement, how can we be sure that a potentially stronger alternative 
administration does not exist?  The second relates to the position of the incumbent 
administration, in particular whether it gains a – potentially unfair – advantage by the absence 
of any need to test its strength in parliament.  The third relates to the issue of whether a 
government may command only a plurality of legislative seats (ie. a minority administration) 
or whether it should command majority support.31 
                                                     
30 The designation of a formateur involves the use either of an objective criterion (such as the selection of 
the leader of the party commanding the largest number of seats), or a more subjective process whereby 
the Head of State, or similar figure, takes advice from the parties themselves.  Both situations strike me 
as being sub-optimal. 
31 A further issue is what or who should be the subject of parliamentary votes.  Should the legislature be 
able to vote solely on the prime minister (Germany, Ireland, Wales), or the prime minister and 
ministers separately (Scotland) or the government as a whole (Belgium)?  In Scotland, both ministers 
and junior ministers have to be supported by parliament before they can take office.  The votes are for 
both lists en bloc; there is no voting on individuals, which avoids the problem of the parliament ‘cherry 




The first is not a particularly serious issue.  In countries without investiture requirements, a 
government is likely to have to convince the Head of State that it is viable, in the sense of not 
being opposed by a majority in the legislature.  If there is any miscalculation and a 
government is installed that is not viable, it should be an option for the Head of State to allow 
the other parties to form an alternative government, and not to give the failed incumbent the 
opportunity of a second chance via a dissolution of parliament and fresh elections (see next 
section). 
 
The second issue asks whether an incumbent administration can, in the absence of an 
alternative stronger government, merely continue in office after an election?  As I noted 
above, in only a few west European countries must a government resign at elections.  In 
countries such as Britain, Denmark and New Zealand, no investiture vote is required and it is 
thus an option for a government to remain in office in the aftermath of an election.  
Governments in all parliamentary democracies only hold office by virtue of the support of 
parliament, and in this sense, even governments that face no investiture vote still face 
parliamentary tests each time they expose themselves to the possibility of a no confidence 
vote.  But in a situation in which a government can hold office without a formal vote at the 
outset, the incentives and constraints differ from a situation in which an investiture vote is 
required, and in a way that favours the incumbent government.  Thus, in the absence of an 
investiture vote, the burden of proof passes to the opposition to demonstrate the unsuitability 
of a government via a no confidence vote.  A no confidence vote is not merely the obverse of 
an investiture vote, since a party may be unwilling to unseat a government that is already in 
office, but less reticent about voting against a potential administration at the investiture stage.  
The absence of an investiture vote thus privileges the incumbent government, which 
represents the “reversion point” in the event that the other parties fail to agree an alternative 
government (Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994: 311-2). 
 
For this reason, I think it desirable that any new government should have to demonstrate at 
least some support in parliament before taking office.  Put simply, governments could not just 
‘trundle on’ after an election; the legislature would need to actively assent to their 
continuation. 
 
But what level of support should be required?  The basic distinctions are between systems that 
require governments (or nominated prime ministers) to have the support of an absolute 
majority, those requiring the support of a relative majority and those that switch the burden of 
proof and require the opposition to show that they command the majority.  The first two are 
features of the ‘positive’ model of parliamentarism, the third a feature of the ‘negative’ model 
(pages 38-41).  Governments formed under positive investiture rules need not command 
majority support; Italy’s 1976 government under Giulio Andreotti won its investiture vote 
despite only being supported by 258 deputies out of 630.  The crucial point is that a relative 
majority was sufficient because all but 44 of the remaining deputies abstained, and 
abstentions are effectively counted in favour of the government (Strøm, Budge and Laver, 
1994: 311).  Nonetheless, positive rules tend to inhibit minority governments, whereas 
negative parliamentarism – where there is no investiture vote or where the onus lies with the 
opposition to show that it holds the majority – is more conducive to minority administrations. 
 
Constitutional designers are thus faced with the decision whether to introduce rules that 
favour majority administrations or to select rules that at least do not hinder minority 
governments.  Should there be a bias in favour of governments that command majority 
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support in the legislature?  In multi-party situations with proportional elections, this question 
effectively asks whether a government should command majority support among the 
electorate, to which the answer must, in ideal conditions, be yes.  Under majoritarian electoral 
systems, government majorities are frequently constructed on mere pluralities of the vote, 
while proportional systems reduce, if not end, such ‘anomalies’ (Powell, 2000: 127-36).  But 
this is not to say that a coalition government should only take office if it holds more than half 
the seats in the legislature (effectively the German system, where a government must win an 
investiture vote with an absolute majority).  It does no harm to the majoritarian principle for a 
– minority – government to pass an investiture vote with the support of only a relative 
majority and to then form coalitions in the legislature with one or more of the opposition 
parties to gain passage for its programme.  In such situations, a government may not gain the 
active support of an absolute majority at the start of its term or during that term as it puts 
legislation before parliament.  But it gains the de facto support of parties not opposed to its 
existence and thus willing to tolerate the administration by abstaining on key votes.  What a 
minority government cannot surmount, of course, is active opposition among a majority of 
the legislature, which is sufficient to bring down any government. 
 
So normatively, I suggest the criterion of majority support does not incline us clearly to one 
form of investiture rule or another.  What about a more empirical test, that of government 
performance.  Are majority governments to be preferred to their minority counterparts on the 
basis that they are more stable or perform better?  This is certainly a viewpoint held by many, 
both in majoritarian systems such as Britain (eg. Birch, 1984) and proportional ones, such as 
Germany where minority government is associated with instability and inefficiency 
(Broughton and Kirchner, 1986: 77-8).  However, using a simple set of cross-national data, I 
suggest that these fears may be exaggerated.  Minority governments are no less durable than 
majority administrations, and are less likely than majority coalitions to fall due to defeat in 
parliament or to an internal ‘crisis’. 
 
To address the issue of stability, I compare government duration in eleven countries with high 
and low incidence of minority governments.  I define the former as those countries in which 
minority administrations have formed 40% or more of all governments between 1945 and 
1987 – Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden – with the other five countries 
having a lower proportion of minority governments (Strøm, 1990: 58).  To assess stability, I 
draw on data showing mean relative government duration (duration, in days, as a proportion 
of the maximum possible duration32) for 16 west European countries, between 1945 and 1999 
(Saalfeld, 2001: 12-13).33  The difference in government duration between the two groups is 
not great: mean duration in countries with a high incidence of minority administrations is 62% 
of the possible maximum, only slightly lower than the 64% for countries dominated by 
majority administrations.  This finding reinforces analysis based on the more conventional 
accounting device of mean duration, which shows that majority coalitions last little longer 
than minority governments (Strøm, 1990: 115-7). 
 
                                                     
32 This measure is more meaningful than simply using actual mean duration, since it takes account of 
the different parliamentary terms across countries (the maximum time period between elections, or 
‘constitutional inter-election period’).  The measure also takes account of governments formed in 
between elections, whose possible lifespan will necessarily be shorter than for governments formed 
immediately after an election. 
33 I omit the UK from the analysis, since I am comparing countries with proportional electoral systems 
and multi-party systems. 
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What about the performance of minority governments?  Since policy effectiveness is 
influenced by a wide range of institutional and non-institutional factors, evaluations of 
minority governments must draw on alternative measures.  One analysis examines the mode 
of government terminations, on the basis that the circumstances surrounding a government’s 
demise provide an indication as to its effectiveness.  On the one hand, we have terminations 
due to ‘defeat or crisis’ (when a government is forced to resign, through a parliamentary no 
confidence motion, or does so under adversity), becoming more benign with ‘voluntary’ 
resignations (when a coalition is under no strong pressure to resign, but does so to change its 
membership) and finally – and most benign – ‘technical’ resignations (as when a government 
continues in office after an election, so that its termination is merely a function of a rule that 
counts elections as marking a change in government).  Empirical analysis shows that, while 
less than half of majority single party governments terminate due to defeat or crisis, six in ten 
minority governments fall in the same way.  But this is a lower rate than for majority 
coalitions, over 80% of which fall due to defeat or crisis.  Minority governments are more 
likely than majority coalitions to terminate voluntarily.  But overall, the data suggest that 
minority governments – which may, of course, be single party – are no less internally riven 
and unstable than majority coalitions (Strøm, 1990: 117-23). 
 
There is thus little case on purely pragmatic grounds for designing an investiture vote so as to 
ward off the possibility of minority governments (there are, of course, normative objections, 
referred to briefly in Chapter 6).  If an investiture vote is to be held, this implies that an 
incoming government must either gain the support of a majority of legislative votes actually 
cast (a relative majority) or must merely avoid a majority voting against it.  The latter is, of 
course, a less onerous position for the government, and may allow it to take office without 
making concessions to the opposition parties.    Where a government must win the support of 
a relative majority, it may have to compromise to gain the support – or at least avoid the 
hostility – of one or more of the opposition parties.  A decision on which form of investiture 
vote is most suitable will be shaped by the importance attached to a minority government 
having to compromise its positions, and by the question of the desirable balance of power 
between the government and opposition. 
 
But what of the recurring concern among many commentators that minority governments 
might be more unstable and prone to collapse than majority governments?  Would it be wise 
to balance permissive investiture requirements with a more restrictive set of termination rules, 
to make it more difficult to bring down a government?  This issue is dealt with on pages 55-7. 
 
The dissolution of parliament 
Once in office, what powers does a government have to dissolve the legislature and trigger 
fresh elections?  This is an important power for any government, since it allows it to call 
elections when its poll ratings indicate it is likely to perform well.  It is also an important 
weapon for a government in a multi-party situation.  It allows a minority administration to 
threaten the opposition with early elections if it acts against the government.  It also allows 
the larger party in a coalition – which will generally hold the prime minister’s post – to wield 
the same threat over a recalcitrant junior partner.  
 
Very few countries allow the incumbent prime minister no rights to a dissolution of 
parliament (see Table 5).  Norway is one such, since its parliamentary term is fixed.  In 
Sweden, early elections may be held, but these must be in addition to, and not replace, the 
regular four yearly contests, thus reducing the attraction of the dissolution option (if the 
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Scottish Parliament is dissolved more than six months prior to a regular election date, here, 
too, the regular election must be held).  Some countries set conditions which must be cleared 
before the head of state can grant a dissolution.  For example, the German Constitution (Art. 
68) stipulates that a chancellor may only gain a dissolution if he has called and lost (ie. by 
failing to gain an absolute majority) a vote of confidence in the government.  An absolute 
majority is also required for a dissolution in Belgium, although the opposition can instigate a 
no confidence vote without having agreed a successor, unlike in Germany (if the opposition in 
Belgium does nominate a successor within three days of a successful no confidence motion, 
this person is sworn in by the monarch).  In Austria and the Netherlands, a dissolution 
requires the support of a relative majority in parliament.  A higher threshold is in place in 
Scotland, where a dissolution must attract the support of two thirds of all MSPs.34  Some 
countries, such as the UK and Denmark, place no formal limits on the power of the prime 
minister to gain a dissolution. 
 
Constitutional rules and practice in Ireland offer an illuminating example of the controversies 
that might face Britain if it moved to multi-party government.  Under the Irish constitution 
(Art. 13.2.2), the President “may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dáil Éireann 
[parliament] on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in 
Dáil Éireann”.  This power has never been used, although in 1994, Mary Robinson threatened 
to refuse any dissolution request from the prime minister, Charles Haughey who, having lost 
the support of his junior partner, Labour, now headed a minority administration.  In the 
event, Haughey resigned and Fianna Fail left office, with the government switching to a Fine 
Gael-Labour-Democratic Left administration without any recourse to an election. 
 
The question that arises is how a far prime minister who appears to lack majority support – 
either because their own party or coalition partner has deserted them – can gain a dissolution?  
In essence, this focuses attention on the proper extent of the Head of State’s discretion.  If it is 
thought that the only clear indication that a government has lost majority support is an 
explicit no confidence vote or defeat on the budget, the prime minister has carte blanche to gain 
a dissolution at all other times.  This would effectively end any discretion for the Head of 
State to prevent fresh elections by establishing whether an alternative government can be 
found (Laver, 1996: 476-7).  The rationale for such a step is that it limits the Head of State 
playing any sort of political role.  If, however, it is thought undesirable for a prime minister to 
have a guaranteed recourse to a dissolution, then the Head of State may be given the 
discretion to put on hold a dissolution request until potential alternative governments have 
been tested.  This arrangement waters down the prime minister’s power, thus avoiding too 
lopsided a balance between the executive and legislature (ibid; Ward, 1996). 
 
At Westminster, the Prime Minister holds the right to request a dissolution, with the power to 
authorise or reject the request being held formally by the monarch (although such a request 
has not been refused for over a century).  In trying to resolve the issue of what principles the 
monarch should follow, precedent offers only a limited guide.  All of the dissolution requests 
made by prime ministers of minority administrations (in 1905, 1910, 1924 and 1974) did not 
take place against the backdrop of alternative majority administrations in the House of 
Commons (Bogdanor, 1995: 160).35  Some commentators favour an automatic acceptance to a 
                                                     
34 As noted earlier, there is no provision for the dissolution of the Welsh Assembly.   
35 In 1924, the King made sure of this, by enquiring of the two opposition parties whether they could 
form an alternative government before granting a dissolution to the Labour minority government 
under Ramsay MacDonald (Bogdanor, 1995: 160). 
 
52
dissolution request, on the basis that this is the only way to avoid the monarch being drawn 
into potentially controversial decisions.  But those from the smaller, centre parties, argue that 
the monarch both retains the right to refuse a dissolution request, and ought to use this power 
where such a request arises soon into the life of a coalition administration, or where an 
alternative government might be formed from within the legislature.36  
 
This would entail the monarch refusing a dissolution request if it was clear that an alternative 
government was viable.  The existence of an alternative government might be verified 
through consultations with the party leaders (Bogdanor, 1995: 160-2), through a clear pact 
between the parties (Brazier, 1999: 40-44), or through a vote in parliament (Butler, 1986: 133).37   
 
Such a step would, in effect, change the burden of proof in demonstrating the need for a 
dissolution.  At present, under Westminster’s majoritarian system, when a dissolution request 
is made, the onus is on the opposition to prove the existence of an alternative majority.  But 
under proportional conditions, the onus would fall on the government to show that no 
alternative majority existed.  As one commentator has put it: 
 
“Instead of the Prime Minister, in effect, deciding upon when to dissolve, the Commons 
would decide by making it clear that it would not sustain any alternative majority”. 
(Bogdanor, 1995: 165) 
 
Although other reforms (notably a move to semi-fixed parliamentary terms; see pages 57-8 on 
fixing the legislative term) might help the position of the monarch, by dissuading prime 
ministers from seeking dissolutions, in practice these requests might often occur at the 
beginning of a parliamentary term, when the next fixed election is a long way off.  Thus, even 
fixed term parliaments might fail to alleviate the likelihood of the monarch being faced with 
awkward decisions over whether or not to agree to requests for parliament to be dissolved.  A 
complement would be to follow the Danish system, and introduce a moratorium on 
dissolutions within a set period – say six months – of any election, to try to stop minority 
governments engineering favourable policy conditions before attempting to boost their 
strength via a fresh mandate (Birch, 1984: 98-9).38 
 
The alternative to subjecting the monarch to difficult decisions over whether or not to grant a 
dissolution request would be to locate this decision squarely with Parliament.  This is the 
position in many west European countries including Scotland (see Table 5).  The need to gain 
                                                     
36 Small parties in the centre are keen to retain the monarch’s right to refuse a dissolution since this is 
seen to put pressure on the larger parties to form a coalition and act to secure its survival (Blackburn, 
1995: 60; Brazier, 1998: 5-6). 
37 The political parties involved in a coalition might themselves play a role here.  For example, in New 
Zealand in 1995-6, the junior partner in a two party coalition made clear that it would not support any 
request from the prime minister for an early dissolution of parliament.  This stance meant that, had the 
prime minister gone ahead and sought a dissolution from the Governor General, the latter might well 
have first enquired of the opposition whether an alternative majority was available (Boston et al, 1996: 
109-10).  Thus the activities of the junior coalition partner helped to clarify the role of the Governor 
General. 
38 Note that the introduction of a proportional electoral system, which would be likely to give rise to 
hung parliaments in the first place, would make it less likely that a minority administration could hope 
to secure an overall majority following an early dissolution.  However, as the Scottish coalition formed 
after the 1999 elections showed, it is still possible to form a majority administration on a mere plurality 
of seats.  Thus, even with a move to a ‘broadly’ proportional system, such as AV Plus, the temptation 
for minority administrations to believe they may secure a majority of seats may well remain. 
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parliamentary approval does not end ‘partisan’ dissolutions (terminations of parliament 
purely for party electoral advantage), since governments can still force a dissolution by 
engineering a vote of no confidence in themselves (as happened in West Germany in 1972 and 
1983: Bogdanor, 1995: 175-7).39  This option is far less likely in the Scottish case, given the need 
to gain two thirds support in the Parliament.  More substantively, withdrawing dissolution 
powers from the prime minister may advantage the opposition parties, who may weaken a 
minority government by thwarting its legislative programme without allowing it a 
dissolution, or agreeing a successor among themselves (Bogdanor, 1995: 175-7).  This 
deadlocked situation could be broken, of course, by the government simply resigning.  But it 
may not be willing to concede office in such a manner, preferring instead to force the 
opposition parties to vote it down.  One means of preventing deadlock from becoming drawn 
out would be to introduce the French rule that allows government to make its legislative 
proposals matters of confidence; the opposition in this case can veto legislation only if it is 
also willing to oust the government (Lijphart, 1999: 304). 
 
In relation to the relative advantages and disadvantages of conferring on a prime minister the 
authority to dissolve the legislature and force fresh elections, two commentators conclude, 
“The choice in constitutional design, then, is what price to pay in partisan opportunism for the 
flexibility and safety valve that dissolution powers represent” (Strøm and Swindle, 2000: 25).  
The need for a degree of flexibility suggests that constitutional designers should avoid the 
restrictions on premature dissolutions in Germany.  Under the Basic Law, a chancellor can 
only request a dissolution if he has failed to secure an absolute majority in a confidence vote.  
This makes sense in the German context since “the inability of the Bundestag to end its own 
term of office is the logical corollary of the constructive vote of no confidence procedure” 
(Paterson and Southern, 1991: 85).  The intention behind protecting governments from 
parliament would be frustrated if the government itself could dissolve the legislature.  But 
this means that, if there is a mid-term change in government, the German Chancellor can only 
gain a dissolution to test the legitimacy of the new arrangements by engineering a no 
confidence vote in himself (exactly what Helmut Kohl did in 1983 after having taken the 
chancellorship from the SPD).40  On the other hand, in a multi-party situation, it seems 
undesirable to allow the prime minister the absolute power to a dissolution.  Rather, this 
should only follow a vote in the legislature supported by at least an absolute majority of 
members. 
 
Enhancing the stability of coalitions: Constitutional options 
One of the main fears of those opposed to proportional electoral systems is that they tend to 
produce coalition governments which are seen as less stable than single party administrations.  
As I show below, coalitions tend, all other things being equal, to have a shorter life than single 
party governments.  But duration is dependent on a host of other factors, which makes it 
impossible to say that a coalition government formed in propitious conditions will be any less 
durable than a single party government. 
 
The most common measurement of stability is the duration of a government, defined as the 
period starting with the investiture of an administration and ending with whichever event 
                                                     
39 Although the dissolution in these two cases were not engineered for partisan reasons. 
40 Note that some commentators have argued that the restriction on the chancellor’s dissolution powers 
are no longer warranted.  In an era of greater political stability, some have suggested that it be made 
easier for governments to dissolve parliament, through a two thirds majority vote in the Bundestag 
(von Beyme, 1983). 
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comes first: an election or the formal resignation of the prime minister.  Two other conditions 
are also commonly held to indicate the end of one government and the start of another: a 
change of prime minister and a change in the parties comprising a coalition (Strøm, 1990: 57-
8). 
 
From this brief discussion, it can be seen that measuring changes in government is a difficult 
task.  Tricky questions also arise in measuring duration.  One method is simply to count the 
months between a government taking and leaving office.  On this measure, single party 
majority governments tend to last longer than coalitions or single party minority 
administrations (ibid: 116).  But this is a generalisation across and within countries, rather than 
a rule for any one government.  More seriously, as I noted above (fn. 32), there are 
considerable variations between countries in the maximum period that a government can 
remain in office without calling an election (and thereby terminating itself under the counting 
rules).  Thus, while governments in New Zealand can only remain in office for three years, 
most west European countries allow for four years between elections, while the UK and a few 
others stretch this to five years.  In other words, assuming that administrations always run 
their full course, governments in New Zealand will appear far less stable than those in the 
UK. 
 
For this reason, a better measure of government stability is mean relative duration, that is the 
duration of a government as a proportion of the maximum time it could spend in office 
(Saalfeld, 2001: 13).  I divide sixteen west European countries41 into ‘coalition models’ (that is, 
those ruled by coalition governments for more than half the time between 1945-99) and ‘single 
party models’ (those ruled by single party administrations for more than half this period).  
The mean duration for the nine ‘coalition’ countries is 59% of the maximum, while that for the 
seven ‘single party’ countries is 68% of the maximum (ibid: 12).  As I pointed out earlier (page 
49), the mean relative duration of governments in countries that frequently resort to minority 
administrations is not appreciably lower than in countries where majority coalitions are the 
norm. 
 
Mean relative duration as a measure has problems just as the simpler mean duration does.  A 
government may decide to cut short its term by calling an early election if it feels it can 
capitalise on favourable opinion polls and thereby extend further its tenure in office.  This is 
typically true of governments in Britain, which partly explains why governments here score 
well on mean duration, but less well on mean relative duration.  Yet such behaviour may well 
be an indication of government strength, not weakness.  By contrast, weaker governments 
may be forced to ‘go the whole way’, since no opportunities arise before regular elections for 
them to dissolve parliament.  The broader point is that government duration is only a proxy 
for, and not a direct measure of, government stability (Budge and Keman, 1990: 170). 
 
Overall, the comparative literature suggests that single party majority governments tend to 
last longer than coalitions and minority administrations, all other things being equal.  But as I 
have noted, government duration varies significantly within and across countries, even when 
the form of government is held broadly constant.  Clearly, all other things are not equal and 
other factors are also at work, including: 
 
                                                     
41 All the countries listed in Saalfeld (2001: 12), except Iceland. 
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• Attributes of the political system: It has been found that the greater the fragmentation of the 
party system, the lower the average duration of governments (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 
156-8). 
• Attributes of the coalition: Governments controlling a bare majority of seats (‘minimum 
winning’ coalitions) are more durable than those with a ‘surplus’ majority of seats 
(‘oversized’ coalitions) (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 150-55).  Duration also increases if a 
coalition includes a stable ‘core’ or ‘strong’ party (Budge and Keman, 1990: 19-26; Laver 
and Shepsle, 1996: 69-78). 
• Attributes of the main political institutions: For example, the degree to which a government 
controls the legislative agenda influences the ‘costs’ of forming or terminating a 
government and thus the incentives for parties to form or end a coalition (Mershon, 1999) 
• Attributes of the players: Notably the degree of familiarity and trust between the actors, 
which may build up over time as actors view each others’ actions in government and learn 
more about their patterns of behaviour.  Thus, coalitions may endure (be ‘inert’) in spite of 
difficulties that, had they been known about at the negotiation stage, might have 
prevented a coalition being formed in the first place (Franklin and Mackie, 1983: 276-7). 
 
Government durability is, then, heavily dependent on the nature of the political system and 
behaviour of the main actors within it.  But can duration also be affected by appropriate 
constitutional rules?  At the broad level, the empirical evidence is equivocal.  I noted above 
(pages 38-9) the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ rules on government formation 
and termination.  Positive termination rules – which stipulate that a no confidence vote must 
gain an absolute majority to pass – impose a high barrier on opposition parties, while negative 
rules provide a lower hurdle for the opposition to clear in overthrowing a government.  
Among seventeen west European countries in the post-war period, only 8% of government 
resignations were caused by parliamentary no confidence votes under positive conditions, 
while under negative conditions, this rate more than doubled to 18% (De Winter, 1995: 139-
40).42  Of the four countries in which more than one quarter of all government resignations 
were caused by parliamentary no confidence votes – Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Portugal – 
three operate a negative termination rule.  But while constitutional rules on government 
termination appear to affect the cause of an administration’s downfall, they seem to have less 
effect on its timing.  In other words, the nature of the parliamentary rules appears to have little 
effect on the durability of a government.  Across a range of west European countries, the 
mean relative duration (‘survival rate’) of governments operating under positive 
parliamentary rules was little different from that of governments where negative rules were in 
place (De Winter, 1995: 140; Saalfeld, 2001: 12).  In other words, the nature of the 
constitutional rules in place affects the chances of a government meeting its demise in 
parliament, but not its chances of surviving a full term, which is far more dependent on a 
range of other factors less easily addressed by appropriate constitutional rules. 
 
In spite of this, it is worth examining what options are open to constitutional designers 
concerned to bolster the stability of governments.  I discuss two such options: making it more 
difficult for the opposition to bring down a government, and reducing the incentives for 
terminating governments prior to constitutionally mandated elections. 
                                                     
42 In both cases, a far higher proportion of government resignations were caused by non-parliamentary 




The no confidence vote 
The first option is to make it more difficult for governments to be brought down by the 
opposition.  In terms of the formal rules, British governments may fairly easily be unseated; 
all the opposition must do is to pass a no confidence motion by a majority of those MPs 
voting.  Relative majorities are also all that is required in Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand, 
among my study countries.  In practice, of course, opposition parties find it far more difficult 
than that.  Nonetheless, they face less of a struggle than their counterparts in countries such as 
Sweden, who can only bring down a government if a majority of all MPs vote in favour.  
Finally, and most restrictive of all, governments in Germany and Spain are safe unless the 
opposition both musters an absolute majority of MPs against the government, and also 
nominates a successor (the ‘constructive no confidence’ provision).  The constructive 
provision was introduced first in Germany, to prevent a repeat of the instability of the 
Weimar regimes where governments were defeated without the legislature being able to elect 
a successor (Saalfeld, 2000: 36).  It has two advantages.  First, it reduces the possibility of 
deadlock, where the opposition has sufficient numbers to vote down the incumbent 
government, but without a consensus on whom to install in its place.  Second, by making the 
replacement of one government by another automatic, it reduces the need to bring the Head 
of State into the – potentially controversial – government formation process.  Insofar as it 
replaces the discretionary role of the Head of State with the formal role of parliament, the 
constructive no confidence provision “might therefore be regarded as the contemporary 
constitutional orthodoxy on the government formation process” (Laver, 1996: 478).43    
 
The constructive no confidence rule has only been put to the test twice in Germany, 
unsuccessfully in 1972 against Willy Brandt, and successfully in 1982, when Helmut Kohl 
replaced Helmut Schmidt (Roberts, 2000: 118-9).  It has only been a constitutional option in 
Belgium since 1995 and a rule in Spain since 1978, where no censure motion has so far been 
passed (Colomer, 1996: 191). 
 
The disadvantage of the constructive no confidence rule is the mirror image of its claimed 
advantage.  By making it more difficult for the opposition to bring down a government, the 
provision has the effect of shifting the balance of power in the direction of the office holder.  It 
is perfectly possible for the opposition parties to be united against a poorly performing 
government but divided on whom they would prefer in its place.  Yet the fact that an 
alternative government is not readily forthcoming might not be thought sufficient reason for 
keeping an unpopular incumbent in office. 
 
The constructive no confidence rule has been recommended in Ireland, and suggested for 
consideration in New Zealand, as a means of shoring up governments (Laver, 1996; Boston, 
1998).  Some commentators see this rule as having contributed to government stability in 
Germany in the post-war period (Roberts, 2000: 118-20), although others argue that the stable 
party system there has really done the work (Smith, 1991: 50). 
 
There are variants of the constructive no confidence provision which avoid making the 
opposition’s task too onerous.  One such variant is the system in Belgium and in New South 
Wales in Australia, in which the opposition may indicate a replacement when passing a no 
confidence vote – in which case this figure automatically takes office should the motion pass – 
                                                     
43 Although this applies only to changes of government in between elections, not after elections, where 
the Head of State might still have a role to play. 
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but does not need to.  If the opposition is united against the incumbent but not in favour of 
any one replacement, a successful no confidence vote simply leads to fresh elections (De 
Winter, Timmermans and Dumont, 2000: 342; Ward, 1996). 
 
The ability of governments to go about their business without the constant fear of being 
ejected from office by a parliamentary vote is a sine qua non of effective policy making.  
Without it, governments would cease to engage in long term policy planning and would 
undertake far more short term measures designed to win support in the legislature and thus 
maintain their tenure in office.  Such stability becomes potentially less secure if governments 
command only a minority of seats in the legislature.  Minority administrations are far more 
prone to the threat and the reality of terminal defeats by the opposition parties.  Protection for 
such governments might be engineered by making it more difficult for the opposition to bring 
down an administration.  On the other hand, this should not be at the expense of depriving 
the opposition of its powers.  For this reason, rather than insisting that governments are only 
overthrown via a constructive no confidence vote, it seems preferable to insist on the milder 
rule that an absolute majority of the legislature must vote against a government for it to fall.  
If the opposition parties mustering an absolute majority can simultaneously nominate a 
successor prime minister, this ‘automatic replacement’ provision might be adopted to ensure 
there is no hiatus between administrations. 
 
Fixing the legislative term 
The second way in which governments could be made more stable is by removing the power 
or incentive to hold early elections.  For a British prime minister, the only constraint on 
electoral timing is the legal requirement for a new poll five years after the previous one.  He or 
she is free to go to the country at any time during this period (although, under multi-party 
conditions, the prime minister’s automatic ‘right’ to a dissolution may come under strain, as 
outlined above).  If an early election is called, the electoral clock starts afresh, so that no new 
poll need be held for another five years.  The electoral terms for the House of Commons are 
thus ‘non fixed’.  The same is true of other ‘Westminster’ democracies – Canada (maximum 
five year term), Australia and New Zealand (both four year terms) – as well as European ones 
– Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany44 and the Netherlands (all four year terms) 
and France, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg (five year terms).   
 
In one European country – Sweden – governments may dissolve parliament in between 
elections, but fresh elections are in addition to, and not a replacement for, regular polls which 
must be held every four years.  This ‘semi fixed’ model allows for deadlocks to be broken, but 
minimises the incentive for governments to capitalise on favourable polling conditions by 
forcing premature elections.  Two European countries – Norway and Switzerland – allow no 
flexibility in the date of elections, which are fixed at four years. 
 
Interestingly, the new legislatures in Scotland and Wales operate under different models.  The 
Scottish Parliament operates on four year terms, and can be dissolved in between ordinary 
elections subject to a two thirds vote among MSPs.  But only if the Parliament is dissolved less 
than six months before scheduled elections are these elections cancelled.  Otherwise, ordinary 
elections are held as per normal.  The Welsh Assembly likewise operates on four year terms, 
but the legislation makes no provision at all for extraordinary elections. 
 
                                                     
44 Although the German constitution allows for early dissolutions of parliament, these are seen as very 
much the exception rather than the rule. 
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Semi-fixed parliamentary terms are held to enhance government stability by making it less 
attractive either for the opposition to bring down a government or for the government to 
dissolve parliament.  Government effectiveness is only really enhanced in the first case, since 
restricting the incentives for opposition parties to overthrow a government helps avoid the 
incumbent from always having to look over its shoulder.  Such defensiveness is seen to take a 
toll on a government’s ability to introduce effective and long term policy measures.  By 
contrast, governments usually seek a parliamentary dissolution in order to capitalise on 
favourable electoral conditions, which are often the result of good performance in office.  In 
other words, the ability to gain a dissolution provides a positive incentive for governments to 
operate effectively throughout their period in office; removing this power might encourage 
governments to ‘back load’ their policy programme; to become more active or responsive 
when they know an election is imminent. 
 
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what impact the semi-fixed nature of the Riksdag has had on 
the stability of Sweden’s government.  The country has only seen one premature election, in 
1958 (Boston, 1998: 116).  Early elections were discussed in the context of government crises in 
1978 and 1981, but ruled out on both occasions since regular elections would need to have 
followed shortly afterwards (Bergman, 2000: 199).  If government duration is measured as a 
proportion of the possible maximum time an administration can be in office, Sweden 
performs well; its mean relative government duration is 80%, well above the European 
average (Saalfeld, 2000: 12).  Thus, the Swedish experience suggests – no more – that a semi-
fixed parliamentary term enhances government durability, although to what degree it is 
impossible to tell. 
 
A fixed or semi-fixed parliamentary term was proposed for New Zealand as a response to the 
instability of its governments in the run up to, and immediate aftermath of, the introduction 
of a proportional electoral system (Boston, 1998: 114-21).  Fixed or semi-fixed terms would 
have wider implications for the balance of power within coalitions and between the executive 
and parliament, as well as for relations between voters and their elected representatives.  It is 
for some of these reasons that many commentators in the UK have argued for fixed legislative 
terms, notably to reduce what is seen as an unfair advantage of the incumbent government in 
being able to decide the date of the poll (Blackburn, 1995: 49-65).  In coalition situations, the 
ability of the prime minister to call snap elections is usually seen as a means of coercion over 
the junior partner in cases of dispute.  But the power that dissolution affords the prime 
minister can also be helpful when the government only commands a minority of seats, and 
can similarly coerce parties in the legislature in order to get measures passed; my interviews 
suggested that this was a real weapon for minority governments in Denmark where the prime 
minister has an absolute right to a dissolution. 
 
However, it is arguable that such coercive powers are less suitable in a situation of majority 
coalitions, a more likely scenario if the Westminster electoral system moved to PR.  I have 
suggested above a relatively unrestricted rule for the investiture of a new government, 
although a higher hurdle when it comes to its termination.  This combination might be 
sufficient to underpin government stability, although constitutional design for any multi-
party situation at Westminster should evaluate what impact the semi-fixed legislative term for 
the Scottish Parliament has had.  Ultimately, however, the arguments for and against fixed 
terms may be influenced more by the perceived need to limit the discretionary power of 
prime ministers and/or by the need to maximise accountability of governments to voters (on 




Keeping the show on the road: The role of caretaker governments 
Having examined the constitutional rules covering government formation and termination, I 
conclude this chapter by examining a less high profile, but nonetheless important, issue: what 
happens in the period between one government resigning and another taking up office, a 
period usually overseen by a ‘caretaker’ government. 
 
Britain has little experience of caretaker governments.  Following a government defeat at an 
election, the opposition leader is normally sworn into office the following day and the 
government fully replaced within the next 48 hours.  But in countries where proportional 
electoral systems do not produce such clear winners, the formation of a new government may 
take far longer.  The longest period required to form a new government in the last fifty years 
in a west European country is the 208 days taken in the Netherlands in 1977 (Müller and 
Strøm, 2000: 570).  But the Netherlands is an outlier; the average across twelve west European 
countries excluding the Netherlands is 19 days, or just under three weeks.  What happens to 
government during this period?   In most west European countries, as noted above, 
incumbent governments are not forced to resign at, or after, an election; rather, they may 
continue in office until ejected by an alternative administration.  But if they do resign – either 
because they have clearly lost the election or because they have failed to form a new 
government – they usually continue in office until a new government is sworn in, as a 
caretaker government.  Given that caretaker administrations may be in office for several 
weeks, what rules cover what they may or may not do?45 
 
In few countries is the role of caretaker governments covered by clear constitutional or cabinet 
rules.  A survey of the constitutions in six west European countries by the New Zealand State 
Services Commission (1995: 81) identified only Denmark as formally setting out the rules for 
caretaker governments.46  But most countries make up for this with informal understandings 
that caretaker governments avoid taking major policy decisions, for example by not 
introducing substantive bills to parliament, although minor bills, particularly on supply 
issues, continue.  The exception is Ireland, where caretaker governments wield broadly 
undiminished powers, and have occasionally made appointments to very senior political 
posts (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 47).  Civil servants in Dublin appear sanguine about the role 
of caretakers.  Caretaker administrations are formally informed of the need to avoid 
committing any future government to expenditure.  Officials also point out the unlikelihood 
that major policy decisions would be taken by a caretaker administration, since such decisions 
would require ratification by cabinet which tends not to meet frequently either side of an 
election.  But appointments can be made without cabinet meetings, and are thus easier for a 
caretaker administration to push through.  The lack of self-restraint on the part of caretaker 
governments in Ireland has prompted one observer to call for the introduction of a 
‘constructive’ no confidence provision – so that the fall of one government is contingent on 
another being ready to take up the reins of power immediately – and for an addition to the 
constitution stipulating that the decisions of a caretaker “be confined to those [matters] 
required to ensure the essential good government of the State” (Laver, 1996: 479-80). 
                                                     
45 In some countries (eg. Australia), governments assume full caretaker status immediately the 
legislature is dissolved pending elections.  With the legislature not in session, there can clearly be no 
scrutiny of executive activity.  For this reason – and for the more prosaic one that most government 
ministers will be out campaigning – executive activities are reduced to a minimum immediately prior 
to an election (Boston et al, 1998b: 644-6). 
46 A caretaker “… shall do only what is necessary for the purpose of the uninterrupted conduct of 




There are partial exceptions to the ‘caretaker’ status of outgoing governments.  In Norway, 
where the timing of elections is fixed, an outgoing government will remain in office for the 
three weeks or so that it takes to present the annual budget (elections are held in mid-
September and the budget delivered in early October).  Thus, in 2001, the Social Democrats 
suffered a humiliating election defeat on 10th September, remained in office while bargaining 
with the Christian Democrats to form a coalition and, when this failed and the bargaining 
switched to the parties on the right, issued a budget one month later.  In instances when an 
election produces a change of government, it is usual, however, for the new administration to 
amend the budget in line with its own policies, with the outgoing government’s budget 
presumably covering only non-controversial items (Boston, 1998: 38-9).  In the Netherlands 
where the caretaker might be in office for months while a new government is being formed, 
major policy issues can be introduced to parliament, but only if there is a majority for the 
measures, which in turn suggests that the caretaker consults with the opposition parties 
before proceeding (Shroff, 1994: 17). 
 
However, even in countries whose conventions limit the power of caretaker governments, 
there is still plenty of interpretation around what these conventions mean in practice.  For 
example, the Cabinet Office in New Zealand proscribes caretaker governments from 
undertaking new policy initiatives or changing existing policies.  The implication is that the 
implementation of existing policies (ie. the policies of the government prior to the election) 
may continue.  Yet the introduction of existing policies might itself be controversial.  
Following the 1996 election in New Zealand, and despite attempts by the Cabinet Office to 
formulate clear ground rules, there was some confusion within the caretaker government as to 
how far it could continue with ‘business as usual’, and how far even pre-existing policy 
commitments needed to be discussed with the opposition parties (James, 1997: 32). 
 
Also, what if an important decision needs to be taken quickly?  In Germany, urgent decisions 
are taken by the incumbent only after consulting with his most likely successor, as Chancellor 
Kohl did with Gerhard Schröder in October 1998 in relation to the conflict in Bosnia.  Other 
countries, such as New Zealand, also operate a convention that a caretaker government faced 
with an urgent major policy decision will consult with the incoming government, and will act 
on its advice even if the caretaker disagrees with this (Palmer, 1994: 244-5).  If the identity of 
the incoming government is not clear, the cabinet rules in New Zealand stipulate that 
substantive issues are either (a) deferred; (b) handled in such a way as to avoid committing 
any future government; or (c) resolved via consultations with other political parties so that the 
action commands majority support in parliament. 
 
Being in their first term, devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales have not yet experienced 
caretaker administrations.  What procedures or contingency planning might be required prior 
to the second devolution elections in May 2003?  In New Zealand, prior to the first election 
held under proportional representation in 1996, extensive preparations were made to 
minimise the number of significant issues falling to a post-election caretaker administration.  
Thus, decisions on major policy matters and political appointments were brought forward to 
before the election, with other potentially divisive issues being identified for deferral until a 
new government had taken office.  On budgetary decisions that could not be deferred (eg. 
annual funding allocations to education institutions), final decisions were only taken 
following discussions with the opposition parties (Boston et al, 1998a: 68-9).  The issues 
requiring cross-party agreement in devolved administrations will include dealings with the 
central or federal tier.  Thus, in the German Länd I visited, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the 
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discussions between the outgoing and incoming government over the role of the caretaker 
include how the state should behave in Bundesrat votes.  Apparently, tight votes in the 
Bundesrat have sometimes been tipped by the vote of a caretaker state government, which is 
seen as going beyond the bounds of its legitimate role. 
 
The principal issue around caretaker governments is a political one, namely to what extent 
caretakers should be limited in the decisions they can take.  However, there is also a 
constitutional issue which potentially might arise.  This relates to the status of ministers, and 
the basis on which they continue in office on a caretaker basis if they have lost their seat at the 
election.47  The Scotland Act 1998 (§47) stipulates that ministers must be drawn from the 
Parliament, and cease to hold office if they lose this status.  The Government of Wales Act 
1998 (§53) similarly requires Assembly Secretaries to be members of the Welsh Assembly.  But 
what happens to a caretaker administration if half of their members have just lost their seats at 
an election?  Two remedies exist.  The first is to transfer to ministers that have been re-elected 
the functions of their non-elected counterparts.  This may overburden the remaining 
ministers, although the principle that caretaker governments are relatively dormant should 
avoid this.  The second is to grant an temporary exception to the rule in cases where ministers 
lose their seats.  Thus, New Zealand’s Constitution Act 1986 (§6.2(b)) allows ministers who 
have failed to be re-elected to remain in the executive for 28 days after the election.  If the 
caretaker is still operating after this time, the prime minister (or presumably the most senior 
minister if he/she has also lost their seat) may appoint another minister to cover the portfolio 
(State Services Commission, 1995: 83). 
 
A final issue relating to caretaker governments concerns the position of civil servants and 
their role in coalition negotiations.  The question is what role civil servants should play in 
advising the parties, given that they still owe formal allegiance to the caretaker government 
which might well be a player in these negotiations.  This issue is dealt with in the following 
chapter (pages 68-70), as part of the discussion on negotiating a coalition. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested a framework of rules for the formation and termination of 
governments.  It builds on the UK’s political tradition (eg. the role of the parties in the 
formation process) while also identifying areas where past practices and conventions may be 
less appropriate in a multi-party setting. 
 
I have argued that the identification of a new government should rest with the parties in a 
relatively unfettered bargaining process.  As in Scotland and Wales, there need be no initial 
role for the Head of State or other external agent in designating a single party head to lead the 
bargaining process.  However, should the parties abuse such lack of constraint by trying to 
play off one another to maximise their own positions, and thereby elongating the formation 
process, a more formal process may be required.  But one reform that might be worth 
considering in an unordered, or ‘freestyle’ bargaining environment is for any incumbent 
administration to resign at an election.  This move would preclude the government in office 
from gaining any – undue – advantage following an inconclusive election. 
 
An alternative would be for any new government to have to gain the approval of parliament 
before taking office, via an investiture vote.  The nature of the investiture vote (either 
                                                     
47 The problem does not arise, of course, if a caretaker administration is created following the 
resignation of a government mid-term, without recourse to an election. 
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‘positive’ or ‘negative’) affects the type of government likely to be formed, specifically 
whether a majority is stipulated or minority administrations are also possible.  If governments 
that command only a minority of legislative seats are deemed undesirable, a positive 
investiture vote will be introduced.  If, however, minority governments are not deemed 
undesirable, a negative vote might be sufficient.  Within the ‘negative’ form of investiture 
votes, minority administrations are most likely when the onus rests with the opposition to 
prove that an alternative majority exists; the system in Scotland and Wales places the onus 
with the government-elect, although only to demonstrate a majority among those voting 
(‘relative majority’).  For Westminster, the latter might be the most realistic of the negative 
investiture options. 
 
Under an unordered bargaining process with no designated formateur, it is possible that the 
parties will not be able to agree on a new prime minister.  One means of avoiding such 
deadlock would be to introduce an ordered element to the formation process, by allowing the 
Head of State or other external agent to designate a formateur in the hopes that this will kick 
start the process.  An alternative, as in Scotland, is to set a time limit for the formation of a 
new government, following which fresh elections are held.  In Wales, the Head of State plays 
no role at all in government formation, and thus clearly cannot play a role in designating a 
formateur in any cases of deadlock.  For Westminster governments, it would be possible for the 
Head of State to designate a formateur to try and break the deadlock.  But there is no guarantee 
that this device would work.  It might be a better option to lower the threshold an incoming 
government needs to meet by reducing the investiture requirement from a relative majority to 
a simple plurality. 
 
Once in office, a balanced distribution of power between the executive and legislature 
suggests that an incumbent prime minister be denied the right to an automatic dissolution of 
parliament.  On the other hand, the resort to a dissolution represents an important potential 
means of resolving a deadlock in parliament.  If constitutional designers wish to limit the use 
of the dissolution as a partisan device, they might adopt the Scottish rule, whereby the 
legislature can only be dissolved if two thirds of its members vote in favour.  But for the 
dissolution to remain a viable means by which a prime minister can resolve any deadlock, it 
may be better to adopt the practice in many west European countries, whereby the support of 
a simple majority in parliament will suffice. 
 
A concern to maintain a balance between the executive and legislature, allied with an eye to 
enhancing government stability, means that the opposition parties should be able to defeat a 
government by passing a no confidence motion with an absolute majority (majority of all 
members), and not have to simultaneously nominate a successor (the ‘constructive no 
confidence’ provision).  This relatively mild package of measures should be enough to 
underpin government stability without resorting to additional devices such as fixed 
legislative terms.  Such devices may be appropriate, but on grounds of fairness between 
parties rather than on the stability that they are seen to bring to government. 
 
Thought should be given to the role of interim, or ‘caretaker’, administrations given the 
potential of such bodies to generate controversy.  While prior preparation will include the role 
of civil servants, the most important role is played by the parties themselves; there is no part 
of the coalition process that demands more consensus between parties than the point at which 
power is transferred from one regime to another. 
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CHAPTER 3: Negotiating a Coalition Government 
 
 
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between single party and coalition conditions is that 
power sharing governments are usually only formed following a bargaining process between 
parties, whereas no such negotiations are required for single party administrations.  An 
indication of this point is that government formation in multi-party conditions often, though 
not always, takes longer than under majoritarian conditions. 
 
In this section, I examine how governments are formed through inter-party bargaining.  I 
focus on the duration and nature of the process, the main actors, the support arrangements 
and the substance of the negotiations.  My analytical focus is on two questions.  First, is there 
a risk that the bargaining process in multi-party conditions might become drawn out, and 
might institutional constraints on this process be desirable?  Second, what features of the 
bargaining environment lend themselves to effective and productive negotiations?  What 
aspects of the process are conducive to providing a firm platform for the subsequent 
operation of the coalition?  Inter-party bargaining may take the form of a ‘two shot game’, 
since a first round of negotiations may be necessary to put together a coalition, with a second 
round required if the coalition commands only a minority of seats, to pull in sufficient 
legislative support.  I deal only with the first round here; issues connected with the behaviour 
of minority administrations are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
The negotiating process 
The duration of negotiations 
In Britain during the post-war period, only four days have been needed on average to form a 
government (de Winter, 1995: 122).  Other west European countries also boast formation 
periods comparable to Britain’s: Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden.  In Ireland and 
Germany, formation typically takes between two and three weeks.  But the average in Austria 
is over five weeks, and in the Netherlands, ten weeks (Müller and Strøm, 2000: 570).  There is 
no reason why a move to coalition government should produce a more protracted period of 
government formation.  In New Zealand, for example, while a coalition took two months to 
form after the first PR election in 1996, the second in 1999 saw a coalition government 
installed after only 10 days, comparable to the average formation period under the previous 
electoral regime (Boston and Church, 2000a: 5).  And in Scotland in 1999, only eight days were 
needed between the first devolved election and the formation of the Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition.48 
 
Why is there such variation between countries in the average length of time taken to form a 
government?  Two variables are the number of parties involved in negotiations, along with 
the degree of detail sought in the agreement (Müller and Strøm, 2000: 572).  Institutional 
factors also play a role.  Thus, the degree of detail is itself influenced by the extent to which 
the executive controls the legislature.  In a political system in which the legislative agenda is 
                                                     
48 The endpoint being used here is the signing of the coalition agreement.  The First Minister, Donald 
Dewar, had been sworn in the day before the agreement was signed.  In systems where the prime 
minister is elected by parliament, some accounts treat the end date for coalition formation as the 
parliamentary vote, on the basis that a vote for a particular person is effectively a vote for a coalition 
(Diermeier and van Roozendaal, 1998: 618).  Note that in Germany, where the Chancellor is similarly 
elected by a vote in parliament, this election can sometimes take place before the coalition negotiations 
have been completed, for example before the allocation of portfolios has been finalised. 
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controlled by the executive, there is little point in negotiating a ‘tight’ agreement, since issues 
can be dealt with on a day by day basis.  But where the legislature enjoys greater powers, a 
proto-coalition has greater incentives to agree at the outset how to handle potential problems 
(De Winter, 1995: 143-4).  And countries that, by virtue of ‘positive’ parliamentary rules (see 
previous chapter) encourage the parties to form majority status coalitions typically exhibit 
longer formation periods than those whose parliamentary rules are ‘negative’ and thus permit 
minority administrations (ibid: 136).  Variations in duration may also be caused by highly 
specific factors.  It tends to be relatively easy to negotiate a coalition if a country’s economic 
conditions are good, since fewer boosting measures need to be agreed between the partners 
and healthy government revenues may allow for more of the partners’ demands to be met.  
During economic downturns, however, the size of the government cake may be smaller, 
producing more intense haggling over the budget. 
 
In the following sections, I examine the players and processes involved in negotiating a 
coalition, returning at the end to the issue of timescales, in particular to address what 
measures might be needed to speed up government formation in multi-party situations. 
 
Who negotiates? 
The negotiation of coalition governments is typically undertaken by a small group of senior 
figures from the bargaining parties.  As I note later (pages 66-7), much of what is agreed 
between the parties concerns policy matters.  It is thus very rare for the negotiations to be 
conducted solely by the party leaders, since these figures lack all the information required to 
agree a full policy programme.  On the other hand, negotiating teams are rarely large, since 
this would extend the potential for disagreement and for compromising secrecy. 
 
Thus, in Ireland after the 1997 election, the coalition negotiations between Fianna Fail and the 
Progressive Democrats were conducted by eight people: two senior TDs from each party, each 
group aided by two senior party advisers.  The party leaders, Bertie Ahern and Mary Harney, 
were not involved directly in the negotiations, but determined their broad parameters at the 
outset (Mitchell, 1999a: 254).  It is not unusual for the party leaders to remain aside from the 
negotiations, offering a final tier for resolving disputes.  In 1992, the Fianna Fail-Labour 
negotiations involved small teams of three negotiators from each party with the party leaders 
again not involved (Farrell, 1993).  In Denmark, the party leaders normally lead the 
negotiations, although again they bring with them small teams comprising prospective or past 
ministers and/or the party spokespeople in parliament.  The negotiating teams in Germany 
tend to be of a similar size; bargaining between the SPD and Greens in 1998 involved two 
teams of four permanent members with other spokespeople brought in to negotiate on 
specific policy issues (although the negotiating teams under Kohl’s chancellorship were 
usually 15-20 strong; Saalfeld, 2000: 47).  The three parties involved in negotiating a coalition 
in New Zealand following the 1996 election adopted a flexible approach to their teams; 
Labour and New Zealand First chose only a handful of people to represent them, while 
National selected a larger team of nine.  But each party brought in additional figures at 
various points during the negotiations (Boston and McLeay, 1997: 222-3).  The negotiations 
between Labour and the Alliance in 1999 were conducted primarily before, not after, the 
election.  The necessity for secrecy limited the negotiating teams to just four or five members 




Judged against these examples, the negotiating teams used by Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats in Scotland were broadly in line with practice elsewhere; the Liberal Democrats 
used a team of eight figures, with Labour drawing on five people (Finnie and McLeish, 1999). 
 
But while small teams around the party leaders may aid swift, trusting and leak-free 
negotiations, they are likely to increase the concern among the parties’ elected members and 
supporters that their interests will be compromised.  What mechanisms are put in place to 
ensure that the leaders do not ‘sell out’?  How is the wider party involved in coalition 
negotiations?  A desire to maintain tight control over the leaders’ activities is usually strongest 
among ‘policy oriented’ parties, that is parties whose supporters and elected members have a 
strong concern with maintaining a set of policy stances rather than simply with attaining 
office.  An example is the Labour party in Ireland.  Following a coalition with Fine Gael 
between 1973 and 1977, ending in the loss of office to Fianna Fail, party members placed limits 
on the delegation of authority to the party leaders by insisting that any subsequent coalition 
agreement be put to a special conference of party delegates for approval (Farrell, 1987: 138-9; 
Laver and Higgins, 1986: 174-7). 
 
Comparative research suggests that parliamentary party groups are often involved in the 
negotiation and ratification of coalition agreements.  Thus, among fourteen west European 
countries, in only six are parliamentary actors not involved in formation talks.  And in just 
two – Belgium and Italy – are the party groups not consulted on the talks.  When it comes to 
ratifying the agreement, it is rare for party members – as with the Labour party in Ireland – to 
have a formal veto; more common is for the agreement to go for approval to either the party 
executive and/or parliamentary party.  This process does not normally involve major changes 
being made to the agreement, except in the Netherlands and here only in relation to a 
particular party (De Winter, 1995: 128-34; Timmermans and Andeweg, 2000: 366). 
 
Danish parties maintain a strong control over their leaders when it comes to government 
formation.  For example, the parliamentary group of the Social Liberal party – the junior 
coalition partner to the Social Democrats in the previous government – would meet prior to 
coalition negotiations to decide what their leaders’ bargaining strategy should be.  When the 
Conservative-Liberal coalition fell in 1993, the Social Democrat leader sought his party’s 
permission before starting negotiations to form an alternative coalition.  The party groups of 
both the Social Liberals and the Social Democrats also have a formal role in ratifying any 
coalition agreement.  The parties in Germany are involved in coalition bargaining via their 
caucus leaders who usually form part of the negotiating teams.  In addition, agreements are 
sometimes put before special party conferences, as with the SPD and Greens in 1998 (Saalfeld, 
2000: 47-8).  The policy oriented Free Democrats (FDP) also ratify any coalition agreement 
through its parliamentary group (De Winter, 1995: 134).  In New Zealand, the agreements 
reached after the 1996 and 1999 elections have both been subject to approval either by the 
parties’ parliamentary groups or by a special delegates’ conference.  In fact, it was the caucus 
of New Zealand First that, officially at least, had the responsibility in 1996 for deciding 
whether to form a coalition with National or Labour (Boston and McLeay, 1997: 231; Boston, 
2000: 247-8). 
 
The varying practices of parties in different countries and within them is reflected in the 
ratification processes deployed in Scotland and Wales.  The Welsh coalition agreement was 
completed in October 2000 and, while the policy oriented Liberal Democrats held a delegates’ 
conference to affirm what had been decided, Labour restricted ratification to its party 
executive (Osmond, 2000).  In Scotland, however, the coalition agreement was ratified for the 
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Liberal Democrats by its parliamentary group and party executive, with Scottish Labour 
putting the agreement before its parliamentary group for ratification.  While the Liberal 
Democrat negotiators in Scotland kept the party caucus informed of progress in the 
negotiations, there was no formal consultation with the MSPs (although the decision to 
negotiate a coalition had been agreed by the parliamentary group as well as by the party’s 
executive).  While many MSPs pushed for a more inclusive bargaining process, the 
negotiations were driven by the close relations between the two party leaders, Donald Dewar 
for Labour and Jim Wallace for the Liberal Democrats.  The Liberal Democrat backbenchers 
have subsequently made life hard for the coalition; however, my interviews in Edinburgh did 
not suggest that matters would have been made easier if the party groups had been more 
closely consulted during the negotiating process.  The party leaders were keen to form a 
government quickly, leaving little scope for drawn out discussions within the parties.  The 
concern that an executive should be formed soon after the election may be relaxed in 
subsequent elections now that the devolved institutions are well established.  
 
Party leaders have to weigh up competing pressures in deciding what role the wider party 
should play in approving coalition negotiations.  On the one hand, leaders will value the 
flexibility and power that comes from their being able to negotiate a coalition without having 
to seek the approval of their parties.  On the other, the involvement of the wider party can 
help build trust in, and commitment to, the coalition among elected members, who play a key 
role in maintaining the stability of coalition administrations through support in the 
legislature.  The failure to bind Labour MPs to the 1977-78 pact with the Liberals was one 
reason given by a key actor for the pact’s demise (Steel, 1980: 156).  A second benefit for party 
leaders in formally committing themselves to seek their party’ approval for bargaining 
outcomes is that it can strengthen their negotiating hand.  A leader has more credibility in 
sticking to a position if their negotiating partner knows that any deviation from this position 
will be opposed by the wider party.  Analysis of the coalition agreement forged in 1981-2 
between Labour and Fine Gael in Ireland shows that, compared with the two parties’ pre-
election manifestos, Labour got far more from the agreement than its partner.  In part this may 
be due to Labour’s stronger bargaining position as a result of its commitment to gain party 
delegates’ approval prior to signing the agreement (Laver, 1992: 51). 
 
What is negotiated? 
Coalition negotiations virtually always cover two issues: the areas of policy that can be agreed 
between the parties, and the allocation of portfolios (ministries).  Sometimes, a third issue is 
addressed, namely the procedures by which the coalition will operate.  Again in virtually all 
cases, policy issues are discussed and agreed before the division of ministerial spoils (De 
Winter, 1995: 128-9). 
 
Policy issues 
Discussions on policy issues serve two purposes.  The first is to reach agreement so that a 
programme for government can be highlighted.  The second is to identify areas of 
disagreement; these can either be put aside, temporarily or permanently, so as not to 
jeopardise relations between the parties, or receive special treatment, for example detailed 
discussion in a dedicated working group.  Areas of agreement are flagged up in the coalition 
agreement (see Chapter 4), while disagreements remain a matter for the parties.  The degree of 
policy detail involved in the negotiations will depend on how far the parties wish to highlight 
a full programme in the agreement.  It also depends on what level of trust exists between the 
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parties; the lower the trust, the greater the incentives for the parties to commit one another to 
specific policies at the outset. 
 
Bearing in mind that coalition negotiations often last only for a week or two, how can 
agreements be reached on potentially complex policy matters?  What kind of arrangements 
are used to ensure that the coalition agreement reflects a considered and thorough treatment 
of such matters and can thus stand as a realistic indication of the government’s forward work 
programme?   
 
I noted above that coalition negotiating teams typically comprise a handful of senior party 
figures.  These people tend to meet with each other regularly, lead the discussion on major 
policy issues and resolve disputes between the parties.  It is also common, however, for many 
substantive policy discussions to be conducted through a wider network of senior figures, 
parliamentary spokespeople and advisers. 
 
Thus, while negotiations between the SPD and Greens after Germany’s 1998 federal election 
centred on the eight strong central team, other people were brought in on particular policy 
issues.  For example, if discussions needed to be held on transport, the party spokespeople for 
that portfolio along with specialist advisers would be brought in to draw up an agreed set of 
policies.  Thus, the core team was complemented by various ad hoc working groups each 
addressing a more specific set of policy issues.  A similar process was adopted by the three 
parties who negotiated in New Zealand in 1996.  The negotiations were begun by the main 
negotiating teams, but it quickly became clear that these small groups would not be able to 
put together a detailed and costed policy programme of the kind that New Zealand First 
insisted on.  So Labour, National and New Zealand First – the last bargaining simultaneously 
with the two larger parties – brought in various backbenchers and advisers to form working 
groups around the core negotiating teams (see Boston and McLeay, 1997: 224).  Such a ‘hub 
and spokes’ arrangement is appropriate when the goal is a comprehensive policy agreement.  
It is noticeable that the coalition agreements produced in Germany in 1998 and New Zealand 
in 1996 were long by international standards, at 17,000 words each (Saalfeld, 2000: 56; Boston, 
2000: 256).  By contrast, if the parties wish to eschew detailed policy negotiations, it is much 
easier to limit the players to the core team.  This is exactly what happened in New Zealand in 
1999, when only a handful of Labour and Alliance party figures were involved in pre- and 
post-election consultations (Boston and Church, 2000: 233-4). 
 
The negotiations to form a coalition in Scotland involved a core team along with small 
working groups, even though the final agreement is not a particularly comprehensive policy 
document (perhaps reflecting the tight timescale).  The groups worked quickly, identifying 
from the pre-election manifestos areas of commonality and divergence.  The latter were then 
dealt with by the core negotiating teams, while the working groups produced concrete 
proposals on areas of agreement. 
 
Negotiating parties need to identify swiftly the policy areas on which they agree and disagree.   
This is most important if there are ideological differences between the parties or they have no 
previous experience of working together.  Thus, the negotiations in Ireland between Fianna 
Fail and Labour in 1992-3 were helped by the prior preparation by Fianna Fail of a twenty 
page document outlining the areas of policy agreement.  This enabled the negotiations to 
focus on resolving areas where the parties were not in accord (Farrell, 1993).  It is quite usual 
for areas of disagreement between the negotiating parties to be put off until later, as the 
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parties in Scotland did on the issue of student finance, for example.  This approach avoids 
causing friction at the outset of a government, and aids speedy resolution of the negotiations. 
 
Use of advisers 
As I suggested above, there are various situations in which parties bargaining to form a 
coalition may not wish to spend long around the table.  If the executive enjoys a high degree 
of control over the legislature, if the parties trust one another and/or if there is little public 
demand for a detailed agreement, there are few incentives for a drawn out negotiating 
process.  Rather, areas of disagreement can be resolved later, on an ongoing basis.  However, 
if these conditions do not exist, the parties may well wish to hold fuller policy discussions.  
Parties in this situation clearly need to have a good grasp of the main policy issues if they are 
to reach realistic and informed agreements quickly. 
 
This rarely poses problems to a party that is already in government, since it will already 
appreciate the opportunities and constraints on the policy agenda.  The picture may not be so 
rosy for parties negotiating to form a wholly new government, however, and the prospect 
may be still more daunting for small parties without the resources available to their larger 
counterparts.  For instance, in Ireland in 1997, the Progressive Democrats negotiated to form a 
government with Fianna Fail.  Despite having been in office with the same partner just four 
years previously, the junior partner found conducting detailed policy negotiations a strain.  It 
had just a couple of advisers, while Fianna Fail – which, in addition, is far more used to 
political office and thus the wider policy agenda – had access to a far larger resource pool.  
The junior partner did have access to civil servants from the Finance Department for help in 
costing any policy commitments.  And more liberal information regimes plus the posting of 
economic data on the web means important material is often readily available.  Nonetheless, 
some Progressive Democrats involved in the negotiations would have liked additional 
resources, in the shape of 2-3 civil servants, to advise the party on its policies, in particular on 
their ‘downstream’ implications.  This plea was echoed in Ireland by Labour figures involved 
in the negotiations with Fianna Fail in 1992-3, and in Germany by members of the Green party 
who negotiated a coalition with the SPD in 1998.  Following the 1996 election in New Zealand, 
the negotiating parties were allocated around £150,000 to employ external advisers.  Maybe 
not surprisingly, only the newest and smallest party, New Zealand First, drew upon this fund 
(Boston and McLeay, 1997: 228). 
 
Civil servants in Ireland appear to be becoming more involved in providing advice to 
coalition negotiations.  This may be because the country has only been in a system of coalition 
politics for twelve years, since Fianna Fail ended its refusal to enter power sharing 
administrations.  The issues on which the parties typically seek civil service advice are the 
costing of programmes, the state of the social partnerships (agreements between government, 
employers and the unions), matters that require discussion within the European Union and 
the internal structure of government.  There are no formal arrangements in Ireland covering 
the provision of such advice.  Requests made by the parties are sent to the relevant 
department, not via the Government Secretariat.  These unregulated arrangements seem to 
work well; I encountered no concern either within the civil service or among the parties about 
access or equity issues, and no calls for more formal rules.  
 
Coalition bargaining in Denmark is not informed by civil servants, who play no role in 
advising the parties on financial matters or policy implementation. In part this is because 
coalition agreements rarely contain this level of detail, since Denmark’s governments tend to 
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hold only minority status and thus engage in a continuous process of bargaining and 
compromise (Damgaard, 2000: 244-6).  It may also be explained by the ready accessibility of 
information in Denmark, with opposition politicians regularly using civil servants to provide 
official information and data. 
 
The German situation is unusual in the British context since many senior civil servants are 
partisan figures, appointed by ‘their’ party when it forms a government.  When there is 
wholesale change in a coalition – an event limited in the post-war period to 1982 and 1998 – 
the partisan nature of the top officials makes it difficult for the incoming government to gain 
advice.  This is less of a problem for the two large parties, the CDU and SPD, since they can 
usually count on some supporters among the civil service’s senior tiers.  But it is a concern for 
small parties or parties that have not previously been involved in government, such as the 
Greens in 1998. 
 
New Zealand has probably done more than any other country to develop conventions 
covering relations between civil servants and political parties during coalition negotiations.  
The civil service in New Zealand is, like that in Britain but unlike that in Germany, wholly 
non-partisan, and the advent of multi-party conditions following the country’s switch to PR 
elections in 1996 led to fears that civil service neutrality might be jeopardised (Boston et al, 
1998a: 70).  The parties already enjoy a good base for negotiations, since the country’s liberal 
information regime means even opposition parties can gain access to official material and 
data.  This reduces the need for parties to have access to civil servants as part of government 
forming negotiations.  As noted above, the demand for official information and advice 
depends largely on the level of detail in the policy discussions.  There was little demand on 
civil servants in 1999, when discussions between Labour and the Alliance were brief and 
concentrated on procedural, not policy, matters.  By contrast, there was high demand in 1996, 
although New Zealand First, which was keen to negotiate a detailed policy agreement, 
channelled its requests through the incumbent government, National.  The bulk of these 
requests were for help in costing policy proposals (Boston and McLeay, 1997: 227-8; Shaw, 
1999: 42).  
 
What rules have been introduced in New Zealand to protect the neutrality of civil servants 
while allowing parties access to the information necessary for an effective policy programme?  
The bare bones of the arrangements drawn up prior to the 1996 election were: 
 
• Civil servants could only provide information to the parties when requested, and when 
authorised by the prime minister (who was not to be shown the response to any request, 
except when it was from his/her own party) 
• All requests for information and any resulting written briefings were to be channelled 
through a committee of senior officials, including the Cabinet Secretary 
• If ministers wanted information to use in the negotiations, they should request this via the 
prime minister and not approach their own department directly 
• Civil servants were limited to commenting on the practical implications of any policy 
proposal, not its merits 
• No civil service input would be provided to the drawing up of the coalition agreement, 
which was deemed a matter solely for the parties. 
 
These arrangements appear to have worked well, with two concerns.  One was that the 
laborious process for filtering requests and responses slowed down the process when the 
parties wanted information to – often complex – questions within 3-4 days.  This placed a 
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burden on civil servants in providing useful responses as well as holding up the negotiations.  
The second was that the concern to protect civil servants by screening their responses 
sometimes led to anodyne briefings that were of only marginal help to the parties.  A 
subsequent review of the arrangements suggested that more flexibility might be beneficial, 
and that direct contact between the negotiating parties and civil servants might help reduce 
some of the misunderstandings and confusion that inevitably creep in when correspondence 
is limited to written form (Boston et al, 1998a: 70-2; James, 1997: 38-44; Shaw, 1999: 50-2). 
 
The guidelines produced prior to the 1999 election differed little from the previous rules, 
except in allowing for face to face meetings of officials and party negotiators once it was clear 
that the parties concerned were likely to form a government (‘preferred partner stage’).  Direct 
meetings could only be held prior to this stage when a written request for information was 
unclear; any meeting to resolve the issue would be attended by the relevant department’s 
chief executive (permanent secretary) and officials from the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet and the State Services Commission, to ensure the impartiality of civil servants 
was maintained. 
 
What is the role of civil servants if one of the bargaining parties is part of the incumbent 
government?  Is the incumbent allowed to draw on the civil service for help, and does that 
give it an information advantage?  The short answer is that the incumbent does normally have 
this right, since few countries require their governments to resign at an election (see Chapter 
2).  Thus, following Ireland’s election in 1992, Labour ended up negotiating with Fianna Fail 
which, at the time, was in office with the Progressive Democrats.  Those on the Labour side I 
spoke to in Dublin said that policy proposals they put to the negotiations were given by 
Fianna Fail to civil servants for comment; they would be returned to Labour a day later in the 
form of detailed twenty page memos!  There were also questions raised in New Zealand after 
the 1996 election, where the National incumbent took part in coalition bargaining, in spite of 
efforts to prevent ministers gaining an unfair advantage (Boston et al, 1998a: 72-3).  Given that 
governments tend to continue in office after an election, it is difficult to devise a regime that 
allows civil servants to continue their proper relationship with ministers, but prevents advice 
being given in the context of government negotiations.  I suggested in the previous chapter 
that thought be given to a constitutional rule stipulating the resignation of governments at 
elections.  This might help prevent instances of incumbent ministers using their officials in the 
course of coalition negotiations, since the administration would hold only caretaker status and 
might have less hold over civil servants as a result. 
 
The negotiating parties in Scotland in 1999 enjoyed access to civil servants, who were allowed 
to provide factual briefings.  But there was little advance preparation of the exact role of 
officials faced with coalition negotiations – no clear guidelines were issued, for example – and 
some concerns were raised subsequently that information provided to one party was also 
shown to the other (Labour was de facto the incumbent government, since the civil servants 
servicing the new Scottish Executive transferred across from the Scottish Office, controlled by 
the Labour government in London). 
 
Portfolio allocation 
We know from gossipy newspaper accounts that ‘who gets what’ from coalition negotiations 
is a key issue for politicians and their parties.  This is reinforced by the theoretical literature, 
which suggests that inter-party bargaining over portfolio allocations should be among the 
most important parts of the negotiating process.  This is because, given high ministerial 
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autonomy, it is only individual heads of departments that have the power to enforce 
agreements (Laver and Shepsle, 1996).  Thus, parties will seek particular portfolios since 
control over these posts is more important for the implementation of policies than mere 
presence around the cabinet table.  In the words of two commentators, ministries are “units of 
power” (Budge and Keman, 1990: 27). 
 
The issue of portfolios divides into two: the allocation of ministries between the coalition 
partners, and the choice of particular figures to serve in those ministries.49  It is fairly usual for 
the allocation of ministries to be agreed by the full negotiating teams, with the issue of whom 
to place in senior and junior ministerial posts discussed by the party leaders.  However, the 
selection of specific figures to fill portfolios is, in most European countries, the preserve of the 
individual parties.  Coalition parties in Germany operate the most formal veto powers on 
ministerial nominations (Saalfeld, 2000: 47-8, 58, 65-6), although my study visit also suggested 
that nominations were the subject of inter-party agreement in Denmark (see also Damgaard, 
2000: 248).  Such behaviour is also reported in Ireland, where in 1991 the junior partner vetoed 
a ministerial nomination put forward by the leader of Fianna Fail (Chubb, 1992: 172-3). 
 
The general principle that collective agreement does not extend to the allocation of posts to 
particular individuals is slightly puzzling.  Political parties are, of course, autonomous 
organisations and might be expected fiercely to reserve the right to appoint whomever they 
wish to a portfolio.  Moreover, the dominant tradition in comparative and theoretical research 
treats parties as ‘unitary actors’, so that “politicians from the same party [are] forecast to 
behave in more or less the same ways when placed in the same situations” (Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996: 25).  Yet clearly this is not the case in practice (ibid: 246-60).  To give one 
domestic example, secret talks in Britain between the Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders 
after the 1997 general election on possible power sharing arrangements included discussion of 
which figures might hold specific portfolios.  The Liberal Democrats are reported to have 
refused to participate in such a government if a particular minister retained his portfolio.50  
The direction of a coalition depends, then, not only on which party gets what offices, but also 
which person is assigned which portfolio.  One might have expected this to be reflected in 
greater collective discussion between the party leaders when it came to the negotiation of 
portfolios. 
 
The allocation of ministries between parties in west European countries has been found to 
conform well to the ‘proportionality rule’, whereby portfolios are distributed to the parties in 
direct proportion to their respective strengths, measured in terms of their legislative seats 
within the coalition (Browne and Franklin, 1973; Laver and Schofield, 1990).  The main 
exception to this rule is the overcompensation to the junior partner that is often made.  In 
order that the junior partner maintains their standing within the coalition and thus avoids 
losing public support, it is often rewarded with a higher proportion of cabinet seats than its 
strength merits, or with a high profile ministry. 
                                                     
49 An additional stage sometimes resorted to is agreement over senior posts outside the cabinet, such as 
European portfolios and headships of government agencies.  Like ministerial posts, these agreements 
are not normally made public.  The 1998 coalition agreement between the SPD and Greens in Germany 
was unusual in highlighting the agreed appointment of a European Commissioner (a Green nominee) 
and the German Presidency (an SPD nominee). 
50 Financial Times, 26th October 2001.  The figure in questions was Jack Straw, and the portfolio the 
Home Office.  Straw is notoriously hostile to the Liberal Democrats and to their policy goal of 
proportional representation.  He is also lukewarm on freedom of information, another Liberal 




In Scotland, the junior partner, the Liberal Democrats, gained only two out of the eleven 
portfolios up for grabs (18%), a slightly lower total than might have been expected from their 
seat share within the coalition (23%).  Nor were they compensated by a larger share of junior 
posts or by senior ministries (although the Liberal Democrat leader, Jim Wallace, took the 
Justice Portfolio which allowed him to bring forward freedom of information legislation, an 
important policy goal for his party).  In Wales, the share of portfolios allocated to the junior 
partner (22%), again the Liberal Democrats, was broadly in line with their seat share (18%), 
and they were also given the important policy post covering economic development.  The 
position enjoyed by the Liberal Democrats in Wales may simply reflect the small size of the 
ministerial ‘cake’ in Cardiff; it is easier to produce a proportional allocation of ministries the 
more portfolios are on offer.  But it may also reflect the greater need that Labour in Wales had 
for a coalition partner, and consequently the weaker its bargaining position. 
 
It is not unusual for coalition partners to squabble about the number of portfolios each is to be 
allocated.  How are these disputes resolved?  In systems where the size of the ministerial cake 
is not fixed (among my study countries, Denmark, Germany and New Zealand), it is possible 
to accommodate parties’ demands by increasing the number of portfolios available.  Such a 
strategy has sometimes been resorted to in Germany, but this is exceptional and not frequent 
(Norpoth, 1982: 22).  This would also be possible for the Scottish Executive and at 
Westminster, where there are no restrictions on the size of the cabinet.  But in Wales51, along 
with Ireland, the number of cabinet posts is fixed.  Disputes among coalition partners in 
Ireland have sometimes been resolved by creating a ‘super’ junior minister, with the right to 
attend cabinet meetings although not to cast a vote, or by increasing the number of ministers 
of state (Garry, 1995: 198).  Allocation of posts also extends beyond ministerial portfolios to 
include other agency and political offices (Mitchell, 2000: 143-5). 
 
Party behaviour in bargaining situations 
Bargaining between parties to form a coalition can proceed in one of two ways.  The first is for 
a lead party or group of parties to emerge and to begin negotiations.  These continue until it is 
clear that a government can or cannot be formed.  The other parties remain aside from the 
negotiations until the lead parties’ bargaining collapses, in which case they may enter the ring.  
Under this model, bargaining follows an order and is thus sequential.  The alternative is for 
one party – usually the pivotal centre party – to negotiate with more than one other party 
simultaneously, a process of parallel bargaining.52  There are no intrinsic reasons to favour one 
model over the other.  There is insufficient comparative data to show whether parallel 
bargaining processes tend to be more drawn out than sequential ones (although the 
experience of New Zealand in 1996 is one example where parallel bargaining strategies almost 
certainly stretched the time taken to form a government; Boston and Church, 2000).  The key 
distinction between them is that the parallel model allows pivotal parties (those able to form a 
viable coalition with more than one partner) to play off their potential partners against each 
other, thereby maximising their bargaining capacity.  This was the strategy of New Zealand 
First in 1996, when it held discussions at the same time with the larger National and Labour 
parties.  Are there any conventions on whether bargaining should be sequential or parallel? 
 
                                                     
51 Under Standing Order 2.5, the maximum number of Assembly Secretaries is fixed at nine. 
52 Where there are formal constraints on the bargaining process – by the designation of a lead negotiator 
or formateur – the parties are forced to operate sequentially.  Thus it is only in ‘unordered’ systems (see 
Chapter 2) in which parties have the option of bargaining in parallel. 
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In Ireland, no parallel bargaining was possible until 1989, when Fianna Fail lifted its self-
imposed moratorium on participation in coalition administrations.  In 1992, Labour emerged 
from the election as the ‘winner’, having made the highest gain in vote share among the 
parties.  Although in terms of seats, it was only the third largest party, Labour thus had the 
momentum to initiate negotiations itself, starting with Democratic Left and opening up to 
Fine Gael shortly thereafter.  These parallel negotiations did not prove fruitful, and Labour 
resorted to negotiations with Fianna Fail, despite having been critical of the Fianna Fail-
Progressive Democrat coalition that governed between 1989 and 1992 (Farrell, 1993; Mair, 
1999: 146-7). 
 
In Germany, the clear division of the parties into opposing blocs means parallel bargaining 
has never been resorted to at the federal level.  But at the state level, there have been instances 
when a party faced with two potential coalition partners has held simultaneous talks with 
both.  After the 1994 and 1998 elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, for example, the SPD 
held talks with the PDS (the former East German communist party) at the same time as the 
CDU.53 
 
So parallel bargaining, while not common, is not unheard of either.  The distinction with the 
New Zealand case is that such bargaining is usually undertaken fairly quickly to test each 
partner’s demands.  It is not usual for parties to adopt New Zealand First’s strategy of 
bargaining simultaneously over a long period of time – akin to “holding the country to 
ransom” (Boston and Church, 2000: 5) – a tactic that would not be deemed legitimate in 
European countries (Boston, 1998: 48).   
 
Bargaining is normally conducted in secret, which often limits the extent to which the wider 
party groups and executive can be consulted.  If the negotiations turn out to be protracted, it 
may be that the parties need to provide the media with some information on areas of 
progress.  The total news blackout in New Zealand in 1996 was counter-productive; while it 
prevented unease on the stock market, it created negative impressions among the public and 
media. 
 
It is in the bargaining parties’ interests to keep the negotiations a private matter, since this 
allows them to make the compromises and trade offs that might otherwise upset their 
members and supporters.  But parties sometimes adopt slightly different tactics in order to 
strengthen their position.  To assuage concerned supporters, Fine Gael and Labour negotiators 
in Ireland after the 1982 election leaked news stories of how difficult the bargaining was 
proving to be, even if in reality the negotiations were proceeding relatively amicably (Farrell, 
1987: 141).  If they want to strengthen their bargaining position against their partner, parties 
will occasionally make public their policy demands.  This tactic makes it more difficult for 
them to renege on their demands, a fact of which their bargaining partners will be well aware.  
Such behaviour was used by both the SPD and the Greens in forming their first coalition in 
Germany in 1998 (Lees, 2000: 103). 
                                                     
53 Note that part of the reason why the SPD wanted to discuss coalition options with the CDU was to 
avoid the criticism of having gone directly to the PDS, which is still something of a ‘pariah’ party (the 
SPD at the federal level refuses to enter a coalition with the PDS, although this stance is gradually 
weakening).  Another reason for the SPD’s parallel bargaining was the more familiar one of maximising 




Limiting the duration of government formation 
How long should a coalition take to negotiate, and are there any reasons for placing limits on 
this process? 
 
First, what is the typical duration of coalition negotiations elsewhere?  I showed at the start of 
this chapter that the average duration varies significantly between countries.  Taking these 
averages across the eight west European countries surveyed recently (Müller and Strøm (2000: 
570) in which more than half of the post-WWII period has been overseen by coalition 
governments54, the mean government formation period is 23 days.  This is one benchmark. 
 
A second is to ask how long should it take to form a coalition?  The last elections in Germany 
in 1998 saw bargaining between the SPD and Greens, a combination previously untried at the 
federal level (although piloted at state level) with, in addition, the Greens lacking any 
experience of federal government.  In spite of the junior partner’s lack of resources to evaluate 
policy issues, the negotiations were completed in 30 days.  Senior figures from the Green 
party who were involved in the negotiations did not think this was too short a period.  The 
same is true in Ireland, whose most recent negotiations, in 1997, brought together a Fianna 
Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition to replace a left of centre coalition.  Although negotiators 
from the junior party felt under pressure from voters for a quick bargaining process, none 
thought the three week period too short.  This lack of concern may be due to the fact that the 
leaders of the two coalition partners had held discussions prior to the election to minimise 
their policy differences during the campaign (Mitchell, 1999: 249-51).  There had thus been 
some contact between the parties, paving the way for rapid agreement after the election.  In 
general, the closer the relations between parties prior to elections, the quicker the formation 
process afterwards. 
 
In spite of the good personal relations between the Labour and Liberal Democrat party 
leaders in Scotland, the formation of the coalition in 1999, in only eight days (with the actual 
negotiations lasting only five), was admitted to me by one of the senior negotiators to be too 
short.  The speed was in large part induced by the parties themselves – although reinforced by 
the media and civil servants – since there was a fear that a longer formation process would be 
viewed unfavourably by voters, accustomed to swift government replacement (Ashdown, 
2001: 440).  The speed of government formation was also exacerbated by the investiture rules.  
Under the terms of the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Parliament must be recalled seven days 
after the election.  Having met, the Parliament can do little until an executive has been formed 
so, naturally, one of its first tasks is to seek to elect a First Minister.55  The knowledge that this 
was likely to happen put great pressure on the coalition negotiations, since it was thought 
necessary to announce a government very shortly after the First Minister had been chosen.  In 
the event, the coalition agreement was signed the day after Donald Dewar was chosen by the 
Parliament.  It is undesirable that negotiations should be so rushed, and it would thus be 
prudent for the Parliament to be recalled at a later date, perhaps after thirty days.  This would 
be in line with international norms, although even this more relaxed approach might force the 
pace for coalition negotiations.  The recall limit for the German parliament is often breached, 
                                                     
54 I do not include the Netherlands, which has by far the longest average government duration (71 
days) and is thus an outlier. 
55 Under its Standing Orders, the initial vote on the First Minister must take place no more than 14 days 
after the election. 
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resulting in the Chancellor being elected before coalition negotiations are fully completed (see 
footnote 48.) 
 
Is there any evidence to suggest that coalitions are taking longer to form?  Might such a trend 
hint at the need for external constraints on the process?  In fact there is little evidence that 
government formation in west European countries has either increased or decreased recently.  
To take the study countries examined in this report, neither Denmark nor Germany shows 
any real variation in formation periods over the past decade; only in Ireland has the period 
since 1989 brought a slightly extended process (the Irish case perhaps being explained by 
Fianna Fail ending its moratorium on coalition participation, thus increasing the bargaining 
options).  A set of competing pressures may help explain the inertia in formation timescales.  
On the one hand, the bargaining process tends to stretch out the more parties there are in 
parliament, since there tend to be more government permutations following inconclusive 
elections.  Thus the partisan dealignment and party system fragmentation that many west 
European countries have experienced since the 1970s should have increased the timescale for 
government formation.  Yet this factor might be counter-balanced by the growing familiarity 
of party actors with one another, leading to a better understanding of each others’ policy 
positions and likely performance in government.  This trend might be expected to reduce the 
time needed to negotiate a coalition. 
 
As the next chapter shows in more detail, there is a growing use of coalition agreements 
across west European countries (Strøm and Müller, 1998: 265-6).  In other words, coalition 
partners appear keener than before to agree a clear policy programme, yet they seem to be 
taking no longer to achieve this.  The best that can be said is that parties appear to be taking 
the business of coalition more seriously, yet appear also to be getting more adept at forming 
such administrations. 
 
Normally, then, coalition formation is not a drawn out process.  But there are exceptions.  
New Zealand’s coalition government in 1996 was only put together after two months, with a 
hiatus of seven weeks in between governments in Ireland in 1992-3.  Such delays can put a 
serious strain on caretaker governments or alternatively lead to a decision making vacuum if 
the caretaker takes a hands-off approach to its role.  These difficulties would become 
particularly acute if a political or economic crisis emerged, which required effective decision 
making capacity.  For this reason, some commentators have suggested that more formal 
constraints be placed on the formation process. 
 
One institutional constraint on the government formation process is the time limit imposed 
for the recall of parliament after an election.  In both Germany and Ireland for example, the 
legislatures must be reconvened no later than thirty days after an election.  The limit in 
Scotland, as pointed out above is much shorter, at seven days.  There is no limit at all for the 
recall of the Welsh Assembly, which reconvened following the first election on a date 
specified by the Secretary of State for Wales.  In a multi-party situation where coalition 
bargaining may be necessary, this should be remedied to give the parties an incentive to 
conclude their discussions.  Similar thought should be given to the situation at Westminster.  
Although parliament is, in practice, always recalled less than one month after an election 
(Blackburn, 1995: 23), this is entirely due to the single party nature of the executive being 
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formed.  Should inter-party bargaining be necessary to form a government, there are no time 
limits to help constrain this process.56 
 
If is difficult to assess how far time limits for the recall of parliament act as a de facto constraint 
on duration of coalition negotiations.  Of the 17 coalitions in Germany in the post-war period 
that took more than a single day to form, ten took longer than the 30 day recall deadline, 
although six of these extended the deadline by no more than one week.  Both  of the last two 
coalitions, in 1994 and 1998, were formed in exactly 30 days, suggesting that the recall of 
parliament may have played a role in the bargaining parties’ behaviour (Saalfeld, 2000: 49).  
There is evidence, too, from New Zealand’s bargaining process in 1996 that the parties 
worked towards the deadline for recall of parliament – eight weeks – suggesting that the 
process might have been swifter if a shorter deadline had been in place (Boston, 1998: 102-4). 
 
Conclusion 
Different parties forming coalitions in different countries at different times will adopt 
different approaches to the negotiating process.  As with many of the issues in this report, 
there is no right or wrong way to proceed.  However, a few points can be identified, either 
because they represent accepted practice in countries with mature systems of coalition 
government, or because they are seen to work well in specific instances. 
 
Although the parties’ negotiating teams will usually be small, to develop mutual trust and 
avoid leaks, it is quite usual for a wider network of party experts and spokespeople to be 
involved, in order that the parties agree a properly thought through programme.  But it is less 
common for civil servants to play an advisory role to the negotiations, even though their 
knowledge is potentially invaluable for parties new to government.  The difficulties involved 
in allowing the negotiating parties access to civil servants, while maintaining the neutrality 
and even-handedness of officials, are numerous and need to be properly prepared for. 
 
Negotiating a coalition takes time, and probably requires longer than the five days taken by 
the parties in Scotland in 1999.  The average across west European countries is over three 
weeks.  On the other hand, the negotiations should not drag on much beyond this time; 
setting a thirty day deadline for the recall of parliament is a sensible means of putting 
pressure on the parties to complete their bargaining within this timescale. 
 
When it comes to ratifying a coalition agreement, it is common for parties to involve their 
parliamentary groups or executive committees, which sometimes hold a formal vote on the 
agreement.  It is particularly important to involve the parliamentary groups, since coalition 
government tends to increase the need for party discipline in the legislature. 
                                                     
56 Unless one counts the 1694 Meeting of Parliament Act, which stipulates that Parliament must 
reconvene no later than three years after a dissolution! 
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CHAPTER 4: The Coalition Agreement 
 
This chapter examines the outcome of the negotiating process described in the previous 
chapter: the coalition agreement.  The principal question driving my analysis is what kind of 
agreement is most conducive to an effectively managed coalition?  Clearly, there is no ideal 
blueprint that can be identified and transferred across countries.  But are there specific 
features of coalition agreements that appear to play an important role across time and space in 
underpinning healthy inter-party relations?  
 
The functions and use of coalition agreements 
Agreements are often used by the junior partner as a way of binding in the larger party.  The 
larger party has significantly greater power as a result of its size.  It is not usual for disputes to 
be resolved by votes, where the larger party could get its way by virtue of controlling more 
cabinet seats.  Nonetheless, the larger party will control more portfolios and, in the person of 
the prime minister, sometimes has the means to end the coalition by calling for a dissolution 
of parliament.  Comparative studies have shown that written coalition agreements are more 
likely in situations where the prime minister holds the power to terminate the government in 
this way; they are a means by which the junior partner can restrict the prime minister’s power 
by preventing him/her from using this authority unilaterally (Strøm and Müller, 2001: 16).  
 
Agreements can be thus used to reassure or inform a governing partner or members of a party 
(‘internal’ function) or to do the same for voters (‘external’ function.  Alternatively, their 
function can be see in relation to party members and voters (‘vertical’ role) and to a coalition 
partner (‘horizontal’ role) (Strøm and Müller, 1999, 2001). 
 
To assess the use of coalition agreements, I draw on a recent comprehensive comparative 
study of these documents, analysing cabinets in 15 west European countries between 1945-99.  
The study found that almost two thirds (65%) of cabinets were found to rest on formal written 
agreements.  Moreover, there is more frequent use of agreements.  Thus, during the 1940s, less 
than half of all coalition governments were based on a written agreement, while by the 1990s, 
this figure had risen to 70%.  One reason given for the greater use of formal agreements is the 
increase in competition between political parties and the mutual distrust to which this may 
give rise (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 269; 2001: 5). 
 
There is substantial variation between countries, however, in the use of formal agreements.  
Among my study countries, coalition agreements are widely used in Ireland (four out of every 
five cabinets on average), but less so in Denmark and Germany57 (only one in every two 
cabinets).  One reason for this variation relates to the precariousness of the governments being 
formed.  In countries such as Denmark, where agreements are produced only half the time, 
and Italy, where they are hardly ever resorted to, the minority status of governments makes it 
less worthwhile for the coalition partners to agree at the outset a clear legislative programme.  
Not all minority governments, however, feel it redundant to agree a detailed agreement.  The 
right of centre three party coalition in Norway in 1997, for example, struck a fairly long policy 
agreement in spite of holding only one quarter of the seats in the Storting. 
 
                                                     




The majority (67%) of coalition agreements analysed were struck after elections, with a fifth 
(21%) concluded during the election period.  Only 7% of agreements were made prior to the 
election period, so that the partners campaigned as a proto-coalition.  A few coalitions (5%) 
were the subject of both pre- and post-election agreements.  In line with the ‘vertical’ function 
of coalition agreements, the bulk of those analysed – eight out of ten across the seventeen 
countries studied – were made public.  Patterns of openness vary between countries: only in 
Luxembourg are agreements always kept secret, while in Denmark and Germany, around one 
third of agreements remain hidden from public gaze (Strøm and Müller, 2001: 5). 
 
The content of coalition agreements 
The comparative study of coalition agreements reveals the size of these documents to vary 
greatly between countries, and within them over time.  The mean size among the twelve 
European countries for which agreements are publicly available ranges from 1,163 (Finland) 
to 14,166 words (Belgium).  In this company, the coalition agreements in Scotland and Wales, 
at 4,200 and 6,900 words respectively, fall towards the shorter end of the scale.  Maybe this is 
to be expected given the novelty of coalition administrations in these two countries. 
 
Coalition agreements may cover one or more of the following: policy,  portfolio allocation, 
and procedural matters relating to the conduct of the government.  Very few of the coalition 
agreements analysed in the comparative study cover the allocation of portfolios; as one would 
expect, policy concerns predominate.  Thus, among the agreements analysed for Norway, 
Sweden, France, Germany and Belgium, more than 90% of the average agreement relates to 
policy issues.  Only in Austria is more than half of the typical agreement concerned with 
issues of procedure or office.  Across the twelve countries analysed, procedural rules account 
for an average of 7% of the coalition agreement.  The coalition agreement negotiated in 
Scotland contains a slightly higher level of procedural matters (11%), while the Welsh 
agreement has a less comprehensive procedural section, accounting for 3%.  Again, it is 
understandable that new coalition partners – like Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 
Scotland – wish to introduce clear procedural rules before taking office together.  However, 
coalition agreements in west European countries are tending to get longer rather than shorter, 
suggesting that parties’ experience of working together in coalitions may tend to reduce, 
rather than enhance, levels of mutual trust (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 269).  Given this, we 
should expect new coalitions to require relatively modest agreements which, in Scotland and 
Wales, is exactly what we find. 
 
One might also expect that, in complex bargaining situations (brought on by a fragmented 
party system, for example), coalition agreements would be more comprehensive, since the 
greater number of partners involved in the coalition would multiply the policy demands 
being made (Nousiainen, 1993: 264).  Yet, the comparative study has shown that the 
relationship is not a tight one, so that countries with complex bargaining environments exhibit 
both detailed coalition agreements (in the case of Belgium) and relatively sparse agreements 
(Denmark) (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 269).  I look further at the distinction between ‘tight’ and 
‘loose’ agreements in the following sections. 
 
Ensuring compliance with the agreement 
If the coalition agreement is treated as a contract between the governing parties, thereby 
committing each to an agreed course of action, what is to stop one party from breaking its 
commitment if this will bring it greater benefit?  After all, potential coalition partners 
negotiate with one another with little knowledge of what the future will bring.  The problem 
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identified in the theoretical literature is that coalition agreements are not subject to any third 
party enforcement except, indirectly, through electoral sanctions.  In response to the question 
of how to ‘lock in’ the coalition partners  (‘endogenous compliance’), one lesson is to spread 
the advantages that each party derives from the coalition (its ‘payoffs’) across the lifetime of 
the government.  Each party should, in other words, avoid ‘lumping’ the advantages accruing 
to the other at the early stages of the coalition’s life, otherwise that party will have little 
incentive to keep the agreement once it has gained what it wants.  Insofar as they can, 
therefore, contracting parties should take care to ensure the “alignment of incentives” (Strøm 
and Müller, 1999: 271-2). 
 
One way in which parties maintain a balance between their interests is to renegotiate 
agreements should the original document have been largely implemented or if underlying 
political or economic conditions change.  The current two party coalition in Dublin is 
instructive in this regard.  Not only is the original 1997 coalition agreement reviewed annually 
to assess progress, but a new set of agreed commitments were issued in a 53-page paper in 
1999.  These reviews and extensions of the agreement are, of course, designed partly for public 
consumption, to encourage visibility and a sense of government activity.  But they also 
represent ways in which the coalition partners can assess how far the agreement’s terms are 
being adhered to and ensure that incentives remain aligned.  In this respect, it is important 
that the coalition partners monitor progress in meeting the agreement’s commitments 
(discussed in more detail below). 
 
Another way in which parties can ensure continued mutual cooperation is through the 
blunter device of procedural rules and constraints.  These constraints might include promises 
to vote together on legislation before parliament and prohibitions on taking initiatives 
without obtaining the consent of the other partner.  The methods used by coalition partners to 
coordinate their activities in government is the subject of the following chapter.  Here, I 
merely note that, while procedural rules are normally agreed between the partners but kept 
from public view, this is not always the case.  Thus, the new coalition formed in Germany in 
1998 between the SPD and Greens included – largely at the behest of the junior partner – 
many explicit procedural agreements, such as the commitment to vote together on all matters 
before the Bundestag (Saalfeld, 2000: 59-60).  The Scottish coalition agreement focuses on 
internal consultation, requiring that all executive business – decisions, legislation, 
appointments and spending plans – is subject to prior discussion between ministers. 
 
This discussion of certain theoretical considerations, and the earlier empirical evidence, 
suggests that written agreements are an important element in coalition politics.  Yet 
agreements represent ‘incomplete contracts’, in being unable to anticipate all the significant 
events likely to face a government over its lifetime.  And even detailed agreements may not 
prevent disputes between the partners because of the distance between setting policy 
commitments and actually implementing them (Mitchell, 1999).  Therefore, to enable the 
partners to deal with such issues, a range of governance institutions are usually provided as a 
supplement to the agreement.  These include: legislative discipline, collective cabinet 
responsibility, special coalition committees and joint working arrangements, oversight roles of 
the prime minister and deputy prime minister and ‘pooled’ patterns of portfolio allocation.  
These structures are all considered in more detail in Chapter 6.  The point of mentioning them 
here is because of their relevance to the question of why, as I noted above, coalition 




Coalition agreements can serve to bind in the governing parties in two ways: first by 
stipulating the government’s future policy course in detail, and second by stipulating 
procedures by which all government decisions must be made.  Governance arrangements that 
bind the coalition partners to each other closely are styled ‘tight’, while those in which the 
parties enjoy only weaker bonds are ‘loose’ arrangements (Strøm and Müller, 2001).  In the 
main, comprehensive policy agreements impose tight constraints on the parties; but it is not 
always the case that limited policy agreements impose only weak constraints, since it may be 
that the procedural rules limit the parties’ freedom of manoeuvre.  Given, then, that the 
tightness of a coalition is a function of governance institutions as well as the level of policy 
commitment in the agreement, what factors explain why parties resort in some situations to 
tight agreements and in some cases to loose contracts? 
 
From the comparative literature, the key factor appears to be the level of uncertainty faced by 
the parties about to enter coalition.  Uncertainty may arise from a number of different sources.  
First, if a minority administration feels that its legislative proposals will require negotiation 
and compromise to get through parliament, it is unlikely to set out a detailed set of policy 
aims at the outset (Strøm and Müller, 2001: 15-16).  Second, if the legislative strength of the 
coalition parties is uneven, the smaller partner(s) may wish to push for a detailed agreement 
up front, to prevent the larger partner using its size to gets its way later on.  The greater the 
powers enjoyed by the senior partner – for example, the prime minister’s authority to gain a 
dissolution of parliament – the keener the junior partner will be to rein it in.  Generally, the 
greater the trust felt by the coalition parties for each other, the lesser the need to resort to 
detailed policy agreements.  Yet the size and nature of coalition agreements is not simply a 
product of how far the parties trust one another; it also depends on their own particular 
strategies.  Thus, while detailed agreements are usually the means by which the junior party 
constrains its larger partner, they are also used by larger parties to signal to their own 
supporters that their concerns are being addressed, and that the government ‘dog’ is not being 
‘wagged by its tail’.  The senior partner in the previous government in Denmark, the Social 
Democrats, saw the detailed coalition agreement as providing it with precisely this benefit. 
 
These features provide British parties in coalition situations with some, admittedly highly 
general, indications of the factors that might shape their decision to agree tight or loose 
agreements.  It is not surprising that, faced with a coalition in Scotland, the Liberal Democrats 
– the junior partner – prepared for, and demanded, a more detailed policy agreement than 
Labour, which would have preferred a shorter document setting out general principles. 
 
The behaviour of parties seeking a detailed coalition agreement is based on the belief that 
decisions struck at the outset of a government shape the subsequent conduct of an 
administration.  What evidence is there that coalition agreements do, in fact, affect what 
governments get up to once in office?  Comparative studies suggest that the importance of 
agreements varies both between countries and across time; in the Netherlands, for example, 
coalition agreements have grown in importance and now assume virtually lawlike status 
(Mitchell, 1999: 274-5). 
 
In Germany, coalition agreements are often seen as highly important documents.  They are 
detailed, to the extent sometimes of listing draft legislative bills, with policy commitments 
systematically monitored to ensure compliance (Müller-Rommel, 1994).  However, my 
interviews with politicians suggested that, once signed, agreements tend to be used only in 
cases of inter-party disputes; day to day coalition management appears to proceed with little 




Coalition agreements in Ireland play a highly significant role for government.  Not only are 
they seen by each coalition partner as means of ‘insurance’ against a policy priority being 
rejected later by the other, they also set the government’s programme, so that any major 
policy not flagged in the agreement has little chance of getting on the agenda later on 
(Mitchell, 2000: 141-2).  The importance of agreements reflects the continued strength of 
collective cabinet responsibility in the Irish political system (Laver, 1992).  Agreements tend to 
stress broad policy objectives, but without identifying targets or specifying how objectives are 
to be implemented.  Thus, one of the key economic priorities for the current Fianna Fail-
Progressive Democrat coalition is set out only in general terms: 
 
“The further encouragement of a home-based industrial/manufacturing sector with export 
potential, and balanced regional development”.  (An Action Plan for the Millennium, 1997) 
 
Changes in Irish governments tend not to produce large ideological swings from one side to 
the other.  This is in part due to policy convergence between the parties, the country’s 
economic health – and thus the ability of governments in recent years to avoid hard decisions 
– and the continuity induced by its strong social partnership.  Such policy stability might 
normally produce more limited coalition agreements.  But this trend might be outweighed by 
the relative novelty of coalition arrangements (Fianna Fail, the largest party, having ended its 
moratorium on power sharing only in 1989) and the combination in office of parties with very 
different electoral strengths.  The junior partner in the current coalition, the Progressive 
Democrats, thus uses the coalition agreement to bind in the larger partner and to ensure its 
policy voice is heard.  By far Ireland’s largest agreement – a 23,500 word document produced 
in 1993 – was the result of Labour going into coalition with a previously untried partner, 
Fianna Fail, scarred by its previous experience of coalition with Fine Gael a decade before, and 
all against the backdrop of a very successful election in which it had doubled its number of 
seats.  The outcome was that Labour pushed for a detailed agreement, both to protect itself 
from a new and larger partner, and also to ensure its electoral triumph translated into policy 
gains in government (Farrell, 1993). 
 
Given the preponderance of minority governments in Denmark, one might have expected 
coalition agreements to be relatively unimportant documents, and this is often how they are 
treated by governments (Damgaard, 2000: 244-6).  But in spite of this, coalition agreements 
appear to be becoming more significant.  In part this was explained to me as a result of media 
demands for greater openness and accountability.  A focus on agreements also reflects the 
experience of poorly managed coalitions in the 1980s.  Thus, the Social Liberals insisted on a 
written agreement before joining a left of centre coalition in 1993 after having participated in a 
right of centre coalition between 1988-90, where the lack of a formal agreement was seen as 
contributing to inter-party strife.  The agreement between the partners in the last coalition – 
the Social Democrats and Social Liberals – was seen by both parties as very important.  It 
represented a public statement of how each party’s core policies were being followed, aiding 
the larger party against charges of watering down its programme as much as the smaller 
party against concerns over losing its identity.  The policy agreement was couched in general 
terms, around agreed values and principles rather than specific commitments.  Nonetheless, 
the agreement was described to me as a “working tool”, indicating that the lack of policy 
detail need not prevent an agreement serving to guide a coalition’s programme. 
 
New Zealand has only had two coalitions since its new electoral system was first used in 1996.  
The first of these, a coalition between National and New Zealand First, was based on a highly 
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detailed agreement which encouraged both parties to take an almost legalistic approach in 
ensuring that ‘their’ policy commitments were met.  However, even very long agreements 
cannot determine in advance the government’s actions in office.  Civil servants I spoke to in 
New Zealand suggested that, while the 1996 agreement played a role for the initial 12-18 
months of the coalition’s life in signalling its policy direction, thereafter it became a less 
important guide to what needed to be done.  In fact, it became an encumbrance, since the 
parties often stuck to their original commitments even when circumstances demanded a 
different policy course. 
 
The coalition agreements in Scotland and Wales are, as noted above, relatively modest in size.  
Yet both make up for this by including a high degree of policy specificity.  The Scottish 
agreement is organised into eleven policy sections, the Welsh into nine.  Each contains an 
initial set of ‘Principles’ followed by specific ‘Initiatives’.  In the Education section, for 
example, thirteen (Scotland) or fourteen (Wales) initiatives are set out, some of which are 
couched in very general terms, while others make clear pledges.  The lists of initiatives are 
longer than the equivalent section in New Zealand’s 1996 coalition agreement between 
National and New Zealand First, generally seen to be too prescriptive on policy matters 
(Boston, 2000: 255-7).  They are also more specific than the education section in the agreement 
of the current Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition in Ireland.  For example, the 
commitment of the Irish coalition to pre-school education runs merely to the provision of a 
specific budget, while the agreements in Scotland and Wales guarantee to provide a nursery 
place for every three and four year old, in Scotland’s case by a set date.  The extent to which 
coalition agreements set out specific policy commitments depends, of course, on factors such 
as the perceived importance of the policy in question, its level of development (targets for 
delivery can only be made if the budget and infrastructure are already in place) and the 
political style of the administration (the setting of measurable targets is a particular feature of 
contemporary British governance).  Yet, in comparative perspective, what the Scottish and 
Welsh coalition agreements lack in size, they make up for in the specificity of their policy 
commitments.  It will be interesting to see whether, next time around, the coalition 
agreements become rather more general, in line with practice in countries such as Denmark, 
Ireland and New Zealand.58 
 
Finally, coalition agreements only serve as contracts (with other parties, party supporters or 
voters) if they are systematically monitored.  This is difficult for groups outside the coalition, 
such as party supporters and voters, although the ultimate sanction at their disposal – voting 
out of office a government that fails to meet its commitments – is severe.  But what about the 
coalition partners themselves: how is the agreement that they sign monitored for compliance?  
I have only a couple of observations to make here.  The first is that monitoring does not seem 
to be a major preoccupation for coalition governments.  It is reported that coalition 
agreements in Germany are systematically monitored by civil servants in the relevant 
ministries as well as in the Chancellor’s office (Müller-Rommel, 1994: 165).  The role of 
bureaucrats in the German system may be explained by the fact that senior civil servants are 
often political appointees for whom monitoring of the coalition agreement would be an 
appropriate role.  I was told on my study visit to Berlin that the current SPD-Green coalition 
                                                     
58 It will also be interesting to see whether any subsequent power sharing arrangements are referred to 
as coalitions or, as is the case in Scotland and Wales at present, as partnerships for fear that coalition 
might create negative impressions.  Power sharing governments in Ireland also prefer to call 
themselves ‘partnerships’ rather than ‘coalitions’; evidently, it is not only “England [that] does not love 
coalitions”, in Disraeli’s famous aphorism. 
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agreement is not monitored by the civil servants in the Chancellery, but by the parties (this 
may reflect the fact that some in the coalition find it difficult to trust civil servants on account 
of the long period of right wing government prior to 1998).  Even this monitoring of the 
agreement has decreased as the coalition has worn on, suggesting either that the parties have 
grown more trusting of one another or, more likely, that many of the important commitments 
have already been met. 
 
In systems without dedicated resources, it may be difficult to monitor detailed coalition 
agreements.  New Zealand First, the junior coalition partner in the 1996-98 administration, 
and lacking the necessary personnel, found it too time consuming to monitor the very detailed 
agreement it had signed.  In Ireland, the detailed coalition agreements signed between Fianna 
Fail and Labour in 1992, and Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic Left in 1994, were 
monitored by dedicated political advisers, Programme Managers (whose role is described in 
the next chapter).  Monitoring of coalition agreements outside Germany appears, then, to be 
an ad hoc exercise, largely dependent on the necessary resources being available. 
 
The ‘tightness’ of coalition agreements 
As I explained above, there are strong incentives for parties, especially small ones, to push for 
detailed coalition agreements that bind in their partners.  Against this, coalition agreements 
are contracts signed with imperfect information, since the parties can never know what lies 
around the corner.  What balance, then, should be struck between detail and flexibility? 
 
The agreement forged between the SPD and Greens in 1998 is the longest Germany has seen.  
The Greens had pushed for a tight agreement concerned, as coalition ‘novices’, to rein in their 
larger partner at the outset and to make sure that their priorities did, in fact, get delivered.  
But while, unsurprisingly, political advisers attached to the SPD bemoaned the constraints 
imposed by the agreement, such sentiments were also shared by Green politicians, who 
thought the agreement too specific and inflexible.  The concern of the junior partner had led, 
unusually in Germany, to the inclusion in the agreement of various procedural rules (Saalfeld, 
2000: 56).  However, these rules, unlike the policy commitments, were not highly specific (for 
example, in setting out how often the main coalition coordinating committee should meet).  
My interviews with Green party figures suggested that, with hindsight, the party might have 
been better off insisting on more specific consultation mechanisms than on stipulating a 
detailed policy agreement. 
 
New Zealand’s second coalition under PR conditions, the Labour-Alliance partnership formed 
in 1999, explicitly took the view that inter-party cooperation was better served by effective 
procedures than by detailed policy agreements.  The 65 page agreement reached by the 
previous coalition partners, National and New Zealand First, was in part the product of the 
junior partner trying to ensure that its policy demands were met in government.  It also 
reflected distrust within National of New Zealand First, particularly since the junior party’s 
leader, Winston Peters, had negotiated tenure of the key post of Treasurer with control over 
public spending.  Some of New Zealand First’s members still support its approach to the 
agreement – pointing out that it helped prevent backsliding by National once in office – 
although most commentators see the agreement as excessively detailed and rigid, leading to 
difficulties when circumstances changed (Boston, 2000: 255-7).  It also provided the opposition 
parties and the media with sticks to beat the coalition when promised initiatives didn’t 
materialise.  While the first agreement was, at around 17,000 words, long in comparative 
perspective, the second, at only 500 words, was extremely short.  The brevity of the agreement 
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was helped by the personal relations between the parties’ leaders and advisers, by the high 
level of knowledge each had of the other’s policies and by the relative congruence of the 
parties’ programmes.  These factors appear to have offset the concern that elected members 
might have been expected to have in the absence of a clear indication of where their leaders 
were heading (ie. a situation of potential ‘agency loss’).59  The drawback of such a minimal 
agreement is the need for more ongoing consultation between the parties than might have 
been the case if issues had been agreed upfront.  Agreements light on policy commitments 
also make it difficult for the junior coalition partner – in this case the Alliance – to 
demonstrate clearly to its supporters what it is getting out of the coalition.  For this reason, 
some figures involved in the current coalition suggested that they would prefer to see rather 
more policy commitment in any future agreement, although there was no support for the kind 
of detailed agreement reached in 1996. 
 
Although very limited coalition agreements might need to be offset by greater ongoing 
consultation between the parties, my interviews didn’t suggest a clear trade-off between the 
level of policy commitment in the coalition agreement and the frequency of internal coalition 
coordination.  It might be, for example, that parties having negotiated a detailed agreement 
would then be happy for internal consultation arrangements to remain limited, safe in the 
knowledge that the path ahead had already been mapped out.  Yet in Denmark, the previous 
coalition was built on both a reasonably full agreement and also close consultation 
arrangements.  More pertinently, the very detailed agreement between National and New 
Zealand First in 1996 did not replace ongoing discussion between the parties, since important 
matters of implementation still required consultation between ministers.  And it is a common 
tactic for parties going into coalition together to leave until later any knotty issues likely to 
arouse disagreement.  Thus, it is not the case that coalition management can be determined by 
a detailed agreement up front, although very limited agreements appear to occur a premium 
in the form of greater consultation between the parties later on. 
 
Interestingly, my interviews unearthed greatest opposition to detailed coalition agreements 
among civil servants.  Although civil servants as a group are often held to value politicians 
setting a clear direction, it may be that they prefer looser policy agreements either because this 
allows them greater latitude (‘bureau shaping’ behaviour) or because, being at the coalface, 
they appreciate more than politicians the limits of deciding policy actions well in advance.  
While specific policy commitments are a tool by which parties signal to their supporters that 
their concerns are being met in government, such detail may make policy making in 
government more difficult and less flexible.  In this sense, the tightness of coalition 
agreements represents a trade-off between the demands of different constituencies, and may 




The use of formal written agreements to underpin coalition governments has become more 
prevalent across west European countries in the last couple of decades.  But these agreements 
vary considerably in length and content between and within countries, suggesting that 
tradition and the predilection of political actors play an important a role in shaping the nature 
of agreements.  However, the greater the uncertainty the contracting parties feel about the 
                                                     
59 A policy ‘blind’ agreement does not mean there is no public declaration of a coalition’s policy 
programme.  Much can be gleaned from the executive’s announcement of its programme to the 
legislature; in New Zealand’s case, the Speech from the Throne. 
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future, and the greater their mutual mistrust, the more likely they are to form ‘tight’ 
agreements that bind each other through policy commitments and/or procedural rules.  
While there is no ‘ideal’ coalition agreement, the parties should weigh up the pros and cons of 
a tight or loose set of commitments.  The agreement should not be so detailed that it prevents 
flexibility and compromise between the partners on a day to day basis.  But while the senior 
coalition partner may prefer a very short agreement, this may be less optimal for the junior 
partner.  Indeed, a certain level of detail is useful for both parties, since each can point to 
concrete commitments to assuage the fears of party supporters.  Some of the considerations 
parties will face in deciding on the form of the agreement are listed in Table 7. 
 
 





Tight policy agreement 
(ie. extensive list of policy 
commitments) 




 May take a long time to 
negotiate after an 
election 
  Enhances the visibility of 
the junior partner.  Evens 
up the bargaining power 
of partners on a day to day 
basis 
 Encourages parties to 
think of government as 
maximising ‘their’ 
policies, rather than 
forging a genuine 
partnership 
 
  Greater accountability to 
voters and parties 
 
 Provides a stick with 
which the coalition can 
be beaten if it fails to 
honour promises 
 
   
Loose policy agreement  
(ie. minimal list of policy 
commitments) 
 Greater flexibility should 
the political environment 
change 
 
 Reduces the bargaining 
power of the junior 
partner, unless sufficient 
consultation and 
decision making 
procedures are also built 










This chapter analyses one of the inherent difficulties with power sharing executives.  How, 
with two or more parties sharing power, are decisions made that reflect the will of the 
government as a single entity?  Given the organisation of modern governments into more or 
less distinct departments or ministries, how are policy decisions made genuinely collective?  
In what follows, I examine the political coordination of government business, that is to say, the 
coordination of issues between coalition partners.  This is to be distinguished from functional 
coordination, which involves policy issues that cut across departments.  While in practice the 
two forms of coordination may not be wholly distinct, I separate them out to distinguish the 
kind of coordination that is largely unique to power sharing executives, as opposed to single 
party, ones. 
 
The first question to answer is why coalitions should be more difficult to coordinate than 
single party governments?  After all, parties consist of factions; single party governments can 
thus be internally riven and prone to conflict.  But party discipline is easier in a single party 
government since parties have their own internal rules and governance structures, while a 
common electoral label reinforces the sense of a mutual dependence.  In other words, 
members of any given party have a strong collective interest in its electoral fate, but the same 
binding conditions do not exist to the same extent between coalition partners.  Coalitions 
typically get round this problem by establishing governance institutions to patrol and enforce 
discipline (Strøm and Müller, 2001: 4).  One institution I have already analysed is the coalition 
agreement.  But while such written ‘contracts’ can be an important method by which coalition 
partners bind themselves together, the tightness of this relationship need not depend wholly 
on the agreement.  Other devices, both formal – such as coalition management committees – 
and informal – such as strong discipline within the parliamentary party groups – can also play 
a role.  I spend little time on informal devices, mainly because they are often products of a 
country’s political culture, and thus less susceptible to cross-jurisdictional transfer.  However, 
I do try to note such features as I go, simply to stress that coalition management depends on a 
host of factors other than formal institutions and structures. 
 
The second question to address is how far coalition governments do, in fact, behave in ways 
akin to single party administrations.  That is to say, are power sharing governments based on 
the collective principle – so that decisions of the executive represent the government as a 
whole, not that of the individual party or minister – or is this principle compromised in favour 
of a looser association in which the partners operate more to their own individual agendas?  
The short answer is that all west European governments operate on the basis of the collective 
principle, but to different degrees, in part reflecting variations in political culture.  Thus, 
comparative studies have shown ministerial autonomy to be high in Germany (although 
departmentalism is counter-balanced to an extent by the power of the Chancellor) and the 
Netherlands, but low in Britain and Ireland, which have stronger traditions of collective 
cabinet government (Thiebault, 1993).  But the status of government – whether single party or 
multi party – also plays a role.  As I explore further below (pages 119-22), coalition 
administrations are more likely to breach collective principles in order to accommodate the 
demands and electoral needs of their component parties.  Some of the main features of the 
two archetypes of government – the collective or ‘blended’ model and the distinct or 





Table 8: Two forms of coalition government 
 
  
Coalition as ‘blended’ government 
 




Cabinet decision making 
 
 Collective cabinet 
responsibility 
 
 Policy opt outs for (junior) 
partner; ‘agree to disagree’ 
clauses in coalition agreement 
 
Policy responsibility  Policies attributed to 
government 
 
 Policy ‘wins’ for individual 
partner 
 
Legislative discipline  Strict legislative discipline 
(eg. extending to all 
legislative matters or to all 
matters unless specifically 
exempted in the agreement) 
 
 Partial legislative discipline  
(eg. extending only to voting 
on government bills or on areas 
specifically highlighted in the 
agreement) 
 
Termination discipline  Election rule 
 
 No election rule 
Election behaviour  Coalition parties fight 
election as an alliance 
 
 Coalition parties fight election 





‘Election rule’: The parties entering government agree to stand or fall together, so that if one party leaves 
 the coalition, this triggers the resignation of the government and fresh elections.  Such a  
 rule, which binds together the parties in death as well as in life, is only used in Austria, France  
 and the Netherlands among west European countries (Müller and Strøm, 2000a: 576). 
 
 
There are many factors that shape the extent to which a coalition involves the parties blending 
with, or merely accommodating, each other, such as the degree of trust between the party 
leaders and the diversity of policy positions between the parties.  External factors, too might 
play a role.  For example, if the members of one coalition party view a potential partner with 
suspicion, the leadership of that party may be forced to adopt structures commensurate with 
the ‘accommodation’ model.  Similarly, if public scrutiny of a coalition (for example, media 
coverage) focuses on which outputs can be attributed to which partner (who has ‘got’ what 
from the arrangement) this, too, encourages the parties to fight their own corner (Mitchell, 
1999: 273-4). 
 
Two comparative scholars suggest that, in contrast to the adversarial nature of party 
behaviour under majoritarian conditions, coalitions are “better described as a board of 
management entrusted for a period by its ‘godfather’ [the parties forming the coalition] with 
the mission of conducting jointly the affairs of the state” (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993a: 
7).  The following sections examine the strategies and institutions adopted by coalition 
partners to help them in this task.  I begin by looking at what role different models of portfolio 
allocation can have on coordinating decision making within coalitions, before moving on to 





Coordination via portfolio allocation 
A coalition partners’ attempts to ensure close coordination of their work in government 
begins during their negotiations.  At this stage, they will decide how portfolios are to be 
allocated, and what procedures will underpin the operation of the government.  These matters 
are crucially important, yet are rarely included in the final public agreement.  Only in one of 
twelve west European countries recently surveyed (Austria) is more than 10% of the typical 
coalition agreement taken up with the distribution of offices.  Internal coalition procedures are 
more in evidence in coalition agreements; across the same twelve countries, just over 10% of 
all agreements is concerned with such procedural rules (Müller and Strøm, 2000a: 576-8).  I 
examine below in more detail the main variants of these coordination arrangements. 
 
What I analyse in this section is the way that the allocation of ministries is used to achieve a 
coordination function.  In particular, I look at the role of junior ministers from one party who 
co-exist within a department headed by a senior minister from another party.  I term such 
allocation patterns ‘pooled’ ministries, while ministries that contain senior and junior 
ministers only from one party I term ‘segregated’ ministries, since the immediate 
responsibility for decision making rests with one party only (although, as we shall see, control 
of a ministry does not entail full control over decision making even if ministries are 
segregated).  Most west European countries have the potential to use portfolios as a 
coordination tool, since only in Denmark and Finland do junior ministerial posts not exist 
(Müller and Strøm, 2000a: 582).  The executives in Scotland and Wales both contain junior 
posts; each Scottish ministry is allocated a single Deputy Minister, while in Wales, there are 
fewer Deputy Ministers (five) than cabinet posts (nine), with one junior minister covering a 
number of departments.60 
 
Comparative studies show that it is extremely common – and, indeed, becoming more 
prevalent over time – for coalitions in west European countries to use pooled ministries 
(Strøm and Müller, 2001: 12).  The allocation of junior ministries helps serve a ‘governance 
function’ in two ways.  The first is essentially defensive: to keep each partner in touch with 
what the other is doing and to make sure that the coalition agreement is adhered to (the junior 
post as monitor or watchdog).  The second is more proactive: to bring the perspectives of all 
the coalition partners to bear on decision making on a day to day basis, recognising that 
leaving such coordination to higher level bodies (eg. the cabinet or coalition committee) may 
be ineffective or slow down decision making (the junior post as coordinator) (Müller and 
Strøm, 2000a: 582-3). 
 
But pooled ministries may only play a full coordination function if the duties of the senior and 
junior ministers are shared.  If duties are divided (ie. a segregated pattern within a pooled 
ministry), there will be fewer opportunities for the ministers to agree a common programme 
of work.  So my first question is how far pooling ministerial posts really represents a tool of 
coalition management? 
 
In Germany, pooled ministries are a frequent occurrence, although their role in coalition 
management is often limited.  During the Schmidt and Kohl-led coalitions of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, junior ministers from the senior party were often placed in ministries controlled 
                                                     
60 Junior ministers in Wales can play only a restricted role in relation to coalition management, since 
they are clearly subordinate to cabinet ministers; for example, they are not allowed to see policy advice 
from civil servants, unless this is authorised by the senior minister. 
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by the Free Democrats (notably foreign affairs and justice) as ‘watchdogs’ (Saalfeld, 2000: 71).  
My interviews in Berlin suggested that junior ministers often have a specific role in helping 
the senior minister liaise with parliament.  This is an important function for any government 
(especially minority administrations; see Chapter 7), although not one directly designed to 
facilitate coalition coordination.  The current SPD-Green coalition has made use of pooled 
ministries in three departments: an SPD junior minister in Foreign Affairs, a Green junior in 
Economic Cooperation and, since earlier this year, a Green senior/SPD junior minister in 
Agriculture.  Again, the presence of the SPD in the foreign ministry and the Greens in 
economic cooperation is designed to give this party a voice and watchdog role in an 
important policy field. 
 
Pooled portfolio allocations have also become more prevalent in Ireland, with the key 
ministries (eg. finance, industry/enterprise and foreign affairs) now being routinely split 
between the coalition partners (Mitchell, 2000: 143-7).  The current junior partner, the 
Progressive Democrats, decided against pushing for more than one senior minister or outright 
control of one ministry, in favour of having a presence – via junior ministerships – in 
important departments (foreign affairs and the environment/local government).  Recently, 
pooled departments have tended to be segregated internally, so that the senior and junior 
minister take charge of different policy areas.  Thus, the Fianna Fail minister at foreign affairs 
covers relations with other states in general, while the Progressive Democrat junior takes 
control of overseas development aid and human rights.  Such specialisation helps boost the 
collective capacity of government, although it does little to improve the coordination of 
coalition business. 
 
Unlike in Germany or Ireland, junior (or ‘associate’) ministers in New Zealand are not 
allocated to a single ministry, but usually cover a range of departments.  It is also possible for 
cabinet ministers to perform associate ministerial functions, although most associate posts are 
allocated to ministers outside the cabinet.  The two coalition governments since 1996 have 
both used associate ministers to create ‘pooled’ ministries, usually where an associate minister 
from the junior partner sits within a ministry headed by the senior partner.  This gives the 
junior partner a voice in portfolios they don’t control, and this function is helped by the 
practice of giving associates clear areas of responsibility within the department.  Thus, in the 
current coalition, the Alliance cabinet member responsible for women’s and youth affairs, 
Laila Harre, is also associate minister for commerce, in which role she takes particular 
responsibility for intellectual property issues.  The use of pooled ministries appears to have 
more to do with giving the junior coalition partner a voice in important issues where it does 
not control the portfolio, than with coordinating coalition decision making within 
departments. 
 
Within the Scottish Executive, ministerial allocation has also followed a pooled pattern.  Thus, 
the Justice and Agriculture departments, controlled by the Liberal Democrats, have Labour 
juniors, while the opposite pattern is the case at Education.  The coalition partners also share 
responsibility for parliamentary liaison.  Within pooled ministries, functions tend to be 
segregated, so that the junior ministers in the Justice and Agriculture departments, for 
example, have distinct areas of policy responsibility.  The Welsh administration has also used 
pooled ministries, so that the Liberal Democrat-controlled economic development and culture 
portfolios have Labour juniors, while the Labour-controlled local government portfolio 
includes a Liberal Democrat junior.  The role of junior ministers appears to have more to do 
with lightening the load of senior ministers (by carrying out second tier policy work and 




Given the often limited purposes for which pooled ministries are used, what contribution do 
they make to coalition governance?  In Ireland, pooled ministries appear to work successfully 
as devices for giving parties a voice in departments they don’t control, as well as allowing 
small coalition parties to take responsibility for high profile issues or areas of importance to 
their supporters.  The strong collective ethos of Irish government means there is less need for 
portfolio allocation to contribute towards coalition coordination, a role it does not appear to 
play. 
 
A broadly similar picture emerges from New Zealand’s more limited experience of coalition 
management.  Here, however, the success of pooled ministries has been less even, with some 
ministries being undermined as the senior and associate minister fought for control of 
decision making (a good example is the health ministry during the 1996-98 coalition, where 
the New Zealand First associate minister eventually had to be sacked by his party leader after 
repeatedly clashing with his National senior).  Some associate ministers from New Zealand 
First had taken their role to involve vetoing departmental initiatives they didn’t like, leading 
in some cases to conflict between the parties.  Learning from these pitfalls, the Alliance party 
was careful in 1999 to select associate status in Labour controlled ministries only on areas of 
key concern to its supporters, such as labour issues and overseas development (for which the 
party takes responsibility within the Foreign Affairs portfolio, just like the Progressive 
Democrats in Ireland).  The junior coalition partner has also ensured its voice is heard in 
departments controlled by Labour by insisting that some of its associate ministers are given 
‘Joint Ministerial Status’, giving them full input into policy making and a veto on final 
decisions.  Thus, Laila Harre, as associate minister for commerce, takes delegated 
responsibility for some areas (eg. intellectual property), but has ministerial status on issues of 
particular concern for the Alliance party (eg. competition policy). 
 
Pooled ministries play a similar role in Germany, but are seen as less successful.  In large part, 
this is to do with the strong principle of ministerial autonomy, which constrains the ability of 
junior ministers to make their voices heard (Müller-Rommel, 1994).  Indeed, I was told that it 
was a recognition of the impotence of junior ministers that persuaded the CDU/CSU under 
Helmut Kohl to relinquish its junior foreign affairs minister in the mid-1980s.61 
 
A second point is that pooled ministries can sometimes work against junior coalition partners, 
especially if they are new to government as the Green party is in Germany.  Ministers from 
such parties will often place a high premium on political colleagues and officials who support 
them and whom they can trust.  This may be less likely if the minister has to share power in 
his/her department with a member from the coalition partner.  The decision for small parties 
of which government portfolios to seek is likely to be an acute one.  On the one hand, full 
control of a ministry allows the party to surround itself with people it trusts, as well as taking 
full responsibility for outputs that it can use to highlight its impact in government.62  Thus, the 
                                                     
61 One commentator suggests an alternative reason for the loss, namely the increased bargaining power 
of the junior coalition partner, the FDP, which controlled the foreign ministry (Saalfeld, 2000: 71). 
62 Segregated ministries, by virtue of allowing parties to make clearer to the electorate that particular 
policy outputs are ‘theirs’, facilitate – retrospective – accountability of government.  Pooled ministries 
make it harder for voters to ascribe responsibility to particular parties, thus hindering accountability 
(Chapter 1, pages 28-29).  This is mirrored by the difficulty that civil servants might face in knowing 
which minister they serve.  In Scotland’s case, this is not a problem, since pooled ministries tend to be 
internally segregated – thus, at the agriculture ministry, the junior minister takes a specific 
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junior coalition partner in New Zealand, the Alliance party, which opted for some cross-
cutting junior posts rather than over-stretching itself by taking senior portfolios is currently 
rethinking its strategy.  Holding only one high profile ministry, it has found it difficult to 
highlight its achievements to voters.  In future, to strengthen its electoral identifiability, it may 
insist on the allocation of more control over spending ministries (which it would also be in a 
better position to run having had experience of government; after the downfall of New 
Zealand First in the previous coalition, the Alliance was wary of placing inexperienced MPs in 
high profile departments).  On the other hand, small parties may typically be restricted in the 
posts they are allocated  to one or two senior ministries along with a couple of junior posts.  
Their influence may be maximised by spreading their allocation of offices across ministries, 
rather than concentrating them in one or two.  Ultimately, the decision may reflect the nature 
of the political system rather than strategic considerations.  In systems where the autonomy of 
senior office holders is high, such as in Germany, junior ministers may wield limited influence 
and thus be of little value for a coalition partner.  In systems where ministerial power is 
weaker, such as Ireland, junior ministers may be able to play a fuller role viz a viz senior 
ministers. 
 
These examples cast doubt on the degree to which pooled ministries are useful devices for 
going beyond an information function and helping in the coordination and management of 
coalition governments.  These functions may be better served by the creation of specialist 
advisers, working groups and other inter-party structures (see below).  But coalition 
coordination is not only influenced, at the portfolio allocation stage, by directly planting 
figures from different parties in the same ministry.  This function can also be achieved by 
giving different parties control of ‘neighbouring’ ministries, or departments that work closely 
with one another.  Thus, in coalitions in Germany, where the junior partner, the Free 
Democrats, has controlled the Foreign Ministry, the senior partner, either the CDU/CSU or 
SPD, will tend to control the Ministry of Economic Cooperation (development aid).  
Responsibility for other neighbouring ministries, such as Finance/Economic Affairs and 
Interior/Justice is normally divided between the coalition partners.  These allocation patterns 
help foster close coordination between related departments, and sometimes the joint 
production of legislative proposals (Saalfeld, 2000: 70). 
 
A similar strategy is often pursued by coalition partners in Denmark, particularly in relation 
to the all-important Finance and Economic Affairs ministries (Wolf, 1998: 36).63  An alternative 
strategy is for the junior partner in a coalition to take control of ministries whose remit cuts 
across a number of other departments.  For instance, in New Zealand the Women’s Affairs 
portfolio is a relatively minor one, but has been chosen by the current junior coalition partner, 
the Alliance, in part because its concerns feature in many other departments’ workloads, thus 
giving its minister a say in decisions taken by ministries not controlled by her party. 
 
Coordination via collective structures 
In this section, I examine the ways that coalition business is managed in my four study 
countries.  I begin by making a simple set of distinctions, before going on to describe and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
responsibility for fisheries policy – thus delineating more clearly civil servants’ responsibilities and 
reporting lines. 
63 The cabinet ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, usually held by different 
parties, also work closely together.  But these ministers are based in the same department, the foreign 




analyse arrangements in each study country, plus Scotland and Wales.  Following these case 
studies, I conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the various models on offer. 
Distinctions and classifications 
Across my four study countries, let alone across west European countries more generally, 
there are a wide variety of structures and processes by which coalitions are managed.64  At the 
outset, then, it is helpful to make some distinctions between different forms and levels of 
management and coordination.  I use these distinctions in the later sections when analysing 
coalition management arrangements in Scotland, Wales and overseas. 
 
1. Arenas for coordination 
 
I deal with two arenas in which the day to day business of coalition governments is usually 
subject to some form of coordination.  The first is within the executive itself, with ministers 
from the parties managing their relations with one another.  The second arena is between the 
parties in the executive and the parties in parliament; these links can be both intra-party 
(relations between ministers and the parliamentary group within the same party) and inter-
party (relations between ministers of one party and the caucus of their partner party).  
Coordination is thus a mixture of horizontal and vertical relationships (see Figure 3).  If a 
coalition enjoys a parliamentary majority, the main focus of coordination relationships will be 
at the executive level (A); if a coalition enjoys only minority status, far more attention will be 
paid to executive-legislative links (B and C). 
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I don’t deal extensively with relations between actors in the executive and those in the 
legislature.  But these links are extremely important for the effective management of 
coalitions.  Members of the executive will have concerns that, since coalitions often command 
only a slim majority in the executive or no majority at all, the defection of only a few MPs may 
be fatal to its chances of survival.  Members of the parliamentary parties will be concerned 
that ministers (their ‘agents’) will compromise their party’s policies in reaching agreements 
with the coalition partner.  A case study of coalitions in Ireland during the 1980s found that 
intra-party conflicts generated almost as much government instability as inter-party conflicts 
(Mitchell, 1999: 279).  This may be an extreme case, but it shows what is at stake.  In response, 
coalition governments will often commit their members to disciplined behaviour in the 
legislature.  The severity of this discipline ranges from total coverage (ie. all parliamentary 
matters), to full coverage (all matters other than those specifically exempted), partial coverage 
(only those matters explicitly specified) and no coverage (no discipline imposed).  Among my 
study countries, Denmark, Germany and Ireland are deemed to insist on very strong 
legislative discipline (Strøm and Müller, 2001: 13); New Zealand can also be added to this list.  
In return, the parliamentary groups often demand more frequent contacts with ministers (to 
ensure non-deviation from core policies) and a greater input to policy making.  I was told in 
New Zealand that the parliamentary groups there had begun to play a more active role with 
the transition to a proportional electoral system in 1996.  Whether this is due to new types of 
MPs, different assumptions about their behaviour or specifically the shift to coalition 
government, is difficult to untangle. 
 
2. Tiers of coordination 
 
There are a number of different levels at which coalition management can take place.  At the 
lowest level, structures or conventions can be developed to keep each partner informed of 
what the other is doing, through exchanging information.  The next tier involves simple 
discussions between the departments involved in a particular policy decision: ministerial 
bilaterals.  At the next level, a range of collective bodies exist which usually involve ministers not 
immediately involved in any one policy decision.  Finally, there will sometimes be facilities 
for dispute resolution, in cases where inter-party disagreements have failed to be resolved at 
one of the lower tiers. 
 
3. Actors involved in coordination 
 
In each arena and tier at which coalition business is managed, a variety of actors may be 
involved.  At the apex is the prime minister, with the deputy prime minister existing slightly 
beneath (although in coalition situations, the deputy often enjoys specific rights and has 
particular responsibilities not accorded to their counterparts in single party conditions).  Next 
may come senior cabinet ministers, who enjoy an elevated position either due to their personal 
seniority and experience, or the importance of their portfolio (eg. the finance minister).  
Following them come non-senior cabinet ministers and then junior ministers, the latter not 
usually taking part in collective coordination bodies.  Within the executive, ministers draw on 
civil servants and advisers, both of whom play a greater or lesser role in coalition management 
according to specific circumstances and countries’ political traditions.  The actors in 




Coalition management in Scotland and Wales65 
The coalition agreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats in Scotland, signed in 
May 1999, binds the parties to collective decision making while respecting each other’s 
identity.  There is a strong commitment to collective responsibility, so that all ministers must 
have knowledge of each policy decision, spending commitment, piece of legislation and 
public appointment, and must support any decision taken in cabinet.  The fulcrum of the 
coalition is the relationship between the First Minister and Deputy First Minister66, with all 
decisions concerning portfolio allocation, the modus operandi of the executive and dispute 
resolution – in addition to those items subject to collective responsibility – being decided 
jointly by the two party leaders.  The approval of both figures is also required for items to be 
included on the cabinet’s agenda.  To help the Deputy First Minister, he, along with the First 
Minister, must be copied all papers relating to significant policy issues or appointments, and 
is given additional support to help him carry out his coalition role.  The agreement does not 
specify party discipline within the Parliament beyond a commitment on the part of two party 
caucuses to “operate in support” of the executive, with each party using its own internal 
procedures to ensure such support. 
 
The flow of information between departments is subject to clear guidance67; the main 
recognition of the government’s coalition status is the stipulation that important material be 
copied to both the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.  The same concern is also reflected 
in the requirement to copy to the Executive Secretariat any civil service advice to 
departmental ministers as well as the minutes of any formal meeting between ministers. 
 
The First Minister and Deputy First Minister do not take part in any routine decision making 
outside their own particular areas of policy responsibility.  Where any problem or 
disagreement arises, ad hoc meetings of one or both figures – and maybe the Finance Minister 
and/or Minister for Parliament – along with the relevant minister(s) can be held, serviced by 
civil servants from the Executive Secretariat.  The principle of collectivity does not mean that 
all decisions need to be taken at the weekly cabinet meetings.  Indeed, the executive’s internal 
guidelines encourage issues to be dealt with prior to cabinet or, where an issue is 
controversial, for the points of disagreement to be clarified, and for attempts to resolve the 
issue to be exhausted, before cabinet.  Nonetheless, cabinet meetings tend to involve fuller 
discussion of issues than is the case in Whitehall, and thus function as an important cog in the 
collective machinery.  Where the interests of two or more departments overlap on a major 
policy issue, a ministerial committee or working group may be established (no formal cabinet 
committees exist).  Representation of the two partners on such bodies tends to be more 
equally balanced than the proportional norm used for the allocation of cabinet seats.  Thus, on 
the committee set up to discuss the divisive issue of student tuition fees, each party was 
represented by three people.  Papers for such bodies are available to all ministers, and a 
minister outside the principal departments concerned may attend meetings subject to the 
                                                     
65 This section draws on various primary and secondary sources, as well as on interviews with key 
personnel conducted during study visits.  These visits were undertaken in July 2000 (Scotland) and 
January 2001 (Wales).  The information presented here is thus limited to the situation on or before these 
dates.  This should be borne in mind, even though I present the information in the present tense. 
66 In both Scotland and Wales, the post of Deputy First Minister is not a statutory one.  This is also the 
case in countries such as Ireland, and may occasionally give rise to problems, as explained further 
below. 
67 The tightness of the Ministerial Code and Guide to Collective Decision Making are a means of reining in 
each coalition partner, and thus providing reassurance to the other that the terms and spirit of the 
coalition will not be broken (Shephard, 2000).  
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chairman’s approval.  The Executive Secretariat must be kept informed of the work of such 
bodies, and may well provide support facilities for them. 
 
Two features stand out from this brief overview of the coalition management arrangements in 
Scotland.  The first is the central role of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.  My 
interviews suggested that a more formal collective coalition structure (eg. cabinet committees 
or an overarching coalition committee), favoured by many Liberal Democrats as a means of 
ensuring cooperation from their Labour partner, had been rejected in favour of more informal 
interaction between the party leaders, reflecting their close mutual trust.68  The second is the 
support role played by the Executive Secretariat, which emerges as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure 
that inter-party information and consultations arrangements are adhered to. 
 
In terms of practice, the coordination structures have generally functioned effectively.  The 
informal nature of the arrangements are seen as allowing disputes to be resolved and 
potentially controversial issues to be aired well in advance.  However, the success of these 
mechanisms is seen as highly dependent on good personal relations between ministers, and 
thus as susceptible to problems should relations deteriorate (moreover, I was told that almost 
two thirds of the commitments in the coalition agreement have been met; the coalition will 
thus begin shortly to enter territory not mapped at the outset).  During the first year of the 
coalition, various teething problems did emerge.  Some ministers – four of the original eleven 
had been schooled in the Westminster model – initially found it difficult to curb their 
autonomy by consulting before announcing decisions.  There was also initially some concern 
within Liberal Democrat ranks that civil servants were not adjusting to the power sharing 
conditions, continued to focus their attentions on the First Minister and were less attuned to 
the policy priorities of the junior coalition partner.69  Consultation between the parties appears 
to be working relatively effectively; information flows mean the Deputy First Minister is kept 
abreast of most important issues, and Liberal Democrat spokespeople are often kept well 
briefed by Labour ministers (although the links vary depending on the personnel concerned).  
With a limited ministerial team, the Liberal Democrats are also helped by an improving 
tendency by Labour ministers to forewarn them of impending issues and potential flashpoints 
(they also rely, as is common practice in other countries, on their parliamentary spokespeople 
to meet Labour ministers and keep them informed of developments in other portfolios).  
However, the Liberal Democrats only have one policy adviser among the shared ministerial 
pool of nine, restricting the party’s ability to undertake prepatory work on such matters.70  
This balance is an issue that the Liberal Democrats want to address at a later stage. 
 
Finally, there is some evidence that close relations between the parties within the executive 
are at the expense of backbenchers.  Many Liberal Democrat MSPs, in particular, feel 
marginalised from decision making.  In part this reflects a different approach to government 
between the two partners, succinctly expressed to me by one Liberal Democrat who said that 
                                                     
68 The First Minister and Deputy First Minister at the time these arrangements were made were Donald 
Dewar and Jim Wallace.  A different set of structures might have been agreed on in the absence of such 
a close working relationship between these two individuals. 
69 See, for example, the speech by former Deputy Minister for Parliament, Iain Smith MSP; Sunday 
Times, 25th March 2001 
70 One curiosity in Scotland is that the appointment of special advisers, whose numbers are limited to 
twelve, is a prerogative of the First Minister, where other important issues demand the additional 
consent of the Deputy First Minister.  Although some advisers are appointed to a ‘pool’ shared between 
ministers, the First Minister’s prerogative appears to be a control exerted by the senior coalition partner 
over the research and advice that the junior partner can draw on (Shephard, 2000) 
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Labour was good at government but bad at coalition, while the Liberal Democrats were good 
at coalition but bad at government (meaning that Labour still had to get used to consultation 
and negotiation, while Liberal Democrat backbenchers had to get used to the compromises 
necessary when taking decisions).71  The Liberal Democrats have attempted to resolve disquiet 
among its MSPs by using Ross Finnie, its agriculture minister, to provide a direct liaison point 
between ministers and MSPs.72  Coalition government tends to put greater strain on 
backbenchers as intra-party discipline becomes more important, since administrations often 
enjoy only a slim legislative majority.  But the design of the Scottish Parliament also exerts 
pressure the other way.  In comparative terms, the Parliament is a ‘strong legislature’, that is it 
has a high degree of influence on the policy agenda in relation to the executive (Strøm, 1990: 
40-4).  In turn, this means that, while backbenchers are corralled by the executive, they also 
have the power to cause discomfort to ministers by amending and defeating legislation and 
by putting forward their own proposals.  The effective operation of coalition government in 
such circumstances is as much a factor of the upward flow of information and bargaining 
(from parliamentary groups to ministers) as the downward flow (vice versa), and there is 
evidence that the coalition partners in Scotland have begun to recognise this and improve 
intra-party communication. 
 
The lessons of the initial Scottish experience with power sharing were drawn on in forming 
the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in Wales.  In fact, the procedural part of the Welsh 
coalition agreement is a replica of the Scottish agreement, although it lacks the sections on 
collective responsibility, responsibility for portfolio allocation, the role of the Deputy First 
Minister and party behaviour in the legislature.  Like its counterpart in Scotland, coalition 
management in Wales is driven by the relationship between the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister; while cabinet meets every fortnight, the party leaders meet each week.  
However, while the Deputy First Minister in Scotland has a say in the way that portfolios are 
allocated, he/she has no such right in Wales, where “The First Minister has a completely free 
hand in such matters [portfolio allocation] although in practice will seek the agreement of the 
Deputy First Minister before such decisions” (A Protocol for Partnership Government in the 
Assembly, section 1.4).  However, the Deputy First Minister does have a say in the 
appointment and responsibilities of deputy ministers (section 5.1).  The First Minister does not 
oversee other ministers’ work; only on important or strategic issues does he become involved, 
in consultation with the Deputy First Minister.  As in Scotland, the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister share responsibility for setting the agenda for cabinet meetings.  
 
The principle of collective responsibility underpins the operation of the coalition, although 
this is subject to all relevant ministers having the chance to debate a particular policy issue 
before it is passed.  Official guidelines also emphasise that decisions are announced by 
departmental ministers and not as cabinet decisions, allowing for decisions to be associated 
with particular ministers or parties.  The Welsh coalition also includes clearer rules about 
collective decision making on matters reserved to Westminster.  Dealing with reserved 
matters has proved a headache for the coalition in Scotland, since the partners have often 
disagreed on the issue in question but have not been able to agree whether to make the matter 
one for collective agreement or not.  In Wales, by contrast, official guidelines stipulate 
                                                     
71 This state of affairs may be common when a coalition is formed between a party used to office and 
one new to government; the same is true for the SPD-Green coalition in Germany. 
72 This highlights the importance of the junior coalition partner having at least two cabinet seats.  Its 
party leader may often be absent or busy with coalition business; a deputy means that links – with the 
parliamentary group, for example – need not suffer as a result. 
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collective responsibility only on devolved matters, with the parties free to take whatever 
position they wish on reserved matters.  Where reserved matters impinge on areas of 
Assembly competence, the guidelines state that the coalition partners should: 
 
“strive for agreement in any public comments, in so far as this remains consistent with 
retaining a respect for the distinctive political views of the different parties involved.  Where 
cabinet members wish to make a public comment likely to emphasise these distinctive 
political matters, they should avoid doing so in a context which compromises cabinet 
collective responsibility” (A Protocol for Partnership, section 3.11). 
 
Both the First Minister and Deputy First Minister are copied any important material and are 
supposed to be made aware of any ministerial statement to the media.  An important 
coordinating role is played by the small team of political advisers working to the two leaders, 
whose number was increased to facilitate coalition management; there are four Labour 
advisers and two for the Liberal Democrats.  The advisers see all government papers and are 
located next door to each other to aid interaction.  Ministers taking decisions that affect other 
departments are also required to copy relevant papers to those ministries, although the 
guidelines on information sharing are limited.  Disputes over policy issues are expected to 
have been resolved prior to cabinet meetings, either through ad hoc ministerial meetings or 
through cabinet committees (of which there are four, concerned with cross-cutting policy 
issues).  If an issue fails to be resolved in cabinet, it is taken to a special meeting of the First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister along with the relevant subject ministers.   
 
As in Scotland, there are concerns that the civil service has experienced problems adapting to 
multi-party administrations, finding it difficult in particular to factor in a junior, as well as 
senior, party’s demands when formulating policy.  
 
Having briefly reviewed the management arrangements for the new coalitions in Scotland 
and Wales, how is coordination achieved in more mature coalition systems?  In this section, I 
review the arrangements in my four study countries, whose experience of coalition ranges 
from the extensive (Denmark and Germany), to the more moderate (Ireland), through to the 
very limited (New Zealand).73 
 
Coalition management overseas 
Germany 
I begin with Germany which, with the exceptions of Luxembourg and the Netherlands, has 
enjoyed the greatest exposure to coalition governments of any west European country.  The 
German system of government is top heavy, with the Chancellor commanding significant 
powers.  It is he who is elected by the Bundestag, not the government as a whole.  The 
Chancellor also wields constitutional powers over the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers, and is responsible for the general policy direction of the government.  Nonetheless, 
the realities of coalition politics serve to temper these powers; as noted in Chapter 3 (page 71), 
cabinet appointments are subject to the agreement of the coalition partner, and the 
Chancellor’s hold over ministers from that partner – for example if he wishes to discipline a 
minister – is in practice limited (Saalfeld, 2000: 51-3).  The constitution acts as a hindrance to 
                                                     
73 The information provided relates only up until the dates of my study visits (which are provided in 
Annex 1), and may have changed subsequently.  In particular, there has been a change in government 
in Denmark since my visit to Copenhagen. 
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collective decision making; under Article 65, ministers must conduct the affairs of their 
departments on their own, subject only to the direction set by the Chancellor. 
 
Coalition management arrangements rarely form part of the written agreement between the 
parties.  Only in 1961 and 1998 have agreements contained explicit procedural rules, on both 
occasions at the insistence of the junior partner to prevent the domination of the senior 
partner (Saalfeld, 2000: 58-9; personal interviews).  The current coalition agreement stipulates 
a dedicated committee to ensure coordination between the partners, discipline on all matters 
in the Bundestag, as well as in other key forums such as European Union bodies, no outvoting 
in cabinet on any issue that one partner deems important and the agreement of the junior 
partner to appointments to cabinet committees and before any major departmental 
reorganisation. 
 
The cabinet is not used as a forum for coalition management, with areas of disagreement 
between the parties dealt with at a lower level.  Although Germany has a well developed 
system of coalition committees presided over by the Chancellor or Vice Chancellor, their role 
is primarily administrative rather than political.  The main feature of coalition management in 
Germany is the use of informal channels of communication – particularly bilateral discussions 
between the Chancellor and his deputy – and the involvement of the leaders of the 
parliamentary parties in these channels.  Nonetheless, when inter-party relations have become 
strained, a common strategy has been a resort to formal coordinating bodies that meet more 
frequently (Saalfeld, 2000: 60-3). 
 
The current SPD-Green coalition marks to some extent a move away from coalition 
management by informal channels and political appointees, resonant of the Kohl era.  In the 
early 1990s, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was managed through weekly meetings of an 
informal coalition ‘circle’ or ‘round’ (koalitionsrunde), comprising the party leaders, the chairs 
and leaders of the parliamentary groups and the heads of the party organisations.  But more 
strategic matters, plus any disputes that arose in the committee, were dealt with by a smaller 
group that met in the evenings, comprising the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor along with the 
chairs of the parliamentary groups and party organisations.74  This smaller group became 
increasingly important as the coalition became more internally divided and Kohl increasingly 
distrustful of his ministers.  This concentration of power helped speed up decision making, 
but at the cost of concerns among ministers and the parliamentary parties that they were 
being excluded from decision making. 
 
Under the current SPD-Green coalition, the main management forum has transferred to a 
formal coalition committee (koalitionsausschuß).  This committee comprises eight members 
from each party – thus institutionalising the principle of the coalition as an equal partnership 
– and meets at the behest of either partner.  This is usually every two months or so, although 
the coalition’s teething problems in its first two years meant that the committee initially met 
every fortnight.  The committee is primarily concerned with conflict management, and thus 
convenes whenever a problem arises.  The difficulty with such irregular patterns is that they 
signal to the outside world the existence of dissonance within the coalition, rather than being 
seen as a regular part of the coordination process.  Indeed, this is the role the Greens would 
like to see the committee play, and are pressing for it to be convened more regularly.  For the 
junior partner, the continued use of informal procedures to coordinate coalition business 
hinders its role across government, as well as leading to an external perception that the 
                                                     
74 The so called ‘elephant round’ on account of its members’ seniority. 
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government is dominated by the SPD.  In spite of a range of formal structures, major issues 
affecting the coalition tend to be worked out in meetings of the Chancellor and Vice 
Chancellor, rather than involving a wider group of ministers. 
 
Much of the coalition’s ongoing management takes place at the parliamentary level.  Each 
week, the leaders and chief whips of the SPD and Green parliamentary groups meet over 
breakfast to share information, identify any concerns within the caucuses and discuss 
forthcoming cabinet items.  Ministers and junior ministers attend this meeting depending on 
the issues being discussed, and will also meet frequently with the powerful subject 
committees in the Bundestag.  Ministers from one coalition party must also forge close links 
with the parliamentary spokespeople and groups of the partner party.  Inter-party 
parliamentary cohesion is also ensured via a range of additional meetings between the 
coalition partners’ party whips and business managers.  Coordination between the parties in 
parliament is matched by close intra-party relations between the executive and parliamentary 
groups.  In the current coalition, the SPD holds three meetings each week of the Chancellor, 
leaders of the party organisation and parliamentary group and head of the chancellery.  
Ministers and their juniors (parliamentary state secretaries) hold regular meetings with their 
party’s subject spokespeople.  Junior ministers in particular are expected to keep in close 
contact with the relevant spokespeople and the subject group within the party’s caucus.  Each 
month, all junior ministers meet collectively with political civil servants from the Chancellor’s 
office.  This meeting focuses on the executive’s relations with parliament, although it can also 
cover more general coalition management issues, and thus serves to keep the Chancellor’s 
office informed of what is happening in the legislature. 
 
It is quite usual for the progress of an issue within the executive to be delayed by concerns 
raised within one or both parliamentary groups.  If such delays do occur, they are dealt with 
either by bilaterals between the parliamentary group chairs or, if sufficiently serious, by the 
Chancellor and his ministers at the executive level.  The price of these extensive consultations 
at the parliamentary level is a rather slow decision making process. 
 
Unlike in many other countries, Germany’s civil service plays an important role in coalition 
coordination, although political management is a task carried out by a select group of officials.  
A proportion of civil servants in each department are appointed by the governing parties, and 
are thus ‘political’ officials.  The job of these figures is to help ministers manage relations with 
their coalition partner as well as with their parliamentary groups.  The political officials tend 
to be appointed to senior positions, extending even to the level of Staatssekretär (Permanent 
Secretary), and leave office when there is a change of government.75  In spite of this turnover, 
the long dominance of government by the SPD and CDU may reduce the attractiveness of 
office for new parties, such as the Greens.  Thus, when it came to negotiating the coalition 
with the SPD in 1998, the Greens could draw on no civil service support, while the SPD found 
it easy to identify sympathetic officials from whom advice could be gained.  Once in office, it 
is tempting for new parties to bring in their own expertise from outside, rather than rely on 
incumbent officials.  However, civil servants tend to bring knowledge of the governmental 
system, an important capacity when operating in a coalition situation (Lees, 2000: 38-9).  It 
was noticeable, though, that some of the Green figures I talked to in Berlin would have liked 
to have replaced civil servants in ministers’ private offices with their own people whom they 
could trust.  Expertise of the political system is one important resource for ministers, but 
                                                     




personal trustworthiness is another; the transition between governments may be a period 
when both of these desiderata are hard to satisfy. 
 
The political officials in each department liaise closely with their equivalents in the 
Chancellor’s office, and meet with them each week prior to cabinet.  The Bundeskanzleramt is 
huge, at around 500 staff.  It reports to the Chancellor, not the cabinet, and is responsible for 
keeping him informed of activity across the departments (thus, although the office helps the 
government as a whole by coordinating coalition activity, it does so on behalf of the 
Chancellor in his capacity as the leader of the government).76  The office gets involved in 
policy planning at an early stage; on very significant or cross-cutting issues, responsibility can 
even be transferred out of subject ministries into the chancellery.  The chancellery is organised 
into sections that mirror the subject departments, each section including political officials, and 
permanent civil servants who are often drawn from the subject departments.  The head of the 
office is usually a civil servant, although the Kohl government in the 1980s brought in a 
political appointee instead, to improve coordination between the executive, the parliamentary 
groups and the wider party organisations.  Under the current SPD-Green coalition, the 
Chancellor’s office has again assumed its formal role in coalition management.  The office is 
once more headed by a career civil servant, and an additional junior ministerial post has been 
created to work on relations within the executive. 
 
There is no doubt that the size and scope of his office gives the Chancellor the means by 
which to oversee and coordinate the coalition.  However, the scale of resources means that 
some trouble-shooting activities are undertaken by the chancellery that could perfectly 
adequately be handled by the subject ministries.  In addition, the chancellery’s oversight and 
coordination role is sometimes felt by ministers to impinge on their decision making 
autonomy. 
 
In contrast to the extensive resources available to the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor’s 
support is meagre (this in spite of the post being a statutory position under the Basic Law).  
The current incumbent, Joschka Fischer, has three advisers working to him, but all in his 
capacity as Foreign Minister, not as Vice Chancellor.  The Greens pushed in 1998 for one of 
their advisers to sit in the Chancellor’s office, but this was rejected by the Chancellor, Gerhard 
Schröder.  The result is that the party struggles to keep up with government business (a 
situation exacerbated by the failure of some SPD ministers to consult with their junior 
partner).  It has compensated for holding only three ministries by drawing on its 
parliamentary party spokespeople to provide information and advice on proposals being 
developed by SPD ministers. 
 
Denmark 
Most governments in Denmark have been minority administrations.  This means the concerns 
of the coalition partners are twofold: how to coordinate matters within the executive, and how 
to ensure adequate support for their measures in the legislature.  The two questions overlap 
closely, and coordination strategies interlink closely with legislative ones.  Nonetheless, 
minority government focuses attention on the legislature, whereas I am primarily interested 
here with relations between the parties in the executive.  In this section, I examine the 
strategies used by Danish parties to coordinate coalition governments, with the operation of 
their minority status reserved until Chapter 6. 
                                                     
76 The Chancellor’s office is thus an amalgamation, on a larger scale, of the Prime Minister’s Office and 




Coalitions in Denmark are based on a strong convention that no government measure be 
introduced without the support of all the partners.  In practice, this means that any 
departmental decision is the subject of consultations with other affected ministries and with 
the coalition partner (often via its parliamentary spokesperson); no issue can be put before 
parliament without having first been ratified by cabinet.  Cabinet meets once a week, but does 
not engage in substantive discussions, rather signing off matters discussed in a lower tier of 
forums.  If disputes do arise in cabinet, formal voting is not resorted to; instead the matter is 
sent back to a cabinet committee or other forum for further work (Christensen, 1985: 119-20).  
Cabinet committees are an important part of government administration in Denmark, 
although they tend to aid coordination on specific policy issues or themes (eg. financial 
relations between central and local government) rather than across the coalition as a whole.  
However, since membership of cabinet committees sometimes includes the leaders of the 
parliamentary parties, they do offer a forum for coordinating relations between the executive 
and legislature (ibid: 129-30). 
 
There are two committees whose work is highly relevant to the management of coalition 
governments.  Since 1982, there has been a formal Coordination Committee, which has 
become the main forum for conflict management and strategic direction of the government 
(ibid: 130; Wolf, 1995: 37).  It comprises 4-6 members: the Prime Minister – who sets the agenda 
– and the leader of the coalition partner77, plus a few senior ministers (membership is 
balanced between the coalition partners, whereas that of the Economic Affairs Committee is 
determined by functional criteria).  It meets weekly78 and is serviced by senior civil servants 
from the Prime Minister’s office, along with the Permanent Secretary from the Finance 
Ministry.  Its role is to oversee the strategic direction of the coalition and its political 
management and to deal with major policy issues.  It not only works via face to face meetings; 
its members also receive papers relating to government initiatives, press events and notice of 
cabinet agenda items. 
 
The political management role of the Coordination Committee is complemented by the 
budgetary planning role of the Economic Affairs Committee.  This committee considers all 
issues with public spending implications; any disputes that cannot be resolved in this forum 
are sent to the Coordination Committee.  Generally, ministers will make every effort to avoid 
taking disputes to the Coordination Committee, which is the final ‘court of appeal’, since this 
is seen to reflect poorly on their own abilities to resolve conflicts.  If an issue cannot be agreed 
by the parties in the Coordination Committee, either wields a veto over its further progress.  
In practice, this option is never resorted to, since it would signal a real crisis within the 
coalition.  Contentious matters tend to be resolved through meetings between the prime 
minister and the other party leader(s). 
 
In spite of the role played by such formal committees, government in Denmark tends to be 
pragmatic and consensual, based on informal methods of coordination and dispute resolution 
                                                     
77 There is no position of deputy prime minister in Denmark, and the leader of the junior coalition 
partner is not allocated any staff beyond those that serve him/her in a departmental capacity.  The 
leader of the junior partner is not consulted on day to day departmental issues, which are dealt with by 
ministers and spokespeople from the parliamentary groups.  In this sense, coalition management in 
Denmark is relatively decentralised, although the party leaders play a more central role when it comes 
to more high profile or strategic issues. 
78 According to Wolf (1998: 37).  I was told on my study visit that it met every 2-3 weeks.  The important 
thing to note is that the committee meets fairly regularly. 
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rather than formal structures.  The prime minister plays an important role in liaising with 
ministers and senior parliamentary figures to ensure disputes are settled.  In addition, the 
Finance and Economic Affairs ministers – who are usually from different parties – tend to 
work closely together on budgetary issues.  These informal networks sometimes lead to a de 
facto ‘inner cabinet’ of leading players who take charge of overall coalition strategy as well as 
helping ensure that each partner’s interests are maintained within the collective structures.  
The prime minister’s office has expanded in recent years to allow the incumbent to pursue a 
more active management style, in particular to enable potentially difficult or divisive issues to 
be anticipated.  But the total staff, at 30-35 officials (of which the prime minister’s personal 
office numbers only half a dozen or so), remains relatively small by international standards 
(Wolf, 1998: 36, 39).  As a result, it often shares the task of monitoring policy across 
government with officials from the larger Finance Ministry. 
 
I was told that, as the size of a coalition grows to three or four parties, formal structures come 
under greater strain (since the small parties get squeezed, start to lose their identity and thus 
resort to more obstructive tactics to protect their interests), and there is more resort to bilateral 
discussions between each party leader and the prime minister.79  However, during periods of 
low trust between coalition partners, Danish parties have experimented with more formal 
coalition structures.  To try and overcome their mutual suspicion, the Social Democrat-Liberal 
coalition of 1978-9 devised a ‘contact minister’ scheme, whereby each minister from one party 
was paired with another from the partner party.  No minister could take a decision without 
having gained the approval of his/her contact.  If this was not forthcoming, discussions 
would take place between the ministers, followed by collective discussion in a cabinet 
committee and finally a transfer to the Coordination Committee as the last court.  Not 
surprisingly, given the atmosphere within which the arrangement was introduced, it simply 
produced vetoes of many major and minor policy proposals, further exacerbating the parties’ 
mistrust in one another (Christensen: 131; Wolf, 1998: 36).  A similar system has subsequently 
been introduced, more successfully, in New Zealand (pages 108-9).  Even under less onerous 
conditions, the need for the coalition partners to consult with one another before decisions are 
taken places ministers under a burden when the coalition consists of three or four parties, as 
has been the case roughly half the time in Denmark during the last twenty years. 
 
The civil service plays a more limited role in coalition management than in Germany.  In part, 
this is a factor of size; I have already noted the limited resources in the prime minister’s office, 
for example.  In part it reflects the neutral and permanent nature of the civil service; like 
British officials, but unlike those in Germany, Danish civil servants are all state, not party, 
appointees.  While this provides continuity between governments, it hinders the extent to 
which departmental policy making takes into account ‘political’ management issues required 
in a coalition situation. 
 
Officials do, however, play some role in relation to coalition management.  First, senior 
departmental officials serve on committees that parallel ministerial committees – particularly 
the Economic Affairs committee – and civil servants from the Prime Minister’s office and 
                                                     
79 This is not to say, however, that coalitions involving more than two parties are unworkable.  The fact 
that they have been so extensively resorted to in Denmark in recent years suggests the political actors 
believe they can function effectively.  For example, the right of centre four party coalition, led by Poul 
Schlüter, that held office between 1982-88 is generally seen to have worked well.  In Ireland, political 
actors with experience of two party and three party coalitions pointed out that a three party coalition 
with trusting ministers and disciplined backbenchers is to be preferred to a two party coalition with 
factionalised party groups. 
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Ministry of Finance are involved in meetings of the Coordination Committee (Christensen, 
1985: 135).  Officials thus play a functional role that complements ministerial political 
structures.  But in the absence of a cadre of political advisers80, senior departmental officials 
are also called on to provide more political advice for ministers, a role that becomes more 
acute when the government is a coalition or enjoys only minority status (Wolf, 1998: 35-6).  
The permanent secretary heading the department controlled by the junior coalition party 
leader, currently Economic Affairs, will be expected to represent that party’s views in any 
officials’ meeting, not just the interests of his/her department.  He or she will also liaise 
closely with the Finance Ministry’s permanent secretary in resolving conflicts that arise in the 
economic field.  But while civil servants may take the lead in consulting across government on 
technical aspects of a proposal, more political negotiations within the executive and with 
parliament are the preserve of ministers. 
 
Coalitions are also reinforced by strong discipline when it comes to voting in the legislature 
(Damgaard, 2000: 247-8).  But while MPs are expected to support the government at the voting 
stage, they expect – and appear to get – a greater input further upstream.  Each week, 
departmental ministers will meet with the relevant spokesperson from their, and/or their 
partner’s, party group in parliament.  This is a means of sharing information and concerns 
between the executive and legislative tiers.  In addition to their role as conduits, party 
spokespeople also take the lead for their party if the portfolio in question is held by the 
coalition partner.  In the absence of junior ministers, the spokespeople thus aid coalition 
management by acting as ministerial ‘shadows’.  They then provide an information flow to 
their ministers through meetings of the whole caucus, which can take place three or four times 
each week.  Strong links are also maintained between the parliamentary groups and the centre 
of government; each week, the chairs of the coalition partners’ caucuses meet with the prime 
minister, other party leaders and the finance minister to discuss coalition business and any 
conflicts that have arisen between the parliamentary groups and the executive. 
 
Ireland 
Under its constitution (Art. 28.4.2), Ireland’s governments serve as united entities, 
underpinned by strong collective cabinet responsibility.  But ministers are expected to restrict 
their activities to their own departments, with only the Taoiseach (prime minister) 
commenting on broader pan-government issues.  The focus of conflict management is seen to 
be the cabinet and, above this level, bilateral meetings between the Taoiseach and Tanaiste 
(deputy prime minister) (Mitchell, 2000: 140).81  The cabinet – which meets weekly – remains 
the key forum for the discussion and debate of important issues, and its decisions must be 
adhered to by the parties although, in recognition of this fact, formal votes are rarely resorted 
to (Mitchell, 1999a).  Some commentators believe that the advent of permanent coalition 
government since 1989 has served to weaken the discipline of collective cabinet government 
(Chubb, 1992).  Others perceive the collective ethos to have weakened during the first 
coalitions in 1948-51 and 1954-57 as ministers construed their loyalty as much to their parties 
as to the government as a whole.  Significantly, it was these administrations that introduced 
                                                     
80 There are some political advisers attached to departments, but these tend to focus on press work or 
on relations with the parties, rather than on coalition management. 
81 The relationship between the Taoiseach and Tanaiste (which post is now, by convention, given to the 
leader of the coalition partner to aid coordination) is crucial.  As an example, the Fianna Fail-Labour 
coalition of 1993 looked strong while the respective party leaders, Albert Reynolds and Dick Spring, 
trusted one another.  But as soon as this bond evaporated, the coalition fell.  Its successor, despite being 
a three party coalition, held together well because the Taoiseach, John Bruton, fully involved the junior 
partners in decision making, extending to consultation on the date of the election.  
 
104
cabinet committees, to compensate for the high degree of ministerial autonomy in decision 
making (Cohan, 1982: 271-2, 276).  But committees are used less than in other European 
countries and, while ad hoc committees are established under coalition conditions to help 
resolve disputes on particular issues, thorny issues still tend to be resolved at cabinet level 
(Connelly and O’Halpin, 1999: 257-8). 
 
The demands of informal management styles under coalition conditions have had some effect 
on the role of cabinet.  During the ‘Rainbow’ coalition (Fine Gael-Labour-Democratic Left) of 
1994-7, much management of the government took place during meetings of the three party 
leaders immediately prior to cabinet.  As a result of such ‘pre-cooking’, levels of discussion in 
cabinet fell with some cabinet members becoming concerned at their detachment from 
decision making.  Meetings of the party leaders before the full cabinet have continued during 
the present coalition, although there is less sense that these sessions channel important issues 
away from cabinet. 
 
Nonetheless, coalition management in Ireland appears to have stuck closely to the 
‘Westminster’ model with relatively few adjustments in the transition from single party rule.  
Coordination tends to be achieved through informal ministerial meetings or occasionally via 
ad hoc committees.  Parties in government, until recently, were happy to subsume their 
identities under that of the government as a whole, reducing the scope for conflict (Farrell, 
1993: 147).  As a result, informal mechanisms of coalition coordination were seen to work 
effectively (Farrell, 1994: 74).  In terms of arenas, coordination takes place primarily within the 
executive (horizontal relations) rather than drawing in parliament (vertical relations).  The 
Irish legislature follows Westminster in according relatively few powers to TDs.  The policy 
role of legislators, unlike their counterparts in Denmark and Germany, is restricted to 
checking unpopular initiatives rather than taking a proactive role in policy development 
(Gallagher, 1999: 194-8). 
 
The levers available for government management at the centre have strengthened, mainly as a 
result of increased capacity in the Taoiseach’s office.  This person, along with the Tanaiste, 
plays the key role in coalition coordination (Farrell, 1994: 81).82  But the formal role of the 
Tanaiste – whose post is statutory – is limited to standing in for the Taoiseach should he be 
away or die in office.  It was only in 1993, when Labour went into government with Fianna 
Fail for the first time, that the deputy’s office gained a more substantial role.  Labour believed 
that its participation in government with Fine Gael between 1982-7 had failed to prevent the 
larger party acting unilaterally at times.  It therefore insisted that the Tanaiste’s office be 
strengthened, by appointing a junior minister plus additional civil servants, and by being sent 
information on all departmental decisions to avoid being bounced.83  The junior minister 
provided an important resource for the Tanaiste (Dick Spring) who was also the Foreign 
Minister, a time consuming post frequently involving overseas trips.  Thus, other Labour 
ministers with complaints about a lack of consultation by Fianna Fail ministers, for example, 
could take their case to Spring’s office rather than burdening the Tanaiste himself.  The junior 
minister acted as Spring’s envoy on government committees and other informal meetings.  
The model was a new departure for government since, as pointed out above, it is only the 
                                                     
82 Note that the Taoiseach plays a particularly important role in policy development across government 
by virtue of his responsibility for the Social Partnership, a medium term economic and social strategy 
involving the government and social partners. 
83 The Tanaiste’s office took no particular policy responsibilities itself, although it did lead ad hoc pieces 
of policy work, on an ethics bill and freedom of information, for example. 
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Taoiseach who is seen to operate outside departmental boundaries (Farrell, 1993: 156-8; 
Mitchell, 2000: 149). 
 
Along with an enhanced role for the Tanaiste, the Fianna Fail-Labour coalition of 1993-4 was 
notable for an attempt to introduce a more formal process of coalition management.  Labour 
wanted a means of exerting more control over decisions made by the government as a whole, 
as well as a mechanism for ensuring compliance with the highly detailed coalition agreement 
signed by the two partners.  Previously, the implementation of coalition agreements had been 
the responsibility of individual ministers, with little recourse available if a partner believed a 
particular minister was dragging his/her heels (Farrell, 1993: 159).  The result was a system of 
‘Programme Managers’, a set of senior figures from inside and outside the civil service 
attached to ministers and tasked with ensuring the implementation of the agreement as well 
as with general coalition coordination.84  Each minister had one Programme Manager – 
although some senior ministers (eg. the Tanaiste) had two – whose responsibility was to 
his/her minister rather than to the department as a whole. 
 
The role of the Programme Managers was to see and exchange information relating to the 
coalition’s activities, to offer a liaison point with each minister and to aid conflict resolution.  
They were intended to make the coalition more dynamic (ie. ensuring the commitments made 
in the agreement were delivered), give the junior partner a greater say in decision making and 
free up the cabinet’s time for strategic issues.  Each partner’s Programme Managers would 
meet in separate caucus on Monday prior to cabinet on Tuesday.  The Taoiseach or Tanaiste’s 
Programme Managers would lead these meetings, having been copied all the cabinet papers.  
The senior Fianna Fail and Labour Programme Managers would then meet with their 
respective party ministers on Tuesday prior to cabinet to brief them and alert them to any 
problems.  The Taoiseach (Albert Reynolds) and Tanaiste (Dick Spring) would then meet 
before cabinet to compare notes based on the reports from the departmental Programme 
Managers.  All the Managers would meet the day after cabinet to be briefed on the decisions 
that ministers had taken.  To ensure that the commitments made in the coalition agreement 
were acted on, the Taoiseach and Tanaiste’s Programme Managers also sat on the Legislation 
Committee, a body also established in 1993 to monitor the progress of draft legislative bills. 
 
Ireland had had experience of political advisers before the introduction of Programme 
Managers, although the reforms introduced a far more political aspect to government 
administration than hitherto.  While Labour chose all their Programme Managers from 
outside the civil service, Fianna Fail – with the exception of one minister – relied on career 
officials.  The pros and cons of both groups are, of course, standard to both single party and 
coalition administrations.  In summary, career officials tend to bring a better appreciation of 
the workings of government85, while political appointees may be less constrained by 
established working methods and more able to engage with a wider set of actors, such as the 
coalition partners’ parliamentary groups and the press.  There is still debate about whether 
                                                     
84 The function of the Programme Managers was distinct from that of the more usual political advisers; 
the former were specifically responsible for the implementation of the coalition agreement, while the 
latter had a broader role in policy formulation within their subject department (Murray and Teahon, 
1997: 43).  In fact, the Fianna Fail-Labour coalition wanted to establish the kind of cabinet system used in 
other European countries alongside the Programme Managers, but this plan was rejected by officials in 
the Taoiseach’s office who opposed the creation of large pools of ministerial advisers (Connelly and 
O’Halpin, 1999: 261). 
85 The Programme Manager to Albert Reynolds, the Taoiseach, had been private secretary to three 
Taoisigh, and was thus particularly knowledgeable about the operation of government. 
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the civil service or political appointees were the more effective.  The Fine Gael-Labour-
Democratic Left coalition that succeeded the Fianna Fail-Labour administration tended to use 
political appointees, although this may merely indicate that even Fine Gael harboured 
suspicion of a civil service seen as being too close to Fianna Fail.  Although Ireland’s civil 
service operates in the same way as the UK’s – officials are permanent and neutral – I would 
have thought it difficult for UK civil servants to operate as the equivalent of Programme 
Managers in a coalition situation.  What is to be avoided in such a situation is for one partner 
to employ the services of civil servants while the other draws on political appointees.  During 
the 1993-4 coalition, Fianna Fail’s Programme Managers, who were almost all civil servants, 
used to work to their own minister, engaged little with the party’s parliamentary group (they 
saw their role as serving the government, not the party) and didn’t deal with the press.  Their 
Labour counterparts, by contrast, met regularly as a group to ensure the party’s overall goals 
were being met, and dealt with the party caucus and the media.86  The different approaches of 
the two teams of Programme Managers resulted in a rather lop-sided arrangement, which 
caused some confusion and generated some tension (O’Halpin, 1996). 
 
The experiment with Programme Managers was seen by external commentators to have 
worked well: studies suggest that the sharing of information, coordination of policy, 
resolution of disputes and activity on the legislative programme all benefited from the reform 
(O’Halpin, 1996; Connelly and O’Halpin, 1999: 261).  Those I spoke to in Dublin suggested 
that the use of Programme Managers brought two benefits in particular: they increased the 
flow of information across government, so that both partners had a better understanding of 
what the other was doing, and they helped to resolve disputes or blockages at a departmental 
level, thus avoiding overburdening the party leaders or cabinet.  While civil servants were 
initially wary of the influx of external appointees, they soon came to value the intermediary 
role the Programme Managers played between ministers and officials (O’Halpin, 1996).  The 
civil servants I spoke to in Dublin were generally supportive of the role that political 
appointees brought to the Programme Manager role; indeed, some ministries regretted the 
curtailing of the reform when a new coalition came to power in 1997, since the level of 
information sharing and coordination across departments declined. 
 
However, Ireland’s first experiment with Programme Managers was not wholly positive.  
Concerns have been raised that their influence and role shifted the locus of decision making 
away from the full cabinet (although some of those involved argue that the effect of the 
Programme Managers was to resolve disputes before cabinet, freeing up the agenda for more 
substantial issues; the fact that the current coalition has retained pre-cabinet meetings of 
Programme Managers and ministerial advisers suggests that such a ‘gatekeeper’ role is 
valuable).  While Programme Managers were intended to focus on management within the 
coalition, some became little more than spin doctors for their minister.  Many also neglected 
relations with the parliamentary groups; the Labour Programme Managers in particular 
attracted some hostility from TDs who felt marginalised in the decision making process 
(Murphy, nd).  Among those I interviewed in Dublin, some felt that the Programme Managers 
over-complicated coalition management, since the more discussion forums existed, the greater 
the opportunities for disputes and vetoes. 
                                                     
86 Access to the media is an important part of coalition management.  Parties in coalition will always 
have one eye on the next election, particularly because their participation in power sharing 
arrangements often opens them up to the charge of watering down their programme for office.  There is 
a great incentive for the partners to court the media and to try to carve out a distinct identity for 




The number of Programme Managers was severely scaled back when the Progressive 
Democrats joined Fianna Fail in coalition after the 1997 election.  While the coalition includes 
a number of ministerial special advisers, there are only two Programme Managers, one each 
for the Taoiseach and Tanaiste.  Their focus remains the implementation of the coalition 
agreement and its management, rather than the everyday business of their minister’s 
department.  Each week, the Programme Managers hold a meeting with all the special 
advisers (on Monday, prior to cabinet on Tuesday) which focuses on issues facing the 
coalition as much as the implementation of its programme.87  The reduction of the Programme 
Managers reflects in part the Progressive Democrats’ concerns over their cost to the public 
purse and a desire for a more low key, informal style to coalition management.  But the more 
limited coalition agreement in 1997 may also have reduced the need for a dedicated delivery 
structure.  In addition, the working relations between ministers are seen to be more trusting 
now than during the Fianna Fail-Labour coalition, in part a reflection of the Progressive 
Democrats’ size in relation to Fianna Fail; being clearly the junior partner and commanding 
only one ministry, there is maybe less pressure for them to be seen to be punching their 
weight across government, as Labour was clearly determined to do in 1993-4 (Murphy, nd).  
At a working level, a manifestation of this is the replacement of formal meetings and 
negotiations during the earlier coalitions with less formal contacts and communication 
between advisers in the current administration.  While a larger pool of Programme Managers 
may be reverted to if the current coalition is replaced at the next election (Mitchell, 2000: 150), 
one lesson from the past is that the number of such figures, as well as their role, needs to be 
tailored to specific circumstances; there is no ideal number or best role for Programme 
Managers. 
 
The strengthening of the Tanaiste’s office, and the deployment of Programme Managers, in 
the 1993-4 coalition was the most serious attempt so far to give a more formal structure to 
coalition management, and to enhance the role of the junior partner.  But the current coalition 
has continued some arrangements to help the junior partner (at only four Dail seats, the 
Progressive Democrats are extremely small).  For example, in order that the party’s sole 
cabinet minister does not feel wholly isolated in cabinet meetings, the party has been allocated 
an additional ‘super minister’ who attends cabinet but without voting rights (Mitchell, 1999a: 
255-6).88  In addition, the Tanaiste’s Programme Manager has an office in the Taoiseach’s 
office, not in the Enterprise ministry where the Tanaiste is based.  This enables the two 
Programme Managers to liaise closely, and also gives the junior partner a stronger voice at the 
centre of government.  Nonetheless, many policy actors believe the larger Tanaiste’s office 
during the earlier coalitions to have been beneficial for the junior coalition partner, and some 
within the Progressive Democrats believe the party should have retained the office to help 
keep it abreast of activities across government.  The junior partner’s limited resources (one 
cabinet minister, two ministers of state, one Programme Manager and one economic adviser) 
mean it sometimes struggles to keep up with what is going on across departments. 
 
Coalition government is also underpinned by arrangements for information sharing, so that 
policy documents from subject departments are now routinely copied to the Taoiseach and 
                                                     
87 The earlier use of Programme Managers was seen to focus too narrowly on delivering the coalition 
agreement rather than on broader issues facing the government (Murphy, nd). 
88 No additional ministers can be created since the Irish constitution limits the total size of the cabinet.  
The appointment of a super minister was also used by the 1994 Fine Gael-Labour-Democratic Left 
coalition to compensate the last for losing a portfolio during negotiations. 
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Tanaiste at the draft stage (Murray and Teahon, 1997: 42).  Formally, Cabinet Office guidelines 
stipulate that draft materials be sent to the Taoiseach’s office and, during periods of coalition 
government, copied also to the other party leaders.  However, the flow of information tends to 
be shaped by the habits of, and relations between, ministers, so that the junior coalition 
partner can sometimes be left out of the decision making loop by virtue of not having seen the 
relevant official papers (Connelly and O’Halpin, 1999: 258). 
 
New Zealand 
The two coalitions (1996-98; 1999-) formed since the first PR election in 1996 have adopted 
very different approaches to coalition management.  The first coalition, between National and 
New Zealand First, bound the parties tightly together through a highly detailed written 
agreement, running to 17,000 words over 65 pages.  While this document flagged up a set of 
policy ‘wins’ for each partner, it also committed them to a number of difficult policy 
compromises.  This was a device to bind together at the outset two partners with 
uncomfortable relations with one another.  As highlighted in Chapter 4, the agreement was 
seen as too prescriptive and allowing too little flexibility to respond to issues as they arose, in 
turn creating tension between the partners. 
 
The coalition agreement also signalled a set of arrangements to ensure the effective 
management of coalition business.  Cabinet papers had to pass through formal consultation 
procedures prior to cabinet.  Ongoing coordination of the coalition would be facilitated by a 
six person Management Committee, with each party contributing three members.  If disputes 
arose between the parties, the matter could be referred by one partner to a special Coalition 
Dispute Committee, comprising the party leader, deputy leader and president of both 
partners.  If agreement could not be reached in this forum, either partner would have the 
option of giving a week’s additional notice before terminating the coalition.  I was told that 
the Dispute Committee only met once during the coalition’s term in office, although the 
Management Committee played a more important role.  The agreement also stipulated that all 
media statements from the government needed to be agreed by the party leaders, and 
committed the coalition parties in the legislature not to support any bill coming from the 
opposition (although it did not make clear what the parties should do if a private member’s 
bill emanated from its own benches, an issue which caused the coalition some problems). 
 
The 1999 coalition agreement was far shorter than three years before (at 500 words).  In part 
this reflected a desire to avoid the impression that the coalition was simply an amalgamation 
of the two partners’ policy programmes.  Rather, a focus on procedural rather than policy 
issues was intended to establish the principle of a unified government.  Again, a coalition 
committee was established – comprising both party leaders along with their deputy leaders 
and chief whips – to provide management of the coalition and a forum for disputes to be 
resolved.  But at the time of my visit, this committee had met only once, its role being more 
symbolic than practical.  Instead, the coalition is coordinated in a fairly typical fashion, with 
ministers liaising bilaterally, followed – in cases of conflict – by discussions involving the two 
chiefs of staff to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and then the involvement of 
the two party leaders themselves.  There is a collegiate forum for coalition management that 
meets more frequently than the full committee, but this is an ad hoc body comprising the 
party leaders and their deputies, along with the two chiefs of staff. 
 
There are two distinctive management features of the current Labour-Alliance coalition.  The 
first is the establishment of formal information sharing channels via ‘Consultation Ministers’.  
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Under this scheme, the minister in each portfolio area is twinned with a minister from the 
coalition partner.89  The portfolio minister must brief his/her consultation minister on 
significant policy developments and appointments (this task is often undertaken by the 
minister’s political adviser).  To enforce this scheme, any submission to the cabinet or cabinet 
committee must be accompanied by a form which details consultation with the appropriate 
minister.  While this arrangement ensures the sharing of information with the junior partner, 
it also allows objections to be made if the portfolio minister proposes a course of action or an 
appointment with which the consultation minister is unhappy.  In these situations, the 
ministers bring the matter to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister’s chiefs of staff.  
If the issue is thought to require consultation with the parliamentary party groups, it is the job 
of the consultation minister to brief his/her party caucus.  The advantage of this scheme – 
similar to the earlier Danish model – is that it allows the junior partner a formal role in 
decision taking in departments it does not control.90  It also allows early notice of decisions; 
although each partner is represented on cabinet sub-committees – to which issues will often 
pass after the consultation process – many decisions have already been taken by the time this 
part of the process is reached.   
 
The downside of the arrangements is their time consuming nature.  The limited policy content 
of the coalition agreement has meant that the coalition partners engage in more day to day 
consultation to resolve political issues than might have been the case with a fuller agreement.  
They also have a commitment to consensual decision making, enshrined in the coalition 
agreement; decision making cannot resort to voting within cabinet.  Yet the time involved in 
consultation means that the requirement to involve the coalition partner is sometimes not 
adhered to.  This is but one example of the potential difficulty in coalition situations of fully 
engaging the partners in decision making at the same time as ensuring that decisions are 
taken promptly where necessary.  Most of my interviews suggested that the pace of decision 
making had slowed somewhat, to take account of the formal consultation procedures.  But 
this was not seen as a problem, since greater consultation often helped improve the quality of 
the policy outputs.  Neither does it seem to prevent rapid decisions being taken where 
necessary, since the parties can, and do, agree to fast track any pressing issue. 
 
The second novel feature of coalition management under the current government is its 
provision for the parties to disagree with one another on key issues; the so called ‘agree to 
disagree’ clause set out in the coalition agreement.  If disagreement between the parties arises 
on an issue deemed by either partner to be vital to its “identity”, and if the coalition 
management committee agreed, the issue could be designated one of “party distinction”.  This 
allows the principle of collective responsibility to be suspended for that issue, and for the 
                                                     
89 The ‘Consultation Ministers’ are, as their name suggests, all ministers, usually with cabinet status.  
This avoids the problem of using members of the parliamentary party.  The use of parliamentary 
spokespeople in coalition consultation is common, particularly for the junior partner if it lacks many 
ministers.  However, it becomes difficult under official confidentiality rules for cabinet papers to be 
shown to members of parliamentary groups.  Such constraints hindered the National-New Zealand 
First coalition between 1996-98.  Spokespeople from the junior partner sometimes complained that they 
weren’t being shown all the relevant papers, but this was often inevitable given that many documents 
were restricted to cabinet members only.  In the current coalition, although it is only ministers that are 
involved in formal consultation arrangements, in practice over-burdened Alliance ministers often use 
their parliamentary spokespeople to assist with advice and recommendations. 
90 Although it also places a great burden on the junior partner whose ministerial pool is far smaller than 
Labour’s.  For example, the Alliance Deputy Prime Minister, Jim Anderton, is Consultation Minister on 
43 portfolio areas. 
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parties to both campaign and vote in parliament on different lines.  The agreement stressed 
that it expected such occasions to be infrequent and, indeed, the clause has only been invoked 
once, over a free trade agreement with Singapore, to which the Alliance objected.  The clause 
is seen as applying to exceptional issues, not the core issues on which the coalition has been 
formed.  In this sense, the ‘agree to disagree’ clause represents a slight watering down of the 
principle of collective responsibility, designed to protect the junior coalition partner, rather 
than any wholesale shift away from the principle of unified government. 
 
Although New Zealand’s current government has established collegiate structures for 
coalition coordination and rules covering the exchange of information, day to day 
management tends to be informal and takes place outside collegiate forums (such as cabinet, 
whose role appears not to have diminished with coalition but which is now the end of the 
decision making chain, with much negotiation and brokerage taking place before the weekly 
meetings).91  Much of the coordination is undertaken by the political advisers attached to each 
minister.  Advisers combine advice on subject policy issues with wider coalition management; 
one adviser suggested to me that the balance between the two tasks works out at, respectively, 
40% and 60% of his time.  Each party’s pool of advisers meets regularly with the chief of staff 
in either the Prime Minister, or Deputy Prime Minister’s office.  They also meet together about 
once a month to review the coalition’s operation: the state of internal communications, any 
bottlenecks within the system and future activities.  The role of advisers around the Prime 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and in the departments, is perhaps the main distinction 
between the current coalition and its predecessor.  The Labour-Alliance coalition has 
developed a more systematic approach to political management, based on networks of 
advisers with knowledge or experience of the government system. 
 
The current coalition also exhibits an interesting balance between centralised and 
decentralised decision making.  On the one hand, the heart of the coalition is the relationship 
between the Labour Prime Minister (Helen Clark), Finance Minister (Michael Cullen) and 
Chief of Staff (Heather Simpson) and the Alliance Deputy Prime Minister (Jim Anderton) and 
his Chief of Staff (Andrew Ladley).  Many of the major decisions are taken within this group, 
and disputes from lower down in the system resolved.  In part this centralised style reflects 
the personalities of the two party leaders.  But it also rests on a belief that, in a political system 
relatively new to power sharing governments, it is imperative to develop effective working 
relations and mutual trust between the parties.  This is clearly much more difficult if decision 
making is conducted in more open forums or large collective bodies, or if it is decentralised to 
individual ministers.  The danger with this strategy is that it cuts out – or appears to cut out – 
other political actors.  And there has been criticism from the wider parties, particularly on the 
Alliance side, of what is perceived to be a small decision making group. 
 
This criticism may have had more validity during the coalition’s early days.  But as it has 
matured and become accustomed to power sharing, and as Alliance ministers and 
backbenchers have got used to government, management has increasingly been devolved to 
individual ministers and their advisers.92  This has removed some of the pressures from the 
                                                     
91 An informal management style is helped by the physical location of ministers and their advisers.  
Unlike in most other western countries, the key government personnel are located in one central 
building adjacent to the parliament, and not in separate departments.  This makes face to face 
consultations and discussions far easier. 
92 Decentralised political management is also facilitated by non-detailed coalition agreements.  The 
more policy is determined at the outset, the greater the subsequent monitoring and control by the 
centre and the lesser the latitude for individual ministers. 
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party leaders’ offices, which has enabled them to move onto more strategic issues and 
resolution of disputes.  The demands made by coalition government are less acute for Helen 
Clark’s office than for Jim Anderton’s office since, as Prime Minister, Clark enjoys the backup 
of the Cabinet Office.  The Deputy Prime Minister’s office, by contrast, consists of a handful of 
advisers; these limited resources strain the ability of the Alliance to respond to all the issues 
they are initially faced with, and sometimes produce a bottleneck in the decision making 
process.  There was some support among my interviewees for increasing the number of 
political advisers in the two coalition leaders’ offices, although expanding these resources 
should clearly not be at the expense of the close personal relations on which much of the 
coalition already hangs. 
 
Decentralised arrangements tend to reduce blockages in the system, but they also make it 
more difficult for each coalition party to keep track of what its ministers are engaged in.  
Alliance consultation ministers, for example, can take decisions without referring them to Jim 
Anderton, but this means that his office has little record of what is being agreed to.  
Concerned by this, the Alliance parliamentary caucus experimented with keeping a register of 
all consultation papers sent to its ministers, but this initiative had not been maintained.  
However, this is not a severe problem for the Alliance, since it holds frequent meetings 
between ministers and MPs which serve as important intra-party information and 
coordination forums. 
 
Civil servants in New Zealand operate to broadly the same system as their counterparts in the 
UK and Ireland; thus, they are involved in policy planning, but not in managing the relations 
between the coalition partners.  However, civil servants have had to change their behaviour 
with the transition to power sharing executives (exacerbated in the case of the current 
coalition by its minority status), notably by becoming more sensitive to the different agendas 
of the coalition partners93, and by factoring in the need for inter-party, not just intra-party, 
consultation.  Civil servants have taken time to adjust to the extra demands that consultation 
requires in coalition situations.  The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) 
has recently introduced monthly meetings of all departmental chief executives (permanent 
secretaries) to provide a forum for communicating to departments the government’s overall 
approach and strategy.  In part, these meetings reflect the centralised style of the coalition 
leaders, although they also reflect the perceived need to give senior civil servants a stronger 
steer on political management within the coalition. 
 
Officials based at the DPMC perform additional roles to support the coalition.  At a basic 
level, they help ensure that formal consultation arrangements are adhered to by checking that 
cabinet and committee papers have been seen by the proper Consultation Ministers.  Within 
the DPMC there is a Policy Advisory Group (PAG) of fourteen civil servants, whose function 
is to provide the Prime Minister with strategic policy advice and options.  But the PAG liaises 
closely with ministers and attends some cabinet committees and, in effect, will provide 
leadership on issues that are causing problems lower down the line.  In other words, civil 
servants in this office continue to work only on policy issues and not on political 
management, but are often used by the Prime Minister’s office to help resolve problems facing 
                                                     
93 My interviews suggested that civil servants were more attuned to the needs of Labour, the senior 
partner, than to the Alliance, the junior partner.  This is perhaps unsurprising among officials used to 




the coalition.  In this way, the DPMC compensates for the small pool of political advisers 
available to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
These arrangements seem to provide adequate mechanisms for consultation and information 
sharing between the coalition partners.  Of more concern to Alliance figures is the strength of 
their party within the government, particularly the extent to which its policy concerns are 
met.  For this reason, there is some pressure from the Alliance for more regular meetings of 
the main collective coordination body, the Coalition Management Committee, which I was 
told has met only once (Labour sees the committee as a forum of last resort in cases of dispute, 
and is not keen to see it meet).  Informal mechanisms tend to privilege the party that controls 
the most ministries and the most senior portfolios, in this case Labour.  Collegiate forums on 
which the parties have equal representation tend to even up bargaining power.   
 
Assessment of coalition management models 
I have summarised the essential features of, and differences between, the various methods of 
coalition management in my study countries in Table 9.  Given the variety of methods by 
which the business of coalition governments is coordinated, how are we to assess their 
relative effectiveness?  This is a difficult task; a model which works well in one political 
system may work less well if transferred to a different system.  What I attempt in this section 
is to identify some of the key specific features of coalition management (eg. the role of cabinet, 
the position of the junior partner), and then compare practice across the study countries 
described above.  This enables me to begin contrasting the different styles of coalition 
management, and to identify some of the strengths and weaknesses associated with each.  The 
aim throughout the discussion is not to identify a single set of arrangements that works ‘best’ 
and that should be aped; more to identify some of the main strengths and weaknesses 
associated with different models of coalition management and to suggest which arrangements 






Table 9: Features of coalition management 
 
 Denmark Germany Ireland New Zealand Scotland Wales 
 
Formal arrangements for 
information sharing 
between the partners 
 
Not beyond normal 
cabinet procedures 
Not beyond normal 
cabinet procedures 
All papers copied to 
Taoiseach and Tanaiste 
All information shared 
with ‘Consultation 
Ministers’ 
All papers copied to First 
Minister and Deputy 
First Minister 
All papers copied to First 





Yes Yes No Yes, but rarely meets No No 
Cabinet as an important 
forum for coalition 
management 
 
No Limited Yes, although conflicts 
managed prior to cabinet 
Yes, although conflicts 
managed prior to cabinet 
Yes, although conflicts 
managed prior to cabinet 
Yes, although conflicts 
managed prior to cabinet 
Coordinating/political 
management role for 
cabinet committees 
 
Mainly concerned with 
policy coordination 
Mainly concerned with 
policy coordination or 
administration 
No Yes, although at a late 
stage in the decision 
making process 
No committees The four committees are 
more concerned with 
policy coordination. 
Coordinating role for civil 
servants or advisers 
 
No Through ‘political’ 
officials 
Through advisers in each 
department and two 
Programme Managers at 
the centre. 
Through advisers in each 
department and teams of 
advisers at the centre. 
Limited coordination 
role played by advisers.  
Numbers limited to 12 




role played by advisers.  
Numbers limited to 6, 
servicing the FM/DFM 
Arrangements for dispute 
resolution 
 
Prime Minister and 
coalition party leader(s) 
Chancellor and Deputy 
Chancellor 
Taoiseach and Tanaiste Prime Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister 
First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister 
First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister 
Special support or resources 
for junior partner 
 
No No Not in current coalition Limited to handful of 
advisers 
No, beyond one adviser No, beyond two advisers 
Formal commitment to 
legislative discipline in the 
coalition agreement 
 
No Yes: Partners commit to 
support each other in the 
legislature 
No No Yes: Partners commit to 
support each other in the 
legislature. 
No 
Relaxation of collective 
principle 
 








In analysing the models identified in my study countries, I employ the different ‘tiers’ for 
coalition management highlighted above, namely: information exchange, inter-ministerial 
coordination, collective structures and dispute resolution (page 93).  In terms of the ‘arenas’ of 
coalition management – within the executive, within and across parties, and between the 
executive and legislature – I limit my comments to the first.  It is important to note, however, 
that coalition management in Denmark and Germany involves parliamentary actors almost as 
much as ministerial ones.  This is less true in Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales – all 
systems in which the executive is dominant over the legislature – and would also be less likely 
at Westminster should coalition government became established in the UK.94 
 
The exchange of information 
The effective functioning of collective coalition governments depends, at the very least, on 
arrangements to ensure that each partner has information on what the other is doing.  How 
far does this involve going beyond the normal cabinet requirement for inter-ministerial 
consultation?  One case that clearly goes beyond the normal cabinet dictates is the current 
New Zealand coalition’s scheme of ‘Consultation Ministers’.  This scheme ensures, for the 
most part, that the junior partner is kept abreast of what is going on in the portfolios over 
which it has no direct responsibility.  It is a response to the perceived inadequacy of normal 
cabinet procedures for information exchange.  Its downside is the amount of information that 
the junior partner must deal with and the demand on resources this makes.  A less stringent 
arrangement is that adopted in Ireland, Scotland and Wales, for all important documents and 
draft policy papers to be copied to both the leader and deputy leader of the coalition.  Even 
this, however, may overload small ministerial offices unless greater resources are made 
available. 
 
In countries with ‘strong’ legislatures, such as Denmark and Germany, the parliamentary 
party groups play a more central support and advisory role for ministers.  They often serve as 
points of contact for ministers from the other coalition partner, in turn reporting back to their 
own ministers on activities within other departments.  The ‘Westminster’ democracies 
typically accord a lesser role to party spokespeople in parliament, although the Alliance party 
in New Zealand uses its MPs in a more proactive way.  This is certainly an alternative model 
to formal information sharing arrangements, although thought would need to be given to the 




The main point to make in this brief section is the extent to which coalition management in all 
my study countries is orientated around informal links between the coalition leaders and 
between individual ministers.  Ultimately, if the coalition parties are ideologically aligned, 
familiar with one another and if relations between the leaders are trustful, there may well be 
little need for additional coordinating or management structures.95  Parties going into 
coalition need to accept that many decisions will be made in closed session by the prime 
                                                     
94 The exception would be if the coalition enjoyed only minority status.  Among my study countries, 
this is currently the case in Denmark and New Zealand whose governments,  spend much of their time 
liaising with their own caucus and the other parties in the legislature. 
95 To give one example, this is the case with the current Fianna Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition in 
Ireland.  As a result, it can afford to rely on slimlined and informal mechanisms to manage and 
coordinate business between the partners.  Less trustful coalitions – for example the 1993-4 Fianna Fail-
Labour government – have compensated by introducing more formal management structures. 
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minister and deputy prime minister; the need for mutual trust and confidence probably 
dictates this.  But it is also important that responsibility for day to day coalition management 
be devolved to departmental ministers; it is not possible to run a coalition from the party 
leaders’ offices.  Ultimately, a balance will have to be struck between the informality of inter-




It is often assumed that, under coalition conditions, the cabinet plays a less important role in 
decision taking.  In part, this reflects the way that cabinet seats are allocated, usually in 
proportion to the parties’ strength in the coalition.  Since small parties may only command 
one or two cabinet seats, their bargaining power may be limited.  To avoid the junior partner 
being outnumbered on key issues96, preliminary decisions are often taken before cabinet, 
either in bilateral meetings between the party leaders or ministers, or through cabinet 
committees or coalition management bodies on which the partners can be more equally 
represented.  Another potential reason why cabinet’s role might be weakened is that decisions 
that need to be agreed between two or more parties may be expected to generate more 
discussion and dissent than those which only need to be agreed within a single party 
executive.  Under multi-party conditions, cabinet meetings clearly cannot accommodate all 
the partners’ concerns, which thus tend to be dealt with in various forums beforehand, 
leaving cabinet free to take decisions and deal with the major issues facing the government. 
 
Collective responsibility is seen to have weakened in Ireland with the advent of coalition 
government in the 1940s and 1960s, whose members sometimes viewed their primary loyalty 
as laying with their party rather than the cabinet as a collective whole.  With recent moves to a 
more overtly ‘political’ style to coalition management – involving a cadre of special advisers 
or Programme Managers – concerns have also been raised that cabinet has been sidelined as a 
discussion and decision making forum.  The role of cabinet may also have been downgraded 
towards the end of the Kohl-led coalitions in Germany during the 1990s, when decision 
making was conducted primarily through small groups of trusted politicians.  In New 
Zealand, contrary to many civil servants’ fears, there appears to have been little waning in the 
role of cabinet with the move to coalition government. 
 
Overall, there is little evidence that coalition government leads to the downgrading of cabinet.  
What it almost certainly entails is a new tier of consultation and deliberation that occurs prior 
to cabinet, to ensure each partners’ concerns are met.  The result of such ‘pre-cooking’ tends to 
be that many ‘second order’ issues are resolved prior to cabinet.  But it is rare for important or 
strategic issues to be settled before cabinet discusses them. 
 
Coalition committees 
It is interesting that among my study countries, the only two that routinely use formal bodies 
to help coalition management are Denmark and Germany, the two with most experience of 
power sharing governments.  In the former, the coalition committee meets regularly and is 
seen by all parties as an important forum for political management.  In the latter, the coalition 
committee is seen more as a sop to the junior partner rather than as an important resource for 
the whole coalition.  This may well be a reflection of the status of the Chancellor and the size 
                                                     
96 Formal votes are rarely taken in cabinet meetings, exceptions to this rule being Finland and, to a 
lesser extent, the Netherlands and Norway (Thiebault, 1993: 83; Burch, 1993: 121-2) or elsewhere only 
on unimportant issues (Laver and Shepsle, 1994: 299). 
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of his office; both give the senior partner ample scope to oversee the coalition without the 
need for additional structures.  New Zealand’s first full coalition – the National-New Zealand 
First administration between 1996-98 – drew on a formal coalition committee that met 
regularly, but its successor makes very scant use of a similar body. 
 
The main function of coalition management committees is to give expression to the principle 
that the partners enjoy equal standing.  The proportionality principle is not the case with 
cabinet, where membership is broadly related to party strength, although it may be applied to 
membership of cabinet sub-committees.  But coalition committees typically comprise equal 
numbers from each partner.  They may also involve wider political actors, notably the 
parliamentary party groups, thus providing a link between the executive and legislature.  The 
main impetus for such formal bodies tends to come from the junior coalition partner, 
concerned that the use of informal coordination and consultation arrangements diminishes its 
say in decision making.  The Liberal Democrats in Scotland were initially in favour of a 
dedicated coalition committee, while the Greens in Germany and the Alliance in New Zealand 
would like existing coalition committees to meet more regularly to give them a stronger say 
across government.   
 
Coalition committees are not, of course, inherently good or bad institutions.  They tend to be 
resisted by the senior coalition partner, and maybe fit less well in ‘Westminster’ democracies 
which tend to place heavy emphasis on the other main collegiate structure, the cabinet.  There 
is also some evidence that coalition committees are a device resorted to when the level of trust 
between coalition partners declines.  When there is a high level of mutual trust between the 
partners, informal mechanisms are likely to be adequate.97  But where relations are wary, the 
partners are more likely to demand formal mechanisms, ranging from a detailed coalition 
agreement to regular meetings of a management committee, to ensure that the other is kept in 
check.  We have seen that low trust coalitions are more likely to resort to formal structures in 
Denmark, where the ‘contact minister’ scheme was devised by the ideologically disparate 
(‘non-connected’, in the theoretical literature) partnership between the left wing Social 
Democrats and the right wing Liberals.  Such formal mechanisms can also be used by small 
parties entering a coalition with a far larger party to ensure it is kept informed about, and has 
an input to, decisions.  This was the Alliance’s rationale for the ‘consultation minister’ scheme 
in New Zealand. 
 
The resolution of disputes 
In countries which make regular use of coalition committees – Denmark and Germany among 
my study countries – one of the functions of these bodies is to act as a forum for the resolution 
of conflict.  As I have already noted, such bodies tend to be forums of last resort, and many 
                                                     
97 Given that the more coalition actors interact and become ‘familiar’ with one another, the more, one 
would assume, they could rely on such informal mechanisms (see Franklin and Mackie, 1983).  Yet 
comparative evidence suggests formal mechanisms (such as the use of written coalition agreements) 
may have increased over time (Chapter Four, page 82).  This may be explained by the increasing 
scrutiny of coalition administrations by the media (Mitchell, 1999: 273-4), fiercer electoral competition 
between the parties (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 277) or simply that past experience is capable of eroding 
trust as well as fostering it (Strøm and Müller, 2000: 577).  Nonetheless, coalition actors need to develop 
understanding of each other through experience in government.  One implication of this is that 
parliamentary terms should be longer rather than shorter.  The four year terms of the Scottish 
Parliament and Welsh Assembly are standard across western Europe.  New Zealand’s three year terms 




disputes will be dealt with by ministers or in meetings of the prime minister and his/her 
deputy.  It is instructive that the National-New Zealand First coalition in New Zealand 
between 1996-98 established a Coalition Dispute Committee which only met once.  Certainly 
this was not due to harmonious relations between the parties, since within two years, the 
coalition had collapsed amid acrimony! 
 
The role of political advisers 
Among my study countries, only in Denmark are political advisers not used in coalition 
management.  Here, political management is the job of ministers, although senior civil 
servants have to be aware of political sensitivities and issues even if they don’t themselves 
formally get involved.  As for the other countries, Ireland and New Zealand operate similar 
systems, in having one or two advisers in each department combined with a handful of 
advisers supporting the prime minister and deputy prime minister.  In Germany, a proportion 
of senior civil service posts are appointed as ‘political officials’ who fulfil much the same role 
as political advisers in Westminster systems, albeit on a larger scale.  One question to ask is 
how many advisers should there be, another one what their role should be.  The experience in 
Ireland and New Zealand suggests that advisers need to be placed within departments (as 
they are not in Scotland and Wales), to allow ministers to liaise easily with other departments 
and to provide a link between ministries and the centre.  Departmental advisers are important 
points of contact as ministers are frequently engaged in other business.  In both Ireland and 
New Zealand, they are important means of maintaining dynamism within the coalition and of 
resolving conflict; relaying solely on ministers for this would induce greater delays in the 
process.  In addition, there needs to be a handful of advisers working on coalition 
management issues at the centre.  In small countries, this number does not need to be large; 
small advisory teams also help develop mutually close relations and trust (although the 
limited pool of coalition advisers at the centre of government in Ireland and New Zealand 
may be slightly too small to fulfil their extensive consultation and management roles).  In a 
larger governmental system, such as the UK’s, the core team would evidently need to be 
larger, although this should not be at the expense of close working relations between 
individuals. 
 
As to their role, advisers should clearly not get into the situation where other important actors 
– such as the parliamentary parties or, indeed, ministers – believe that their role has withered.  
The otherwise successful scheme of Programme Managers in Ireland between 1993-7 suffered 
in this regard.  Advisers can also double up by performing a coalition management function 
in addition to advising ministers on particular policy areas, as in New Zealand.  However, 
again, this might place too much strain on advisers in the UK’s larger governmental system.  
Depending on whether the coalition rests on a detailed policy agreement or not, advisers can 
also play a policing role in ensuring implementation of the coalition partners’ commitments. 
 
The role of party appointees in political management does not mean that civil servants need 
not alter their behaviour.  The fears that coalition situations will lead to the politicisation of 
civil servants – with departmental officials having to take the side of their minister’s party 
against the coalition partner – is not borne out by my interviews.  But, as I pointed out in 
relation to New Zealand, Scotland and Wales, the transition to power sharing executives 
demands a new set of skills and sensitivities on the part of officials.  Nonetheless, the task of 
political management clearly cannot be undertaken by civil servants in countries whose 
officials occupy the permanent and neutral position akin to the UK’s civil service.  Nor is it 
realistic to expect that such a management role will be undertaken by ministers; this may be 
possible in a small country like Denmark – although even here periodic debates take place on 
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the desirability of a formal system of political advisers – but not in a far larger, less personal 
political system.   
 
The role of the junior partner 
Coalition government imposes great strains on all of the parties involved.  The requirements 
for information exchange and consultation are, as I have pointed out, frequently onerous.  
These demands tend to hit the junior party hardest.  For a start, they hold fewer portfolios or 
junior ministerial posts, and thus have fewer personnel to cover the ground.  In addition, 
while the prime ministership normally comes with at least some support in the form of 
officials or advisers in the cabinet office, the deputy prime ministership – assuming such a 
position even exists in statute – normally comes with little or no resources (while the prime 
minister will be primus inter pares, the deputy prime minister in a coalition situation is an 
important position).  
 
Among my study countries, only in Ireland and New Zealand do the deputy coalition leaders 
receive any support in their non-departmental role, and even in these cases, the resources are 
limited to at most a handful of advisers.  The current junior coalition partners in Ireland, the 
Progressive Democrats, actually abolished the Tanaiste’s office established by the 1993-97 
coalitions.  Many within the party now regret this decision, and believe a small team around 
the Tanaiste would help the junior partner make a more active contribution across 
departments.  In Germany, the Greens get no support in the Vice Chancellor’s office (the 
advisers are all allocated to Joschka Fischer in his capacity as Foreign Minister).  Despite 
having pushed for a Green adviser to be placed within the Chancellery, the junior partner gets 
no support from this quarter either.  
 
As a result of its limited resource base, the junior partner often struggles to keep abreast of 
business across government departments.  This weakness can to an extent be alleviated by 
strict arrangements for information sharing, although the sheer bulk of material this entails 
can often swamp the junior partners’ meagre resources.  In Denmark, Germany and to a lesser 
degree New Zealand, the junior partners have attempted to get round these constraints by 
drawing on their parliamentary resources, notably by using their spokespeople to keep tabs 
on subject departments and report back to ministers.  These arrangements are most formalised 
in Denmark, where ministers hold weekly meetings with their partners’ parliamentary 
spokespeople to ensure their party is kept informed of, and can have an input to, important 
decisions. 
 
The advantage of this type of arrangement is that it decentralises information flows and 
decision making to ministers and senior party figures in parliament.  In the absence of this 
support, it may well be necessary to boost the resources available to the junior partner in their 
leader’s office.  Even if parliamentary spokespeople do play a role, it may still be necessary to 
provide the deputy coalition leader with dedicated support; as I stressed above, if there is a 
lynchpin to any coalition, it is the relationship between the prime minister and his/her 
deputy.  While the prime minister will always enjoy greater resources than the deputy prime 
minister, the junior partner will only be able to make a full contribution if its leader can draw 
on an adequate level of support through his/her office.98  This is an argument for at least a 
                                                     
98 One minor, but potentially significant issue, is which departmental portfolio should be taken by the 
leader of the junior partner.  It may be wise for this person to eschew the status that comes with an 
important ministry in favour of a relatively quiet one that allows for time to be spent on governmental, 
rather than departmental, business.  Thus, Dick Spring’s role in coalition management as Tanaiste 
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limited capacity available to the deputy prime minister, although not for a large office of 
officials and advisers.  The only example I have of the latter is Ireland’s experiment with a full 
blown Tanaiste’s office between 1993-97.  While this capacity clearly aided the junior Labour 
coalition partner, it arguably also created confusion among civil servants and voters about 
who was running the government and may have exacerbated the tensions between the 
coalition partners.  What might be more appropriate is to build a small pool of staff around 
the deputy prime minister as can be seen, on a very limited scale, in the current coalitions in 
Ireland and New Zealand. 
 
Coalitions as unified or divided entities? 
The previous sections on coalition management have addressed the question of how 
governments in which two or more parties share power can coordinate their activities and act 
collectively.  There is no doubt that coalitions must act collectively; if nothing else, the basis of 
government in parliamentary democracies rests on the premise that there is always a majority 
in the legislature that either supports or at least tolerates the executive.  But an equally basic 
piece of practical politics cuts across such collective behaviour: governments are only formed 
following elections that are usually fought by parties standing on their own record.  Two or 
more parties may subsume their identities and contest an election under the same banner.  
But, as Chapter 1 showed, such behaviour is very much the exception (although most 
prevalent among incumbent parties campaigning on their record in government). 
 
How, then, do parties reconcile their duty to collective behaviour in government with the 
need to campaign on their own record come election time?  Or, put another way, how do 
parties that have just campaigned on a distinct electoral message agree to join together in 
power sharing arrangements without prompting the charge of ‘selling out’ that message?  As I 
posed the issue at the outset of this chapter, how far do coalitions form a genuine ‘blend’ 
between the constituent parties and how far a less cohesive ‘accommodation’?  This question 
is particularly acute for small parties in coalition situations.  Contrary to the views of many 
commentators, the balance of power within coalitions frequently lies with the larger partner, 
with the smaller partner struggling to gain visibility and seeing its electoral ratings drop.  Far 
from the ‘tail wagging the dog’, the reverse is often the case.  What strategies does the junior 
partner adopt to prevent such declines in fortune? 
 
These questions open up a larger question of party strategy within coalition governments.  I 
pointed out in the previous section the great strain that participation in coalition often makes 
on the junior coalition partner, on account of the limited resources at its command.  Faced 
with this position, junior coalition partners can adopt one of two different forms of behaviour 
within a coalition.  One is to concentrate only on those areas which are particularly important 
to its supporters and on which it is likely to push for portfolio control.  Under this ‘niche’ 
option, the junior partner enters government but does not attempt to play a role across 
government; in this sense it takes the decision to be an ‘unequal’ partner within the coalition.  
The second option is to enter government as a full, or ‘equal’, partner and to demand a say in 
all major policy decisions even on areas where the senior partner holds the portfolio.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                        
between 1993-97 was slightly hindered by his occupancy of the foreign ministry, which demands a 
good deal of time out of the country.  Spring had considered not taking a departmental brief as 
Tanaiste, but could not since the deputy prime minister’s role is strictly limited by the constitution and 
the total number of cabinet posts similarly constrained.  The leader of the junior partner – the Social 
Liberals – in Denmark’s outgoing coalition has deliberately taken a portfolio – Economic Affairs – with 
a relatively light load and few overseas trips to allow her to spend time on coalition management. 
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advantage of the limited strategy is that it concentrates the resources of the junior partner; a 
focus on a few key issues also enables voters to more clearly identify its role and thus its 
achievements.  The disadvantage, of course, is that it is seen to be making only a minor 
contribution to government and is associated with decisions made by its coalition partner (in 
the other portfolios) over which it has very little say. 
 
In practice, junior coalition partners tend to adopt the latter course; they try to play a role 
across government as equal decision partners.  Thus, coalitions in Ireland have tended to 
become more collective in the last decade or so.  My interviews suggested that coalitions in 
the 1970s and 1980s – before the power sharing model became institutionalised and when 
Labour and Fine Gael had to share power if they wanted office – were more accommodations 
between two parties keen to gain power than genuine collectives.  In these situations, each 
party fought fiercely for certain portfolios and drove ‘their’ programme through these 
ministries with less concern paid to the overall strategy and health of the government.  Since 
Fianna Fail entered the coalition game in 1989, there have been more opportunities for multi-
party executives based on common programmes.  But attempts to monitor and have a say in 
decisions across government become more difficult the smaller the junior partner.  The junior 
partner in Ireland’s current coalition government, the Progressive Democrats, only holds one 
senior minister, two junior ministers and one additional TD.  Some of its members that I spoke 
to were keen that the party continued to play a full role across government, while some would 
prefer it to focus on the core issues within the ministries it holds.  Even when junior partners 
do play a cross-government role, they often maximise their identifiability to voters by 
focusing on particular portfolios.  Thus in Germany, the Free Democrats – the junior partner 
in well over half of all post-war coalitions – have usually taken the foreign ministry.  
Denmark’s Social Liberal party usually takes the Education, Culture and Ecclesiastical Affairs 
ministries to reflect their supporters’ policy priorities. 
 
One means by which coalition parties send signals to voters is via the written agreement.  
These are usually made public precisely so that the partners can identify to their supporters 
the way that their policy commitments have been translated into a programme for 
government.99  The absence of a clear policy agreement hinders the parties in this task, as well 
as removing one of the main means by which the junior partner binds in the senior partner.  
Thus, one of the drawbacks of the very limited coalition agreement underpinning the current 
coalition in New Zealand is that it does not allow policy initiatives to be clearly claimed, or 
‘badged’, by the junior partner, the Alliance party.  Although the Alliance oversees four out of 
twenty departments, government programmes are often credited to Labour since it controls 
most of the ministries and therefore makes most of the public announcements.100 
 
The concern of a small party entering a coalition with a larger party may be greater if the 
senior partner is already in government.  For a start, the government machine (officials and 
advisers) has got used to that party and may privilege it even after the election when it forms 
power sharing arrangements with a (new) partner.  To the extent that Labour governed in 
                                                     
99 This was precisely the way that the Welsh Liberal Democrat leader, Mike German, sold the coalition 
with Labour to the party’s autumn conference on 15th October 2000.  The coalition had been negotiated 
in secret, so many of the delegates needed convincing that going into a power sharing executive was 
the best thing for the party. 
100 This lack of identifiability is of greatest concern to junior partners facing stiff electoral competition. 
Thus, the Alliance wants to be seen to be getting more out of the coalition, since its support base is 
being challenged by the Green party who, as it happens, support the – minority – government in 
parliament but without the public opprobrium often directed at those in office. 
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Scotland prior to devolution – through the former Scottish Office – many officials continued to 
treat Labour ministers as ‘the government’ even after the formation of the coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats.  Second, junior parties coming into a government with an incumbent party 
may find it more difficult to show voters that it is making a difference and that business is not 
simply progressing as before.  This was one of the reasons why, in 1996, New Zealand First 
felt it important to secure a set of clear policy ‘wins’ in a formal agreement before entering 
government with the incumbent, National. 
 
Across my study countries, various arrangements are used to allow party differentiation 
within the principle of collective government.  In part these arrangements reflect countries’ 
broader political systems.  Thus, in Germany, ministerial autonomy is stipulated in the 
constitution (Art. 65), with collective cabinet responsibility being rather weaker than 
elsewhere.  In these conditions, it is easier for the junior coalition partner to claim credit for 
initiatives it takes through its portfolios (Müller and Strøm, 1999: 289).  By contrast, in 
Denmark and Ireland, collective cabinet responsibility is far stronger.  In Denmark, despite 
the strong convention of party discipline in the legislature, the junior coalition partner may, 
occasionally, use its MPs to boost its profile by turning a blind eye if they take a different line 
in parliament to the government (at the time of my study visit, some Social Liberal MPs were 
adopting just such a strategy in relation to immigration and refugee issues).  But in general the 
Danish political system allows for no real derogations from collective decisions.  Given this 
rigidity, the only course for a junior partner fearing for its electoral base is to leave 
government prior to elections to minimise the fallout from its position in office (as happened 
with the Centre Democrats in 1996).  
 
Collective responsibility in Ireland tends to be relaxed only rarely, and for legislative or 
referendum votes only on issues of personal morality such as abortion, when free votes are 
provided in the Dail (Mitchell, 2000).  These constraints limit the ability of the junior partner 
to achieve a high profile (Müller and Strøm, 1999: 289; Connelly and O’Halpin, 1999: 262).  In 
addition, the power to comment on matters across departments is, by convention, the 
prerogative of the Taoiseach and is avoided by the Tanaiste.  The pressure on the junior 
partner in coalitions is exacerbated by the tendency for small office-holding parties to perform 
badly at elections (Laver, 1999: 275).   But in recognition of this, they are often given policy 
‘wins’ by the senior partner, in which they are allowed to claim responsibility for a popular 
initiative, or even secure a policy that the senior partner does not favour.  For instance, during 
the three party Rainbow coalition between 1994-97, Fine Gael was opposed to the policy of 
ending water charges but allowed its Labour and the Democratic Left partners to pass this 
issue to assuage their supporters.   
 
New Zealand’s two coalitions since 1996 have adopted radically different approaches to 
collective government.  The National-New Zealand First coalition was built on strong 
collective responsibility.  The coalition agreement expressly forbade the partners from 
supporting any legislative bill introduced by one of the opposition parties, although it did 
allow MPs to campaign on either side of a forthcoming referendum on pensions.  These 
constraints were tempered, though, by the detailed policy content of the agreement, which 
allowed both parties to point out to their supporters how election manifesto pledges had 
followed through into government.  By contrast, the 1999 coalition eschewed a detailed 
agreement, which restricted the parties in presenting the coalition to their supporters.  But it 
incorporated a concession to the collective responsibility principle in the form of its ‘agree to 
disagree’ clause, dealt with above.  This clause applies only to parties and not to ministers; the 
official cabinet guidelines state that it is “unacceptable” for individuals to dissociate 
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themselves from collective decisions.  Given that the clause has only been invoked once, it 
remains to be seen whether it represents a significant concession to partners facing decisions 
they disagree on or merely a device that assuages the fear of party supporters when the 
coalition is being formed. 
 
As I have pointed out, collective cabinet responsibility is usually closely adhered to even 
under coalition conditions, so such opt out clauses are relatively rare.  Where used, they have 
often been a response to power sharing between ideologically disparate parties, such as the 
UK’s National Government in 1932, where the parties agreed to suspend collective 
responsibility (Bogdanor, 1983).  It is thus somewhat surprising to find an opt out clause in 
New Zealand, since the coalition in this case is ideologically close, or ‘connected’. 
 
Conclusion 
The political management of multi-party governments can be achieved in a number of 
different ways.  The most important features of a cohesive and effective coalition, however, 
are the attitudes and behaviour of the key actors; any lack of mutual trust and understanding 
can only partly be compensated for by well designed mechanisms for inter-party 
coordination. 
 
Parties need to begin thinking about political management at the time the coalition is formed.  
The way that portfolios are distributed – involving shared positions with ‘pooled’ ministries 
or shared ministries in adjacent policy issues – can aid coordination, although such devices 
are often more effective in giving each partner a voice in important policy issues. 
 
Coalitions depend on a good flow of essential information between the partners, which 
demands explicit arrangements that go beyond the normal cabinet rules for the exchange of 
papers.  In political systems new to multi-party governments, it may be necessary to institute 
formal procedures for information sharing.  But any such arrangement will almost certainly 
place pressures on the coalition partners, and may require additional resources to be provided 
to enable information to be adequately tracked.  An alternative is for the partners to draw 
more systematically on their parliamentary spokespeople and experts than will probably be 
the case under single party conditions.  Such figures are an important resource for under 
resourced coalition partners and, subject to cabinet confidentiality rules, might be brought 
more fully into the information loop. 
 
Coalition governments almost certainly entail a shift of decision making away from cabinet.  
This body may not be downgraded, but tends rather to become the location for the ratification 
of decisions that have been discussed and negotiated in a host of lower level forums.  Power 
sharing executives may spawn formal coalition committees, although the role of these bodies 
is often limited to dispute resolution.  Generally, coalition business is transacted in more 
informal settings, while formal bodies are often resorted to when trust between the coalition 
partners breaks down and informal relations no longer become effective.  However, in 
principle, coalition committees offer the parties – in particular the junior partner – a means for 
managing a high level range of issues on the basis of equal representation. 
 
Ministers are hard pushed to meet all their departmental responsibilities, let alone spending 
valuable time on coalition management issues.  For this reason, a system of political advisers 
is desirable.  Any pool of coalition advisers should be relatively limited, to allow for good 
personal relations between the individuals involved.  Ideally, too, at least some of the advisers 
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should be located at the departmental level.  While the party leaders need their own resources 
to help them oversee the coalition (this is particularly true for the deputy prime minister, since 
rarely does this figure command any significant resource base), the management model 
should be decentralised to avoid bottlenecks at the centre and to allow individual ministers to 
play a role in coordinating coalition business. 
 
Power sharing governments face a constant task in coordinating relations between the 
partners who will have interests that occasionally or frequently diverge.  Most of the 
management structures I have described work to bring the parties together so that the 
coalition functions more cohesively.  But there is also a role for occasional behaviour that 
breaks such cohesion, ranging from allowing a partner a specific policy ‘win’ to a relaxation of 
collective responsibility on key issues.  The latter are likely to be very difficult for new 
coalitions to manage, although they do allow for flexibility on issues that threaten the very 
survival of a coalition. 
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In this chapter, I look more closely at the strategies used by governments that command only 
a minority of seats in the legislature.  Minority administrations have often suffered a bad 
press.  Within the theoretical literature, they have frequently been treated as aberrations, since 
researchers’ focus has been on how coalitions ‘win’ by securing a majority in the legislature.  
In policy terms, too, minority governments attract criticism, since they are seen to produce 
weak and ineffectual administrations.  This refrain is particularly common in Britain (Birch, 
1984: 98).101  But on each of the five occasions during the twentieth century at which a 
Westminster election failed to deliver a majority for one party, the outcome was a single party 
minority government rather than a majority coalition (Butler, 1986: 36).  This pattern was 
replicated in Wales after the first devolved election in May 1999.  Despite only gaining 47% of 
the seats in the Welsh Assembly, Labour preferred to govern alone rather than form a 
majority coalition with another party.  Ultimately, this approach failed, and a formal coalition 
was negotiated with the Liberal Democrats in October 2000.102 
 
Governments in the UK fall within the ‘majoritarian’ democratic model, one of whose 
characteristics is executive dominance of the legislature (Lijphart, 1999: 10-21).  Our political 
practice and culture may thus deter parties from forming minority administrations, where this 
level of control would not be possible.  However, another country whose political system and 
culture have, traditionally, been majoritarian – New Zealand – not only witnessed a shift from 
majority coalition to minority single party rule after the 1996 election, but also the formation 
of a minority coalition after the 1999 election.  Even where a majoritarian culture is powerful, 
then, minority administrations remain a real possibility.  It is therefore important that policy 
makers in multi-party systems of the type in Scotland and Wales be aware of the governing 
options open to them. 
 
The following sections examine the operation of minority governments in two of my study 
countries.  In particular, I examine the strategies used by such administrations to ensure they 
receive adequate support for their measures in the legislature.  I don’t distinguish between 
single party minority governments and minority coalitions, since the parties’ strategies and 
patterns of behaviour are often the same.  However, coalition governments, which involve 
relations between parties in the executive as well as with other parties in the legislature, 
                                                     
101 Birch’s critique includes the following specific points.  He argues that minority governments (a) 
engage in policy compromises and/or over-production in order to gain parliamentary support for their 
legislation, and (b) weaken the parliamentary principle, since government defeats are no longer 
deemed to be signals of no confidence in the government.  Instead, governments pick and choose which 
defeats they count as being fatal.  As descriptions of minority governments’ behaviour, these points are 
often valid, although note that governments commanding only a slim majority, such as the Major 
administration in Britain between 1992-97, also may accept legislative defeats without resigning.  The 
normative strength of the points is a matter of debate. 
102 The move, from single party minority government, to a majority coalition, reflected in part the 
Labour administration’s frustration at not being able to control business in the legislature (technically, 
as a unified body, the Welsh Assembly is not a ‘legislature’ separate from the ‘executive’, since both 
form part of a corporate whole).  But it also reflected the perception that minority government was 
contributing to policy ‘drift’, and that only a shift to a majority-commanding administration could 
provide the stability, and allow the long term planning, that was required.  One of the consequences of 
the coalition is that the third largest party, Plaid Cymru, has been designated as the official opposition, 
thereby introducing a clearer separation between the executive and legislature. 
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clearly involve a more complex set of interactions than single party minority governments, 
which can focus more squarely on cutting deals in the legislature.   
 
The main sources I draw on in these tasks are Denmark and New Zealand.  Over one third of 
all governments formed in western Europe since 1945 have been minority administrations 
(Müller and Strøm, 2000: 560-1).  However, the tendency towards minority governments 
varies considerably between countries, as Table 10 shows.  Denmark is clearly a prime case 
study, given its long history of minority governments.  I also consider the case of the Labour-
Alliance minority coalition formed in New Zealand in 1999, although for the opposite reason, 
namely the country’s rather limited experience of such administrations since reform of its 
electoral system in 1996. 
 
 
Table 10: Incidence of minority administrations in western Europe, 1945-99 
Source: Müller and Strøm, 2000: 561 
 
 
All governments need to be able to get their legislation passed in parliament (they need to be 
able to ‘win’).  But this may not require governments to hold a majority of seats in the 
legislature.  The theoretical literature has shown how minority governments can reach an 
“effective decision point” if a plurality of votes will suffice to see its measures pass (Strøm, 
1990: 39).  The theoretical literature goes on to point out the conditions under which minority 
administrations may be preferred by the parties.103  Parties may prefer to remain outside 
government, rather than joining a coalition, if being in office would entail taking decisions 
that would alienate their supporters, resulting in punishment at future elections (the 
‘incumbency effect’).  The incentives are increased if governments lack the power to dissolve 
parliament104 and have to share policy making authority with the legislature.  This is the case 
where parliaments are ‘strong’, characterised by limited executive control over the 
parliamentary agenda and strong legislative committees, capable of forcing changes to 
legislation proposed by the executive, and in some cases of initiating legislation themselves.  
                                                     
103 The puzzle for theorists has been to explain why, if a government holds only a minority of seats, the 
opposition parties don’t immediately vote it down and take power themselves.  The challenge has thus 
been to explain the behaviour, not of the party taking office, but of the parties forming the opposition.  
104 Although the constitutional rules in Denmark, which has a high incidence of minority governments, 






































































In other words, minority governments are typically found when the benefits of government 
office are low and where there is a limited “policy influence differential” between the 
executive and legislature (Strøm, 1990: 37-52; Müller and Strøm, 1999: 288).  These conditions 
are not typically found in ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ democracies, such as the UK, 
although the relatively active Scottish Parliament begins to create the conditions in which 
minority administrations might be a rational option for the parties. 
 
Comparative studies suggest that minority governments are most effective in political systems 
characterised by a high level of policy consensus between the parties , such as in Denmark 
(Nousiainen, 1993: 278).  However, analysis of the incidence of minority administrations 
suggests that they are also common in ‘Westminster’ democracies, such as Ireland.  Here, 
minority governments are a response to adversarial party relations and reflect a jockeying for 
electoral advantage of parties trying to secure a majority mandate at a later date; these 
administrations are best described as “imperfect majority party government” (Strøm, 1990: 
90).  What this suggests is that, while minority governments are often formed in adversarial 
conditions, they may require a certain level of consensus in order to operate beyond a short 
term timescale. 
 
Minority governments’ legislative strategy 
In the comparative literature, minority governments are seen to rest on one of two types of 
support (Strøm, 1990: 61-2, 94-6).  The first is where the government is supported by one or 
more parties in a deal negotiated before the government is formed, involving an explicit, 
comprehensive commitment to the government’s policies (‘formal minority governments’).  
The alternative is for the supporting party(ies) to sign up only after the government takes 
office and without a clear written agreement (‘substantive minority governments’).  Under 
formal minority conditions, the government commands effective majority status, except that 
one partner chooses to remain outside the cabinet.  With such guaranteed support, formal 
minority administrations can operate day to day in a fairly straightforward way.  Substantive 
minority governments – the more common model – by contrast, only negotiate legislative 
support once in office, and have a far wider set of options (or constraints) facing them, notably 
on membership consistency (a stable support party or ‘shifting coalitions’ between different 
parties) and duration (short v long term support arrangements) (ibid: 97-9).  It is the choices 
open to substantive minority governments that the following sections focus on.  In particular, 
I examine the option of securing majority support on an issue by issue basis, often with 
different parties, against that of tying one party into a medium term support arrangement, 
which might not guarantee a government continual support, but which provides greater 
stability than ad hoc, or ‘shifting’, majority arrangements. 
 
I don’t address the issue of which arrangements deliver the best rewards for minority 
governments.  This issue has been dealt with in the theoretical literature, and suggests that the 
strategy adopted by a minority government will depend on its strength and level of risk 
aversion.  If a government is ‘strong’ (meaning it enjoys high bargaining power with potential 
partners by virtue, for example, of occupying the centre or ‘median’ position in the ideological 
spectrum, and/or because the executive has high ‘agenda control’ over business in the 
legislature), it is more likely to negotiate majorities on an issue by issue basis.  Such ‘shifting’ 
patterns will tend to maximise its policy payoffs.  If, however, the government is ‘weak’ or 
risk averse, it may maximise its impact by avoiding constant negotiations and instead trying 




Under majority coalition conditions, the ‘action’ occurs primarily between the parties within 
the executive (with the parliamentary party groups involved to a greater or lesser extent).  
Under substantive minority governments, the action shifts to involve opposition parties in the 
legislature, since their support must be gained in order for the government to survive and 
implement policies.  The most pressing concern for minority governments is, of course, to 
protect themselves.  It is hardly surprising that minority governments are more likely than 
majority coalitions to fall through a lack of support in parliament.  Comparative analysis has 
shown that, across 19 countries between 1950-83, between one fifth and one quarter of 
minority governments (single party and coalition) fell due to lack of support in parliament, 
while only one tenth of (minimal winning) majority coalitions terminated at the hands of the 
legislature (Budge and Keman, 1990: 166-8).  What strategies are open to a minority 
government if it wants to avoid such a fate?  Its options are fourfold: 
 
• Find one or more support party(ies) to give the government a majority 
• Limit legislation to that which will at least be tolerated by a majority 
• Accept opposition defeats – up to a point – without resigning  
• Resign if the opposition defeats the government 
 
In practice, the choice is limited to the first three options.  The following sections examine the 
balance adopted by governments in two case studies: Denmark and New Zealand.105  
Minority governments in Denmark have resorted to each of the three options highlighted; 
New Zealand’s minority government since 1999 has limited itself to the first option. 
 
Minority government in Denmark 
Denmark has only once experienced single party majority rule, right at the start of the 
twentieth century.  As Table 10 shows, minority governments are very much the rule; 
moreover, since 1982, all governments have been coalitions, reflecting the fragmentation of the 
party system in the early 1970s (Damgaard, 2000).  The constitutional rules and political 
structures of the Danish system conspire to make minority administrations an attractive 
option for the parties.  The Folketing is a strong legislature, according significant legislative 
powers to the committees; moreover, members can also provide for a popular referendum to 
repeal any legislation by virtue of a majority vote.  There is also no stipulation that incoming 
governments must gain the support of parliament, via an investiture vote.  Finally, Danish 
politics is – or certainly was – characterised by a high level of consensus, which often 
overrides the dictates of left-right political competition (Fitzmaurice, 1986: 263-4, 267). 
 
Minority governments were aided until the 1970s by this cross party consensus, with the 
result that, between 1945-65, almost six in ten bills received unanimous support in the 
parliament.  But since 1973, this proportion has fallen to between one fifth and one third 
(Damgaard, 1992: 44).  Since then, with the exception of the 1993-4 majority coalition, no 
government has been able to secure a legislative majority by the support of a single party 
located adjacent to it in policy space.106  Minority governments have thus been faced with 
attracting either the support of two or more ideologically similar parties, or a single additional 
                                                     
105 Although Ireland has a high incidence of minority governments, the pivotal role in supporting such 
administrations is frequently played by Independent TDs, the price of whose support is often ‘pork 
barrel’ offerings (eg. additional public spending in their constituency) rather than the kind of policy 
negotiations I am interested in here. 
106 Using the placement of parties on a single dimension left-right ideological spectrum (Damgaard, 
2000: Table 7.1). 
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party from a different point on the ideological spectrum.  This has made life more difficult for 
minority governments, and their average duration has fallen since the 1945-70 period 
(Saalfeld, 2001: 12-13). 
 
One of the results of the more stringent conditions post-1973 is that the ‘parliamentary’ basis 
of government has been weakened.  Prior to the 1980s, if a government suffered a defeat in the 
Folketing on an important matter, it would resign.  Since then, governments have accepted 
defeats without these being seen to compromise their position (Damgaard, 1992: 31-3).  The 
series of minority coalitions between 1982-93 headed by Poul Schlüter, for example, were 
frequently defeated in the Folketing; only economic policy issues were designated by the 
government as critical to its programme and on which defeats would be deemed fatal. 
 
This shift in constitutional convention slightly reduces the need for governments to consult 
with opposition groups.  If legislative defeats are deemed to be critical, governments must do 
anything to avoid them, including factoring in the views of key opposition parties when 
preparing initiatives.  If, on the other hand, defeats are not fatal, there is less incentive for pre-
legislative cooperation, although a government will still wish to avoid being defeated since 
this gives the impression of weakness.107  
 
The behaviour of the support parties has also been influenced by the more competitive 
political environment since the mid-1970s.  The higher the level of electoral volatility (that is, 
the shift of voters between parties from one election to the next), the more concerned party 
leaders will be about the future impact of their actions.  If electoral volatility is high, this may 
induce the support parties to avoid long term, binding forms of cooperation in favour of short 
term agreements through which they can maximise their bargaining power (Strøm, 1990: 47).  
This situation is exactly what minority governments have faced since the early 1970s.  As 
electoral competition has increased, governments have found it more difficult to forge cross-
bloc legislative coalitions, but have had to rely more on forming ad hoc alliances with 
whichever party is closest to its stance on the issue in question (Damgaard, 1992: 29; Arter, 
1999: 203-4).108  Thus, during the 1985-6 session, the four party right of centre coalition tended 
to look to the centrist Social Liberals for support on economic policy, but to the Social 
Democrats for support on defence and legal issues (Damgaard and Svensson, 1989: 737).  In 
the previous parliament, policy formulation by the Social Democrat-Social Liberal coalition 
factored in the likely views of the two parties ideologically closest to the coalition.  But within 
                                                     
107 Danish minority governments have one more weapon in their armoury: the right to a dissolution of 
parliament.  This is an important means of ensuring government retains at least some control of the 
legislative agenda, and is used as a threat by minority administrations.  In political systems where 
governments are normally formed with majority support in the legislature, it is appropriate that a 
dissolution be granted only if parliament supports this.  But in Denmark’s case, this would almost 
always preclude a government gaining a dissolution, thus reducing its bargaining power.  In situations 
where legislative strength is highly fragmented between parties, such as in Denmark, it may be 
appropriate for the prime minister to command an absolute right to a dissolution. 
108 The lack of an investiture vote in Denmark aids the formation of minority governments, since it 
means an incoming administration need not gain parliamentary approval prior to taking office.  But it 
also aids ad hoc legislative coalitions since, at the outset, governments are not forced to put forward a 
legislative programme for approval (and can thus bargain support between parties later on) and 
opposition parties are not forced to declare their support for the government (and are thus freer to 
behave in the same way) (Strøm 1990: 110-11).  The implication for policy makers concerned with 
institutional rules is that, if shifting majorities are deemed unsatisfactory on the grounds that they blur 
accountability, governments and opposition parties might be forced to ‘declare their hand’ at the outset 
via an investiture vote. 
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the transport portfolio, the two key centre/centre left parties tended to support the coalition 
when it came to railways, but not on road building projects, for support on which the coalition 
had to travel to the opposite end of the political spectrum to the right wing Conservative 
party. 
 
But this does not mean that minority governments face a constant test of survival.  While the 
degree of shared policy goals between the parties has narrowed, governments and opposition 
parties retain a shared commitment to negotiate and compromise during policy formulation.  
Thus, governments’ legislative programmes tend to be set out at a broad level, and anticipate 
the reaction of opposition parties.  This year’s Finance Bill, for example, included various 
issues where the government indicated it wished to consult more widely.  Beyond specific 
legislative items, there is a widespread view among the parties that, on important issues, the 
majority supporting a measure should be as broad as possible to provide it with greater 
legitimacy.  Governments often try to form ‘oversized’ legislative coalitions rather than 
‘minimal winning’ ones; coalitions that go well beyond the minimum level of support needed 
to give the government a majority. 
 
The main expression of this consensus is the existence of medium to long term agreements 
signed between the parties.  These agreements range from the specific to the general.  At the 
former end of the spectrum, are one year concords over specific measures, notably the budget 
which, as noted above, involves considerable inter-party negotiation before its details are 
worked out.  Parties can also agree on specific measures (eg. an increase in science spending) 
over the timescale of a few years.  More general agreements are also signed on key areas of 
government policy, but without specifying particular initiatives or timescales.  Thus, for the 
last fifteen or so years, six of the main parties have signed an accord on schools policy.109  If 
any government plans a major initiative within one of these areas, all the parties are invited to 
discuss the proposals by the relevant minister.  These agreements provide an important 
source of stability for minority governments. 
 
While broad legislative concords between the government and opposition parties tend to be 
negotiated outside parliament, more detailed discussions take place within the party groups 
in parliament or within standing committees, away from the media glare (Arter, 1999: 219-20).  
The close relationships between party spokespeople on the Folketing’s important 
departmental committees mean that governments usually have good information prior to 
cabinet signing off on whether a particular proposal is likely to gain majority support or not.  
But sometimes it is more difficult to gauge parliamentary approval, and a bill will be 
introduced without the government being clear about its chances.  In these situations, the 
responsible minister will often use his/her civil servants to produce a range of solutions 
compatible with the general thrust of the measure so that compromises can more easily be 
reached with parliament (this might even involve a departmental permanent secretary 
meeting the parliamentary spokespeople from key opposition parties to gauge their positions 
on an issue).  The minister will usually stay out of detailed negotiations, which involve the 
party spokespeople on the committees.  Only if problems arise will ministers tend to get 
involved through bilateral meetings with individual opposition party spokespeople.   
 
I pointed out above the rigorous consultation that any government measure must go through 
in Denmark.  The upshot is that the final legislative output will frequently look very different 
                                                     
109 Other long term agreements have been signed on a number of areas, including refugees, universities, 
industrial policy, the police and the court system. 
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from the original proposal.  Governments then have two options: to accept the amendments 
and support the legislation or to drop the proposal.  Both are slightly unsatisfactory; the first 
may cloud the issue of policy responsibility, the second may stymie policy initiatives.  Danish 
governments thus present an example of a normative difficulty with minority governments, 
that they tend to erode the parliamentary principle, which states that governments take 
responsibility for legislation until they lose the confidence of the legislature.  Instead, 
Denmark’s ‘policy influence differential’ referred to above is reduced almost to nothing, 
making it difficult for voters to identify responsibility for any particular measure (Damgaard 
and Svensson, 1989). 
 
Denmark offers a corrective to those who believe that minority governments cannot deliver 
effective public administration and leadership.  Those I spoke to in government rejected the 
idea that a highly negotiated form of policy making led to a slow decision making process; 
parties are aware of the need to take rapid decisions if need be.  Nonetheless, the high rate of 
government turnover and relative weakness of the executive in Denmark are causes for 
concern among some commentators, since they are believed to encourage short term policy 
making and obscure accountability for voters.  The more that minority governments make 
concessions to the opposition to remain in power, the less easy it is for voters to determine 
who is responsible for which policy decisions (Damgaard, 1992: 49).  It should also be 
remembered that, although the Danish political system has become more competitive and 
adversarial, it retains a high degree of cross-party consensus, certainly by British standards.  
This in part reflects the fact that minority governments are the norm rather than the exception.  
Because governments have a relatively weak hold on power, the parties have an incentive to 
ensure that all have a stake in decision making.  Thus, while governments might fall fairly 
regularly (Denmark’s mean relative cabinet duration is below the European average; Saalfeld, 
2001: 12), a consensual policy making style makes it more likely that their policies will 
continue with any new administration.  This situation is less likely in a country in which 
minority government is the exception; here, minority administrations are more likely to have 
to rely on short term and ad hoc legislative support arrangements to get their business passed. 
 
Minority government in New Zealand 
New Zealand’s political system is closer to the UK’s than is Denmark’s, suggesting that the 
operation of minority government in this context offers a better source of lesson learning.  
New Zealand has had recent experience of minority administrations, since over one third of 
the 1990s was overseen by a minority administration.  However, only one minority 
government has been formed following an election, in 1999, the others being more akin to 
‘failed’ majority governments. 
 
In some ways, even the 1999 minority government was a majority coalition manqué.  After the 
votes were counted on election night, Labour and the Alliance held a wafer thin majority, 
with 63 of parliament’s 120 seats.  There was then a 10 day wait for ‘special votes’ (ballots cast 
outside the voter’s constituency) to be counted, which in the end led to the Greens gaining 
seats, thereby depriving Labour and the Alliance of their overall majority.  But in the 
meantime, Labour and the Alliance had conducted negotiations, produced a coalition 
agreement and had this ratified by their parties.  The new government was formed the day 
before the final tally of seats was known, effectively freezing the Greens out of any 
government formation.  After the coalition agreement had been signed, the Labour leader, 
Helen Clark, held a meeting with her Green counterparts to test their views on possible 
incorporation into the government at a later stage, an option rejected by the Greens.  One 
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interesting point arises from this sequence of events.  Under a proportional electoral system, 
the balance of power between the parties might well be extremely fine, coming down to the 
allocation of a handful of seats.  If the final tally is not known until a week or more after the 
first election results are announced – due to the counting of special votes or recounting ballot 
papers – the government formation process might take place under false conditions and 
effectively lock out a party whose bargaining power is subsequently shown to merit a place at 
the negotiating table.  This is indeed what happened to the Greens in New Zealand, and it 
was only the fact that the Greens were highly ambivalent about participation in government – 
eventually rejecting the offer of places in the coalition – that prevented the bargaining process 
from becoming more controversial.  As it was, the Greens remained frustrated at having been 
ignored by Labour and the Alliance in their coalition negotiations (Boston, 2000: 245-53).  The 
situation in which the parties’ bargaining power alters as late results become known is clearly 
unsatisfactory.  The obvious solution is that ballot counting should proceed far faster than the 
ten days taken in New Zealand.  If the process could be shortened to a few days, it may be 
that the announcement of the result should be delayed until then, to prevent the possibility of 
negotiations beginning under false information. 
 
The Labour-Alliance coalition began life two seats short of an overall majority.  In order to 
provide it with a stable majority in parliament, the government began negotiations with the 
Greens to draw up a formal protocol to define each side’s rights and responsibilities.  This 
written document committed the Greens to support the government on all confidence and 
supply issues, as well as on procedural motions unless contrary notice was given to the 
government in advance.  The coalition, in return, promised to consult with the Greens on 
policy intentions and proposals, although short of providing ministerial briefing papers to 
Green spokespeople.  The coalition also rejected the idea that a Green official be placed in the 
Prime Minister’s office to help coordinate relations between the government and support 
party (Boston, 2000: 270-1).  But although the support party did not gain such procedural 
wins, a formal written protocol would have provided it with a regular input to decision 
making.  Maybe for that reason, the protocol was never signed; speculation suggests that 
Labour wanted to keep its negotiating options open, while the Alliance wanted to avoid any 
situation which boosted the Greens’ standing (since both parties compete to some extent for 
electoral support).  There is also some indication that Labour and Alliance backbenchers 
objected to support arrangements that they felt would give Green MPs greater access to 
ministers than they would themselves enjoy.  As a result, the support arrangements are based 
on an informal government commitment to inform the Greens of its plans and to listen to their 
suggestions (Bale and Damm, forthcoming). 
 
Minority coalitions, as pointed out above, face a dual consultation process, with negotiations 
required both between the coalition partners and also with parties in the legislature.  This can 
make life difficult, if concessions granted within the executive are unacceptable to support 
parties in the legislature or vice versa.  In practice, as with Denmark, consultation with the 
Greens often takes place prior to cabinet so that the government is clear what level of support 
a bill will get before taking a decision.  The coalition is helped by the detailed knowledge the 
partners have of the Greens’ policy goals110 and the high degree of policy congruence that 
exists between the coalition and the Greens.  Irrespective of this, relations between the 
government and the support party in the legislature are tightly managed, with the Labour 
chief whip holding weekly meetings with the Greens’ parliamentary business managers. 
 
                                                     
110 The Greens used to form part of a broad Alliance coalition. 
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The ad hoc nature of the support system might commit the Greens to less, but also delivers a 
lower level of cooperation from the government.  Where there are good links between 
ministers and Green party spokespeople, the support party tends to get well briefed – albeit 
on an issue by issue basis rather than through regular meetings – and its concerns sometimes 
taken on board.  But elsewhere, the Greens complain that decisions are often taken without 
having been the subject of consultation and that policy papers are not made available to party 
spokespeople until they appear in the public domain (Bale and Damm, forthcoming).  The 
party could increase its bargaining power by agreeing to support the government on an issue 
by issue basis and withholding its support if its demands were not met.  But such horse 
trading is inimical to the Greens.  To compensate for this, if the Greens form a support 
arrangement after the next election, they are likely to push far harder for more regular 
meetings with government ministers as well as greater resources.  They might well revisit the 
proposal made in 1999, but rejected by the coalition, of a placement inside the government.  
This arrangement was successfully trialled by the Social Democrat minority government and 
Centre party support in Sweden between 1995-97, whereby a Centre party official was located 
in the Finance Ministry and acted as a liaison between the government and support party 
(Boston, 1998: 82-4).  Such a device might also have helped the operation of the support 
arrangements for Britain’s most recent experience of minority government; the 1977-78 ‘Lib-




Box 2: Britain’s experience with minority government, 1977-78 
 
The minority Labour administration signed an agreement with the Liberal party that provided 
the government with support on confidence and supply.  In return, the Liberals were involved in 
the planning of government business via a dedicated Joint Consultative Committee.  Regular 
bilateral meetings were held between ministers and their Liberal ‘shadows’ and between the 
prime minister and Liberal leader.  The Liberals also gained access to Whitehall documents, thus 
providing them with a high level of information on which to base their decisions.  However, 
neither party was committed to supporting the position of the other (Maor, 1998: 119, 170-71).   
 
While this inter-party machinery looked impressive on paper, the procedures did not work well 
in practice.  In particular, the Joint Consultative Committee, while meeting every two weeks, did 
not prevent disagreements between the two parties.  The Liberal leader at the time, David Steel, 
argued that the ad hoc nature of the committee did not give the parties sufficient incentive to 
reach a collective agreement, and that the forum should have taken the form of a cabinet 
committee in order to require collectivity (Steel, 1980).  Both sides also acknowledged that the 
support party lacked the facilities to engage with Labour as an equal.  The Liberals did not get 
access to all the necessary policy documents from within Whitehall, and had inadequate research 
facilities.  For their part, Labour ministers found the Liberals to lack the facts necessary to make 
effective policy decisions (Hennessy and Masani, 1992: 4). 
 
Steel argued that the arrangements were too ‘top down’ and centred on relations between 
himself, as Liberal leader, and Callaghan, the prime minister.  The parliamentary party groups 
were insufficiently involved; for example they were not asked to sign up to the agreement 
negotiated between the party leaders.  The disaffection of Labour MPs eventually made itself 
clear when they refused to support the Liberals’ commitment to a proportional system for direct 








For the New Zealand government, the key feature of the agreement was to remove the threat 
of a successful no confidence motion and thus provide it with some stability.  It would be 
perfectly possible, of course, for the government, having secured this promise from the 
Greens, to seek ad hoc support from other parties on specific legislative items, depending on 
which other party it could strike the most favourable deal with.  Although the government 
keeps open the option of bargaining with New Zealand First – to maintain the threat to the 
Greens – it has not thus far taken this route.  Generally, the government has done well from 
the support arrangement, since the Greens are in a relatively weak bargaining position.  But 
the need to consult with the support party has slowed down the policy process, to the 
frustration of some ministers.  This is partly the result of the limited size and experience of 
Green MPs, who are not equipped to take decisions promptly.  Resource constraints are also 
felt on the government side, since much of the consultation is are undertaken by the Prime 
Minister’s Chief of Staff, who is also responsible for relations within the coalition.  Minority 
coalitions require greater capacity not just for the support party, but also for the government 
itself. 
 
Overall, the minority arrangements in New Zealand since 1999 have worked reasonably well, 
although the balance of power clearly lies with the government.  In the absence of formalised 
information and bargaining arrangements, consultation with the Greens has relied on the 
attitudes of individual ministers, resulting in an uneven pattern of cooperation from 
department to department.  Unless ministers take a more positive attitude to the support 
party, the Greens are likely to push for a tighter set of consultation procedures.  They may 
even decide that the only way to influence decisions is to take seats at the cabinet table as a 
full member of a coalition executive. 
 
Conclusion 
Minority governments are very common in some countries, particularly those where being 
out of government does not minimise the parties’ ability to influence the policy agenda.  For 
this reason, in Britain minority governments are less likely in multi-party conditions than 
majority coalitions, since there are fewer incentives for parties to remain out of government.  
Nonetheless, minority governments are not necessarily less stable than majority coalitions, 
and can operate effectively in practice. 
 
A minority government will often prefer to form a stable relationship with a single support 
party in the legislature if it can.  This is particularly the case where governments are 
unfamiliar with minority arrangements and/or where relations within the legislature are 
‘confrontational’ rather than ‘consensual’.  While such support arrangements provide the 
government with a de factor majority in the legislature, they do limit its bargaining options 
and often require a high level of cooperation, and maybe compromise, with the support party.  
Less risk adverse governments may opt to form ‘shifting’ coalitions with whichever party 
offers it the best terms for support.  Such a strategy may be required in situations where 
electoral competition is fierce, and where no one party is willing to support the government 
on a long term basis.  While ad hoc coalitions can work well, they probably require at least 
some consensus between the parties and a willingness to compromise with opposition parties.  
It may be that minority governments also need to accept the inevitability of occasional defeats 
in parliament, although this strategy may adversely affect government accountability.  
Whichever option is chosen, coalition management under minority conditions will take place 
as much in the legislature as within the executive. 
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Coalitions are never formed in a vacuum.  The decisions of participants are shaped by past 
patterns of behaviour as well as by the potential implications of their actions in the future.  
The actions of party leaders are constrained by having to factor in the views of a range of 
other actors, such as their parliamentary groups, party members and voters.  Timeframes and 
actors are just two of the variables impinging on coalition behaviour; but territory is also an 
important factor.  In unitary states, executives at the centre rise and fall with little reference to 
patterns of party competition and government formation at other tiers.  But in federal states, 
governments are formed at both the centre and regional levels, with each tier influencing 
decisions taken at the other.111  If this report had been written five years ago, no chapter on the 
sub-national level would have been necessary, since coalitions at Westminster would have 
been shaped only by considerations of party advantage at the centre.  But the devolution of 
power to Scotland and Wales has introduced a new two-way dynamic to government 
formation in the UK.  Henceforth, should Westminster be faced with the possibility of a power 
sharing administration, the decisions of the party leaders would almost certainly be shaped by 
patterns of government formation and operation at the sub-national tier.  Similarly, 
government formation at the sub-national level is influenced by party strategies emanating 
from the centre.  The territorial dimension thus forms an additional set of constraints on 
coalition behaviour. 
 
The following sections briefly examine some of the dynamics of coalition formation and 
operation in a devolved political system.  I consider the relationship between coalitions at the 
sub-national tier and governments – either coalitions or single party administrations – at the 
centre.  Specific topics of interest within this core frame of analysis are: 
 
1. What constraints are placed on sub-national parties by their national party organisations 
when it comes to coalition bargaining? 
2. How far are sub-national coalitions used by parties at the centre as informational devices, 
in particular to gauge public support for certain party configurations as well as the 
internal compatibility of these configurations? 
3. Do sub-national coalitions whose membership is fully or partly congruent with the 
government at the centre operate under particular constraints?  Is the congruent party 
given an advantage over its coalition partner at the sub-national level by virtue of also 
holding power at the centre? 
 
Sub-national coalitions in Germany 
These questions are not simply about the relations between governments at different tiers, 
which raise a far wider set of issues around the distribution of powers and the allocation of 
finance.  They are specifically about the impact that multi-layered polities have on the 
relations between parties in government at different tiers.  The questions I explore in this 
section thus relate to the way coalitions are formed (ie. the constraints imposed on the parties 
as coalition bargainers) and operate (ie. the constraints imposed on the parties in 
                                                     
111 I use ‘regional’ and ‘sub-national’ interchangeably here, although for most of this chapter, I prefer 
the term ‘sub-national’.  While I recognise that Scotland and Wales are nations in their own right, my 
nomenclature is merely a convenient shorthand for distinguishing governments that exist one rung 
down the ladder from the national/central/federal tier. 
 
135
government).  I attempt to shed light on these questions by reference to a case study of 
Germany’s federal system.  Single case studies rarely enable categorical answers to be 
provided to broad analytical questions, since the features identified are often particular to that 
country and may not be generalisable or amenable to cross-national transfer.  So, whereas in 
previous chapters I have been able to compare institutions and practices across countries and 
thus, to a limited extent, to identify generic features, in this chapter, my aim is purely 
descriptive.  That is to say, I take Germany as a case study of how sub-national coalitions 
operate in a highly decentralised political system.  In some ways, Germany is not an ideal case 
study for the UK, since it is clearly a federal state, while the UK was, until recently, a unitary 
(or ‘union’) state and has only recently begun the process of decentralising authority.  But 
given that the function of this chapter is purely descriptive, the choice of a country located at 
the far end of a spectrum along which the UK is now travelling is instructive if for no other 
reason than that it highlights sharply the kind of issues that political actors in the domestic 
setting may well have to grapple with. 
 
My case study draws on interviews conducted at the centre (Berlin) and in one Land, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.  This Land is located in the former East Germany, about 150 miles 
north west of Berlin.  I chose it for three reasons.  First, as a recent member of the Federal 
German Republic (since reunification in 1990), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern might still be 
adapting to the federal system, of which states in the former West Germany have fifty odd 
years of experience.  In other words, coalition formation in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern might 
be expected to show more of the strains arising from membership of a federal system than the 
states of the former West Germany.  The second, and more pertinent, reason was that the 
coalition in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is ‘partially congruent’ with the administration at the 
centre.  I wanted to examine the dynamics of federal-state government relations in a situation 
where one party shares office at both tiers, but with different parties.  This situation gives rise 
to more complex dynamics than those in which the parties at the two tiers are either all 
different (‘incongruent’ membership) or all the same (‘congruent’ membership).  The 
particular question I can explore in a partially congruent situation is whether the congruent 
party – the party in power at both levels, in this case the SPD – is by this fact subject to 
particular tensions or to particular advantages in relation to its sub-national coalition partner.  
The nature of this partner was the third consideration in choosing my Land, since 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is the first case in Germany in which a mainstream party has 
entered government with the former East German communist party, the PDS, which remains 
a pariah party in much of the former West Germany.  This pariah status might, again, be 
expected to produce particular strains within the different tiers of the mainstream coalition 
partner, the SPD, and thus highlight intra-party dynamics in a decentralised political 
system.112 
 
The – rather limited – secondary literature on sub-national coalitions points to several factors 
that influence the coalition behaviour of party actors at the centre and regional tiers.  One set 
of factors relates to the internal organisation of political parties (eg. their degree of 
centralisation or decentralisation), and factors such as career ladders.  Another reflects the 
nature of electoral competition.  Thus, the greater the electoral volatility (variations in party 
                                                     
112 At the time of my study visit to Germany (March/April 2001), the SPD was involved in eleven of 
Germany’s sixteen Länder governments.  In four its partner was the Greens (congruent coalitions), with 
the rest being partially coalitions with the CDU (four Länder), the FDP and the PDS (one Land each).  
The final case is Saxony Arnhalt, where the SPD governs alone as a minority administration, although 
tolerated by the PDS. 
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support across elections) the greater the concern of national party leaders and the higher the 
likelihood that they will try to influence the strategies of their regional arms.  Conversely, the 
greater the electoral localisation (the deviation between voting patterns at sub-national, and 
national, elections), the greater the incentive for regional parties to resist these advances.  
Where electoral competition is both volatile and localised, the conditions will be set for 
conflict between the national and regional arms of the parties (Downs, 1998: 187-218).   
 
These factors reflect considerations of party strength and advantage (although the crucial 
point is that these considerations differ depending on which tier of government they are 
viewed from).  But there is one feature of Germany’s political system that directly links the 
sub-national and national tiers.  This is the Bundesrat, the second parliamentary chamber, 
which consists of members appointed by each Land government.  It is quite common for the 
federal government to control the Bundestag (the lower house) but not the Bundesrat; 
sometimes, the result of just a single Land election can tip the balance of power in the second 
chamber from one side to another, as happened in 1999 when the SPD lost its majority in the 
Bundestag following defeat in state elections in Hesse. 
 
The national party organisations exert pressure, rather than control, over the Länder parties.  
The most recent example of this was in Berlin, where elections in October 2001 gave the SPD 
the option of forming a two party coalition with the PDS or a three party coalition with the 
Greens and the Free Democrats.  The federal party leader, Gerhard Schröder, called for the 
party to shun the PDS, although the formal decision rested with the Land party which, initially 
at least, opted for the course preferred by the Chancellor (although it subsequently turned to 
the PDS when negotiations with the Greens and FDP collapsed).  A similar situation faced the 
SPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern following elections there in 1998.  The ‘grand’ coalition 
between the CDU and SPD, which had ruled since 1994, was again a viable option in 
numerical terms, but not favoured by the Land SPD.  Instead, it preferred a coalition with the 
PDS, until then a ‘pariah’ party in terms of involvement in government.113  But this approach 
was anathema to Schröder who, fearing the weapon it might hand the federal opposition 
parties, put pressure on the Land SPD to remain in coalition with the CDU.  The right of the 
state party to determine for itself its coalition strategy became a fierce issue within the SPD, 
and was only resolved – in the state’s favour – through meetings at the highest level within 
the party.114 
 
But while, in some situations, the coalition choices of a state party may embarrass the federal 
party, in others they prove more useful.  There is a strong bottom-up process of coalition 
learning in Germany, with no change in coalition at the federal level having taken place 
without prior experimentation at the state level (Downs, 1998: 227-9).115  The German system 
thus provides a more fully developed example of the kind of lessons that the national parties 
in Britain could learn from alliances formed at the sub-national level.  Indeed, some 
commentators see the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in Scotland as a testbed for the kind 
of power sharing that some within both parties are keen to pursue at Westminster. 
 
                                                     
113 Although the SPD in Saxony-Arnhalt had been supported in government by the PDS since 1994. 
114 The federal party’s objections to state coalitions with the PDS have waned, in part, because the main 
substantial area of policy disagreement between the two parties – foreign affairs and defence – are 
matters ‘reserved’ to the federal level. 
115 Government at the land level is also an important training ground for future federal politicians.  Both 
the current chancellor and Green leader cut their teeth in state politics. 
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In terms of the operation of coalitions, Germany’s federal system introduces various points of 
tension, but also provides means by which disputes can be resolved.  An obvious source of 
potential tension arises from the asymmetrical nature of national and sub-national electoral 
cycles.  State elections are both frequent – there are sixteen states, only one of which holds its 
election on the same date as the federal tier – and important for the federal parties, since they 
affect the balance of power in the Bundesrat and may well stabilise or destabilise the coalition 
depending on how each partner fares (Roberts, 2000: 107).  State elections in Germany are 
used as barometers of public opinion by the federal parties, in part because Germany’s 
electoral system does not provide for by-elections which would serve the same function.  
Thus, one of the reasons why the FDP switched coalition partner in 1982, from the SPD to the 
CDU/CSU, was a belief – based on state election results – that its fortunes were on the wane 
due to its cooperation with a left of centre party (Broughton and Kirchner, 1986: 83). 
 
But in spite of the significance of sub-national elections, they do not induce the federal 
coalition partners to resort to formal protocols to keep their relations with one another on an 
even keel; rather, the partners observe informal agreements that restrain their behaviour.  
Nonetheless, sub-national elections increase the points at which the federal coalition partners 
may find themselves in electoral competition.116  For example, the need for coalition unity has 
not stopped the Greens from calling for rises in fuel taxation during Land election campaigns, 
a policy anathema to their coalition partners, the SPD. 
 
The day to day interaction between state and federal coalitions is more tricky in Germany 
than in Britain.  For a start, there are more sub-national units: sixteen Land compared to the 
three main units in the UK (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland).  In addition, while the 
Labour government at Westminster is currently faced with two identical partially congruent 
coalitions in Scotland and Wales (both Labour-Liberal Democrat), the SPD-Green coalition in 
Berlin is faced with a far wider range of coalitions in the Länder.  This means that the interests 
of the states vary considerably depending, for example, on whether the coalition in power is 
of the centre right (CDU-FDP) or centre left (SPD-Green).  These variations also affect the 
parties themselves.  The SPD, in power with the Greens at the federal level, may be faced with 
a Land SPD whose participation in government is linked to the right of centre CDU (as is the 
case in Brandenburg and Bremen).  An alternative scenario faces the PDS, which is in coalition 
with the SPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (and provides legislative support to the SPD in 
Saxony-Arnhalt), but in opposition to the same party at the federal level. 
 
The tensions between incongruent coalitions are a matter for the two tiers of government, and 
are worked out either in the Bundesrat117 or through informal channels, such as direct contacts 
between federal ministers and state prime ministers (Ministerpräsidents).  But relations within 
parties also require close management.  The task of ensuring that the Land SPD parties are 
content with the activities of the federal party falls in the first instance to the federal party’s 
chief whip, who frequently meets with SPD deputies in the Bundesrat.  Before each sitting of 
the Bundesrat – usually once or twice a month – the Chancellor will meet with the prime 
                                                     
116 While the SPD and Greens are currently in coalition together in four states, the SPD is in coalition 
with another partner – the CDU, FDP or PDS – in a further six.  Thus, while the SPD may be 
campaigning for a continuation of a coalition congruent with the federal level in some states, it may be 
campaigning for a different coalition configuration in others. 
117 The importance of the Bundesrat means that the agreements signed between coalitions at the Land 
level often include clauses stipulating the agreement of both partners before the state votes in the 
Bundesrat (Sturm, 2000: 119).  In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the coalition agrees on its behaviour in 
the Bundesrat at full cabinet meetings. 
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ministers from SPD-controlled Länder; the party will also involve the prime ministers in 
regular monthly meetings of its Prasidium, the highest of its executive boards.  The Greens 
also involve their state parties in regular meetings with the federal party leadership to ensure 
a common approach to high profile policy issues, such as nuclear power.  Generally, the 
federal government will try to prevent sub-national coalitions voting against its measures in 
the Bundesrat.  However, while the actions of state parties in the Länder may be difficult for 
their federal party offices, especially if the state party pursues different policies to those 
favoured at the federal level, the federal parties cannot impose their will on the sub-national 
tier.118  Partially congruent sub-national coalitions will often be pushed into taking a different 
line from that of the federal government because of the non-congruent partner.  Thus, in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the SPD is pulled to the left by the PDS, while in Bremen and 
other states, it is pulled the opposite way by virtue of its CDU coalition partner.  In these 
situations, the federal government might buy the support of the non-congruent partner via 
extra financial incentives, or this task might be left to the SPD at state level. 
 
Within coalitions at the Land level, are the dynamics between the parties altered if one is 
simultaneously in coalition at the federal level (ie. a partially congruent situation)?  For 
instance, does the SPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern have an advantage over its coalition 
partner, the PDS, by virtue of also being in coalition – with the Greens this time – at the 
federal level?  In decentralised political systems in which the activities of the federal and 
regional tiers overlap strongly (“interlocking federalism” in Germany; Sturm, 2000), such a 
possibility might arise, since the interests of the states are highly affected by the activities of 
the federal government.  Indeed, some of the political actors I spoke to in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern agreed that SPD ministers did have an advantage over their PDS counterparts 
by virtue of gaining early warning of upcoming federal government initiatives.  The PDS has 
minimised their disadvantage, however, by using their Bundestag members to keep the Land 
party informed of federal activities (and since all matters affecting the Länder go before the 
Bundesrat, for which the PDS ministers are sent all the relevant papers, this forum, too, helps 
the non-congruent party keep abreast of developments).  In other words, the advantage that 
can be gained in an interlocking federal system by one coalition partner in office at both tiers 
can be counter-balanced by virtue of institutions – such as regional representation in the 
Bundesrat – that reflect the interlocking distribution of responsibilities. 
 
Finally, and interestingly in the context of devolution in the UK where the division of power 
between tiers remains a contentious issue, tension between the Land coalition partners is 
sometimes caused by issues that are ‘reserved’ to the centre.  In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
the SPD and PDS have had public disagreements on issues of internal security and foreign 
and defence policy, none of which falls within the competence of the Länder.   
 
Sub-national coalitions in the UK  
Parties at the Land level experience various constraints from the centre when it comes to 
coalition formation.  The subsequent operation of sub-national coalitions also involves 
constant interaction with the federal government, which necessitates negotiation and 
compromise at both levels.  These interactions are all conducted in the context of Germany’s 
relatively mature federal system.  Decentralisation in the UK is of more recent vintage, and 
the nature of the interactions between national and sub-national party and governmental tiers 
                                                     
118 Thus, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the CDU has tacked to the centre in order to enhance its appeal 
to voters.  Its emphasis on non-market mechanisms irritated Helmut Kohl when he was chancellor, but 
the federal CDU had to respect the decisions of its Land party. 
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– and the constraints each imposes on the other – are not yet clear.  A few early observations 
can, however, be made. 
 
It is clear that, while the Edinburgh coalition was ‘made in Scotland’, its formation was 
watched closely, and indeed shaped, by party leaders at the centre.  For example, although the 
Liberal Democrat leader, Paddy Ashdown, was clear that the centre did not have a role in the 
negotiations, he sent an aide to Edinburgh to keep him informed of progress (the aide 
subsequently assumed a key role in the party’s negotiating team).  The central party leaders 
also played a key role in resolving the principal area of dispute between the negotiating 
parties, on university tuition fees.  There were extensive conversations between the Prime 
Minister and Liberal Democrat leader on this issue; indeed, the eventual compromise was 
largely brokered at the national level (Ashdown, 2001: 439-58). 
 
As might be expected given the recent transition from a unitary state to a decentralised one, 
some pressure is exerted from Westminster on Labour ministers in Scotland to pursue policies 
commensurate with those in England and Wales, while Liberal Democrat ministers can afford 
to be more relaxed about these constraints.119  Yet constraints have also flowed the other way, 
so that the Labour government at Westminster has had to take account of Scotland’s policy 
priorities and coalition sensitivities when framing its legislation.  A good example of this is 
the line taken by the Home Office on freedom of information, which remained relaxed about 
the more liberal provisions made in Scotland by the Liberal Democrats (who control the 
justice portfolio), since these provisions were a key policy priority of the junior coalition 
partner. 
 
To the extent that tension has existed in the early relations between sub-national and national 
tiers of government, these appear to have had more to do with devolution itself than with the 
complexities of coalition government.  But one event in a multi-tiered polity that might be 
expected to have implications for coalition government is an election.  The electoral cycles for 
Scotland and Wales are not coterminous with that for Westminster.  Thus, at the mid-point of 
the devolved governments’ first terms, in June 2001, the coalition partners faced a 
Westminster election in which they competed with one another.  The official guidance issued 
by the Scottish Executive indicated that the operation of the devolved administration should 
continue with as little disruption as possible.  But the political imperatives of two coalition 
partners campaigning on distinct platforms meant that government in Scotland was reduced 




I have suggested throughout this report that the dynamics of coalition formation and 
operation do not exist in a vacuum, but are highly dependent on the nature of the wider 
political system.  One key aspect of this system is whether it is unitary or federal in nature.  
Decentralised systems introduce a new set of constraints and opportunities for coalitions at 
the central and regional levels.  The specific nature of these dynamics in the UK’s context 
remain to be seen, although their broad outline can be gleaned by reference to more mature 
federal systems elsewhere. 
                                                     
119 Variations between the parties may also result from their different internal structures, with the 
Liberal Democrats an internally federal party, while Labour has a more centralised organisation. 
120 Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of Devolution, Quarterly monitoring report in Scotland, August 




Using Germany as a test case, it appears that sub-national coalition formation rarely escapes 
at least some constraints being imposed from the centre.  On the other hand, regional parties 
will often try to assert their autonomy, particularly if electoral competition revolves around a 
sub-national set of issues.  This need not be a wholly negative feature for the parties at the 
centre, since they can use coalition configurations at the sub-national level to inform their own 
coalition strategies.  Nonetheless, while devolved political systems require forums for 
governments at different tiers to interact (the Bundesrat in Germany; the Joint Ministerial 
Council in the UK), so coalitions at different tiers require forums for interaction within the 
parties.  The range of bodies that bring together the federal and state ‘arms’ within the 
German parties is testament to this. 
 
Relations between coalition partners may become more difficult around elections, particularly 
if there are coalitions at both national and sub-national level with differing memberships 
(‘incongruent’ coalitions).  Thus far, conditions in the UK have been relatively benign, since 
the two coalitions in Scotland and Wales share the same partners, and are ‘partially 
congruent’ with the centre.  But should coalitions become the norm at Westminster, these 








I conducted around 70 interviews for this project, as follows: 
 
Scotland, 6-7th July 2000 
Margaret Curran MSP Member for Glasgow Baillieston (Labour) 
Ross Finnie MSP  Minister for Rural Affairs (Liberal Democrat) 
Brian Fitzpatrick  Head, Labour Policy Unit 
Sam Ghibaldan  Chief of Staff to the Deputy First Minister 
Robert Graham  Head of the Executive Secretariat 
Willie Rennie   Head of the Liberal Democrat Parliamentary Staff 
 
Ireland, 4-8th December 2000 
Alan Dukes TD  Former leader of Fine Gael 
Liz O’Donnell TD  Minister of State, Department of Foreign Affairs (Progressive 
 Democrat) 
Dr Maurice Roche  Economic Adviser to the Tanaiste 
Greg Sparks   Programme Manager to the Tanaiste, 1992-97 
Tom Kitt TD Minister of State, Department of Enterprise, Trade and  
  Employment (Fianna Fail) 
Frank Murray   Civil Service Commissioner; former Secretary General to the 
  Government  
Dick Spring TD  Former leader of the Labour party, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
  and Tanaiste 
Dermot McCarthy  Secretary General to the Government 
Paddy Teahon   Former Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach 
Martin Cullen TD  Minister of State, Department of Finance (Fianna Fail) 
Katherine Bulbulia  Programme Manager to the Tanaiste 
Michael Laver   Professor of Politics, Trinity College Dublin 
Jim O’Donnell   Secretary to the All Party Parliamentary Commission on the 
  Constitution 
Gerry Hickey   Programme Manager to the Taoiseach 
 
Wales, 12th January 2001 
Anonymous    Executive Secretariat, National Assembly for Wales 
 
Germany (Berlin), 12-16th March 2001 
Dr Jean Angelov  Special Adviser on Home Affairs, CDU Head Office 
Rheinhard Bütikofer  General Secretary, Green Party 
Michael Donnermeyer Chief Press Spokesman, SPD Head Office 
Andrea Fischer MdB  Minister for Health, 1998-2001 
Kristian Gaiser  Head of West European Desk, SPD Head Office 
Gert Olav Göhs  Special Adviser on Foreign Policy, CDU Head Office 
Peter Hintze MdB  General Secretary, CDU, 1992-98 
Joachim Hörster MdB  Chief Whip, CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, 1994-98 
Andreas Kuhlmann  Adviser to General Secretary, SPD Head Office 
Wolfgang Nowak  Head of Policy Planning Unit, Federal Chancellery 
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Dr Wolfgang Schäuble Head of Federal Chancellery, 1984-89; Minister of Interior, 1989 
  91; Chairman of CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, 1991-2000 
Wilhelm Schmidt MdB Chief Whip, SPD Parliamentary Group 
 
Germany (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), 2nd-5th April 2001 
Sylvia Bretschneider MdL Vice Chair, SPD parliamentary group 
Professor Rolf Eggert   Minister of Economy (SPD) 
Angelika Gramcow MdL Leader, PDS parliamentary group 
Helmut Holter MdL Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Labour and Construction 
  (PDS) 
Sigrid Keler MdL  Finance Minister (SPD) 
Hinrich Kuessner MdL President of the Landtag; former Minister of Social Affairs and 
  Deputy Prime Minister 
Professor Wolfgang   Minister for the Environment (PDS) 
  Methling MdL 
Volker Schlotmann MdL Chairman, SPD parliamentary group 
Steffie Schnoor MdL  Leader, state CDU; former Culture minister 
Dr Christian Westphal Coordinator of Affairs for the Deputy Prime Minister 
Dr Pirko Zinnow  Chief Political Analyst, State Chancellery 
 
Written comments were also provided by: 
Dr Frank Tidick  Head of the State Chancellery 
Nikolaus Voss   Head of Land-Federal Relations Office, State Chancellery 
 
New Zealand, 30th April – 4th May 2001 
Nathalie Baird   Senior Legal Adviser, Cabinet Office 
Rick Barker MP  Senior Government Whip (Labour) 
Professor Jonathan Boston Victoria University of Wellington 
Rod Donald MP  Co-Leader, Green Party 
Hon Brian Donnelly MP Associate Minister for Education, 1996-98 (New Zealand First) 
Chris Eichbaum  Senior Adviser, Minister for Social Services and Employment 
Hon Bill English MP  Deputy Leader, National Party; Minister of Health, 1996-99 
Grant Gillan MP  Alliance Senior Whip 
Hon Laila Harré MP  Minister for Women’s Affairs (Alliance) 
Dr Peter Harris  Economic Adviser, Minister of Finance 
Colin James   Political columnist, New Zealand Herald 
Hon Doug Kidd MP  Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1996-99 
Dr Andrew Ladley  Chief of Staff, Deputy Prime Minister’s Office 
Dr Mark Prebble  Chief Executive, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Marie Shroff   Secretary of the Cabinet 
Heather Simpson  Chief of Staff, Prime Minister’s Office 
Hon Roger Sowry MP Shadow Leader of the House, Minister of Social Welfare, 1996-99 
  (National) 
Mary-Anne Thompson Deputy Chief Executive and Head of the Policy Advisory 
  Group, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
 
Denmark, 10-14th September 2001 
Elisabeth Arnold MP  Parliamentary spokesperson, Social Liberal party 
Eric Damgaard Professor of Political Science, University of Aarhus 
Camilla Hersom Head of Section, Public Management Division, Ministry of 
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  Finance 
Sonja Mikkelsen MP  Minister of Transport, 1998-2000; Minister of Health, 2000 (Social 
  Democrat) 
Jan Petersen MP   Chairman, Social Democrat parliamentary group 
Torben Sorensen  Office of the Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office 
Margrethe Vestager MP Minister of Education (Social Liberal) 
Adam Wolf Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance; former 
  Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1991-5 
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